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STRENGTH IN NUMBERS - THE IMPACT OF TRADE UNION MERGERS 
ON TRADE UNION POWER - Richard John Gartside, Doctorate of Philosophy, July
1999
Hitherto much of the academic research on trade union mergers has concentrated on an 
explanation of the growth of mergers or the link between merger activity and the 
business cycle. In this study an attempt is made to explain the effects of union mergers, 
in particular on trade union power. In so doing, the consequences of mergers in relation 
to organisation post-merger, change management, collective bargaining agenda and 
outcomes and membership services are all investigated.
Three distinct methods of research have been applied in the study. An extensive 
questionnaire survey has been conducted and evidence collected from practitioners in 
employee relations from both public and private sectors, employers and the unions. The 
findings were supplemented with follow-up interviews in which key respondents were 
questioned in depth on their experiences of merger. The evidence was collated in 
conjunction with two independent case studies, involving different economic sectors 
and types of merger, where the mechanisms under which the merger was organised and 
the outcomes of the merger were examined in more detail.
The evidence was assessed in relation to a the relevant academic literature on mergers 
and power and a model for union power which attempted to isolate the effects of 
mergers on power. An unintended outcome of the research was that an investigation of 
the link between merger activity and the concepts of strength in numbers and economies 
of scale was conducted alongside an examination of the degree to which involvement 
merger activity legitimised a review of organisational efficiency with the union.
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1. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This study investigates the consequences of the growth in mergers amongst trade unions. It 
is conventional wisdom that unions which engage in mergers, pooling their resources and 
releasing economies of scale, become more powerful and serve their members’ more 
efficiently. The notion that unions truly achieve a strength in numbers, through pursuing a 
strategy for growth based around mergers and amalgamations, will be examined in relation 
to union structure and collective bargaining with a view to determining the impact of 
mergers on trade union power.
Given that the merger activity of trade unions has not been neglected by academics, 
particularly during the 1980s, it is perhaps surprising that, hitherto, studies have preferred to 
investigate the reasons for mergers rather than the consequences. It is to be hoped therefore 
that Ihis study can add something new to the studies of union merger and reinvigorate, the 
debate. The interest in, and prevalence of, merger activity amongst trade unions has shown 
no sign of abating during the 1990s.
The research conducted for this study involved three distinct methods. An extensive survey 
of practitioners in employee relations from employers and trade unions in the public and 
private sector was conducted, in conjunction with follow-up interviews in which 
respondents were asked to elaborate on (and to justify) their responses. The research was 
supplemented by two case studies involving different mergers in different sectors which 
aimed to control for any subjectivity residing in the findings of the initial research by
allowing for the views of an independent observer to be taken into account. Moreover, case 
studies allowed the dynamics of the merger process to be taken into account by delivering a 
mechanism by which the development of the merger over time could be studied in a way 
that a static survey response could not.
The study concluded that on a number of counts the growth in mergers had had some 
impact on trade union power, both in relation to bargaining and organisation. It also 
concluded that the consequences of the merger stemmed from two distinct facets of the 
merger. There is a direct impact through the growth or stabihty of union members or 
resources and a secondary impact, whereby the merger unfroze the union’s reluctance to 
rationalise through an organisational and structural review. In generating a focus for 
organisational change within the union, there was some evidence that the merger acted as a 
catalyst for an efficiency reviews which stemmed beyond the immediate and direct confines 
of the merger.
Not unsurprisingly, the study indicated that an accurate assessment of union power and 
power relations is very difficult. Given the number of potential determinants of union 
power, it is extremely difficult to isolate the effects of a single deteiminant. More work 
needs to be conducted in generating a workable model for union power that, whilst allowing 
for a range of interrelated determinants, can be apphed in practice. It is to be hoped that in 
some way this study, in addition to refocusing the debate on union mergers per se, can also 
contribute to an investigation of the determinants of union power and how they can be 
measured.
The thesis is set out in five parts beginning with the academic hterature relating to the study. 
Given that the investigation is primarily a study of trade union mergers the hterature 
relating to merger theory is outlined. Where there are conclusions that have an impact on 
the thesis, particularly for example in the classification of mergers, this is reviewed in some 
detail. The notion of power is important in the study and consideration of the hterature 
relating to power theory forms the next section of the thesis. Where authors have directed 
their studies towards a robust definition of the concept of power this is discussed in relation 
to trade unions and the bargaining environment. Where research on cohective bargaining 
has been conducted to identify the major components and determinants of union power 
these are examined and apphed. In both cases, hterature going back to the 1960s firom both 
the UK and abroad, has been included.
A brief overview of trade union mergers during the period covered by the study is included 
in the next section. This wih describe the mergers which occurred in the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s, as weU as placing them in the economic and political environment of the period, 
indicating where necessary, developments which had a notable impact on merger activity. 
In the next section. The results of the research are necessarily covered in some detail in the 
third section and they are preceded with a brief summary. The range of issues, under 
examination and the variety of different sectors and organisations which submitted 
information demanded that adequate space was allocated to investigating the different 
responses fi*om within and between unions and employers operating in different sectors and 
industries. Lastly, in the final section of the thesis, the findings of the research are collated 
and evaluated. The degree to which trade union power has been affected by mergers, either
directly or through legitimising a review programme, are considered in relation to a range of 
mergers and different industries. The question of whether the dramatic increase in trade a 
range of mergers over the last decade or so has benefited union members, either in terms of 
the services they enjoy or through the enhanced performance of their unions in collective 
bargaining, is considered.
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2. A MERGER INVESTIGATION... - INTRODUCTION
One of the most dramatic changes in trade union organisation in the last twenty years has 
come through the quickening pace of mergers and affiliations. In 1978 there were one 
hundred and twelve trade unions affiliated to the TUC and by 1994 the total was down to 
just sixty nine. Since then, mergers have continued to have a substantial impact upon trade 
unions, the way in which they are structured and the basis on which they represent their 
members. Manual employees in the postal and telecommunications industries are now 
represented by a single organisation as are middle management and staff throughout the 
civil service. Seamen and railway staff are in the same organisation and so are electricians 
and engineers. There is speculation that by the end of the year a single organisation wUl 
represent staff in all the major clearing banks. The idea that the labour movement may be 
moving towards an organisation based on so-called “super-unions”, each representing a 
range of occupations and grades of employee, has gained som e credence. The days of a 
wide variety of different unions representing members in different trades and occupations 
separately have long gone. Robert Taylor (1993) has noted that in 1993 just five of the 
unions affiliated to the TUC accounted for sixty two per cent of its membership.
The conventional wisdom is that as unions have increased their size through mergers they 
have similarly increased their power and efficiency. The notion that union mergers have 
dehvered strength in numbers is an attractive one given that unions have pursued the merger 
strategy in a proactive and calculated way in recent years. Although there are fewer unions
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as a result of mergers, it is argued that those that remain have more members across a wider 
number of economic sectors. It is easy to be persuaded that more members (and access to 
even more members) has delivered an increase in union power concentrated amongst fewer 
organisations. Yet how true is this? Have mergers led to an increase in union power? Is it in 
fact the case that in securing a larger membership base unions have realised a strength in 
numbers'^
i  1Despite the growth in mergers and amalgamations within the labour movement, and 
although academics and commentators have investigated the phenomenon and sought to 
explain its causes, the consequences of the growth in merger activity has been neglected.  ^
Where research has been conducted it has concentrated on studying mergers within their 
historical economic context and on investigating the factors which influence the propensity 
of unions to merge or affiliate. In analysing periods of intense merger activity, 
commentators such as Waddington (1995), Undy et al (1981) and Biichanen (1981), have 
all sought to isolate the key determinants of trade union mergers with a view to explaining 
the economic climate in which mergers flourish. Academics have argued about the degree 
to which mergers are the result of an expansionist policy adopted by some key unions
seeking to widen their influence and break into new areas of representation when their_
competitor unions are faced with declining levels of membership. Alternatively, mergers 
have been explained as the rational process by which unions respond to hostile economic 
and/or pohtical environments, behaving like employers in seeking to weather a storm by 
pooling resources and exploiting economies of scale.
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This study contributes to the academic research and debate surrounding trade union mergers 
by examining the impact of mergers on trade union power. In short, to concentrate upon the 
degree to which trade unions have become more powerful and extended their influence as a 
result of engaging in merger activity. The study examines the impact of a merger on power 
through direct organisational factors such as realisation of economies of scale post-merger, 
increasing the membership and resources within a single organisation, as well as those 
arising indirectly from the extent to which the merger facihtates an efficiency review across 
new organisation. In effect the merger may be a Trojan Horse for conducting an efficiency 
review in organisations that have traditionally been opposed to notions of organisational 
review and structural efficiency unlike their business counterparts.
So whilst hitherto, studies of union mergers have sought to isolate and measure the relative 
merits of internal and external factors on union mergers, this study has sought to measure 
the external consequences of a merger and examine their contribution to union power. 
Although the study highhghts some of the internal consequences of involvement in a 
merger these have largely been downplayed during the study. There are two reasons for this: 
Firstly, internal factors are relatively unimportant influences on the economy and bargaining 
agenda compared with external factors. Secondly, a focus on internal factors n%y eveo 
contribute to a misleading picture. For example the position of an individual union official 
may ^pear more powerful with wider post merger responsibihty but this may, in effect, 
mask the fact that the wider responsibihty means less contact with activists and a growth in 
workload which will lead to a net reduction in power and influence.
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The question of the degree to which merger activity impacts externally on union power 
seems important for three primary reasons. Firstly, an investigation of mergers and union 
power will assist in describing the economic and political consequences of union merger 
activity and its effects on the relative standing and influence of social partners. Of course 
merger activity may be only one of several interrelated factors that may have an impact in 
this area but, nevertheless, one which has remained relatively neglected in academic 
research.
Secondly, a smdy of this nature will be able to describe some of the mechanisms and stages 
by which a merger occurs and the impact this can have on the outcome of the merger. 
Finally, a study of the consequences of union merger can contribute to a debate on whether 
or not individual union members benefit fi-om the involvement of their union in a merger. 
The degree to which individual union members, those who have voted for mergers on the 
understanding that it will benefit them in some concrete way, have actually improved their 
position as a result of the merger, is an interesting question (particularly given that 
generally, merger initiatives seem to be ratified by substantial majorities in participating 
unions). In investigating the consequences of mergers, it is hoped that the study will make a 
significant contribution to the debate on union mergers and fill a significant gap in the 
research.
Union mergers are difficult to investigate which is perhaps why studies of mergers, 
particularly the consequences of mergers, have been neglected. There are several key 
problems with a project of this sort both in terms of the conceptual firamework of the study
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and the measurement of factors within it. The conceptual framework of the study rehes on a 
workable definition of power and a method of measuring trade union power and changes in 
trade union power. There has been a significant debate surrounding the definition of power 
and the frnmework within which it operates. This debate is summarised later in this study 
and it is clear that there is no general agreement on how power should be defined and hence 
no consensus on how it should be measured. This problem is amplified in relation to studies 
of trade union power, in particular, which demonstrate that again a workable definition of 
the concept is difficult but also that the range of potential determinants of power make 
accurate measurement extremely difficult.
There are a number of potential factors that may have an impact on trade union power and 
these, combined with the ways in which they are measured, means that any model of power 
is unlikely to embrace all the potential determinants. As a result researchers have been 
obliged either to concentrate on isolating and controlling for several key primary 
determinants or to focus on specific case studies in which generic observations about the 
nature and determinants of power can be made. Studies of power can be also be deemed 
subjective given the reliance on the opinions of respondents for an assessment of power 
relations. Given that individuals actively involved in employee relations power are unlikely 
(or unable) to provide a balanced and unpartisan assessment of power relations, steps must 
be taken to ensure that any bias is subject to controls within the study. In this study, an 
attempt has been made to combine two methods of studying power and changes in power 
relations. One is a model for assessing union power which controls for a range of important 
factors outside a merger which may affect power. The other is a case study approach which
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facilitates my own first-hand observations of power relations in two different organisations.. 
This combination of investigative techniques is designed to extend the research and findings 
of this study beyond some of the criticisms traditionally directed at studies attempting to 
measure changes in power relations.
Despite the inherent difficulties it is vahd, nevertheless, to investigate power relations and 
changes in them by collecting the views of the employee relations practitioners involved. 
This study has been able to combine these investigations with those conducted 
independently and outside the bargaining framework. 1 hus the study can combine the views 
of those involved first hand in collective bargaining, both before and after the merger and 
on both sides of industry, with those of a less subjective viewpoint. Whilst the study is still 
rehant on the views of protagonists involved in collective bargaining, it attempts to 
recognise (and counter balance) the limits of this approach. It is also fair to say that the 
views of individuals directly involved in the areas under investigation can contribute to the 
investigation in a unique way providing the views are properly defined and taken in context. 
Individuals operating directly in the organisations, with first hand knowledge of 
organisational culture, the history of collective bargaining and the personahties involved, 
offer the researcher a wealth of information in areas that other methods of investigation 
would find difficult to isolate. Some attempt to limit the scope for subjectivity in this study 
has been made by conducting follow-up interviews with key respondents.
Given the sheer range of economic and pohtical pressures combined with the variety of 
aspirations amongst members, activists, and even employers, it seems unlikely that there is
15
one single determinant of merger activity. Unions are more likely to be developing policies 
related to their organisational goals whilst at the same time having to respond to a range of 
changing external pressures. In evidence to the Employment Committee inquiry into "The 
Future of Trade Unions," (1994), the TUC identified four factors that it claimed were a 
major influence on encouraging unions into merger activity. These were: securing the trade 
union’s financial base; enhancing the range of services that trade unions provide for tiieir 
members; enabling the newly merged union to extend its influence (particularly into new 
areas of membership growth); and improving the competence of union organisation. In 
other words, a degree of post merger rationalisation. The TUC stressed to the inquiry the 
financial benefits to unions of pooling personnel and capital resources, and assets. The 
resources saved through merging and becoming more efficient could be directed to areas 
with a greater direct interface with members (for example, education, research or employing 
experts in areas such as health and safety or employment law).A union may be attracted to 
a merger by the opportunity to approach new areas of potential membership growth and 
to become a more efficient organisation. Alternatively, the union may be attracted to a 
merger by the opportunity of a one-off increase in members during a period in which 
membership generally is declining.
Whether the merger has delivered a more efficient organisation and a greater range of 
services for members, or simply compounded inefficiency and a poor level of interaction 
with members, may not be easy to identify. In seeking to investigate the impact of a union 
merger, the motives underpinning the decision to merge are only one element in assessing 
whether or not the merger has achieved its objectives. The degree to which economies of
16
scale were realised and exploited is another and the effects of the merger on the range and 
quality of member services, another. Whether unions that have engaged in mergers have 
been able to break into new areas of membership, stabilise a membership decline or 
rationalise their organisation are all important indicators of the degree to which the 
merger has produced tangible gains for members and organisation.
Yet an efficient organisation and a wide range of speciahsed and affordable membership 
services are only two indicators of the degree to which the merger can be said to have 
delivered benefits for the members. Trade unions are above all collective organisations. 
They are based on the principle that individuals engaged in selhng their labour in the 
marketplace can only be properly protected and fairly rewarded by acting together with their 
colleagues. Therefore, it is not enough to investigate the impact of a merger on union 
organisation and services, the impact on union’s collective activity is central to the 
investigation. The collective dimension of a union’s work is particularly important given the 
importance which members attach to the subjects of collective negotiation. There is 
evidence that improvement in the level of wages, health and safety, job security and access 
to training and development at work are rated as the union’s most important fimctions. For 
example, both training and development issues (GMB, 1994) and health and safety (Mori, 
1994) were highhghted as important by the ordinary union member.
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The Research
As has been stated, this study attempts to add something new to the debate on union 
mergers. It goes beyond an investigation of mergers in a historic context or a case study of 
individual mergers in order to identify the factors influencing the decision to merge. Whilst 
the importance of the reasons underpinning a union’s decision to merge are recognised, this 
study focuses on in the impact of mergers on trade union organisation and power. To this 
end, the effect of mergers on the range of union activity is considered together with the 
effects on trade union services, collective bargaining and on the ability of the union organise 
itself efficiently and secure its future growth in a changing economy and labour market. 
Collectively, these factors provide some useful indicators of trade union power. The way in 
which, hitherto, studies of union mergers have concentrated attention on the causes of union 
mergers does create its own difficulties, since it means that the majority of this study is in 
itself pioneering and, as such, an enormous challenge.
The areas and arenas in which trade union power is examined are predominantly economic 
and some may argue that the pohtical dimension in which unions operate is unduly 
neglected. However, unions in the UK are essentially economic organisations and where 
unions engage in political activity, in the Labour Party for example, it is primarily in order 
to facilitate the attainment of economic objectives. Pohtical expenditure and activity is a 
resource to secure favourable conditions in the economic environment as opposed to a
18
formal attempt to secure influence for political ends. The question of trade union pohtical 
influence does, however, indicate a potential difficulty in measuring the degree to which 
union power is affected by merger activity. In seeking to secure influence across a wide 
range of arenas simultaneously, and seeking to improve the conditions of union members in 
a wide range of different companies or sectors, trade unions are constantly adapting to, or 
influencing, a variety of changing and interrelated factors. In seeking to isolate and measure 
the impact of one factor, merger activity, on trade union power it is necessary to identify 
and then control for other factors which might have an impact, positive or negative, on the 
success of unions in attaining their goals.
Because of the difficulties in accounting for the effects of a range of related influences on 
trade union activity, this study concentrates on evaluating survey responses from union 
members and employers. An alternative to this approach might have been to define union 
power and the key influences upon it statistically by examining the outcome of key 
decisions and measuring the influence that the union was able to exert in different 
circumstances. Such an analysis, dependent primarily on statistical data and analysis, was 
unlikely to be able to reflect adequately the full range of ways in which influence may be 
exerted or the subtlety with which power may be exercised. For example, power may be 
exerted without any outcome being apparent if one party has an interest in delaying or 
preventing a decision . Simply keeping a discussion off the agenda may, in itself, be a 
demonstration Of power.
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In the light of this , a statistical approach was rejected in favour of an approach in which a 
variety of evidence on trade union power was collected, based, as we have seen, on detailed 
responses to key questions obtained from a wide range of industrial relations practitioners 
on both sides of industry. In studying the responses, the effects of the merger may be 
assessed in isolation from a range of other influences. Although it can never be possible to 
control for the full range of potential influences on union power, the approach does at least 
afford a degree of flexibility to study separate mergers and to isolate the factors which 
impact on them. This information specifically would not be available in a more general 
statistical analysis.
As my study indicates, a considerable amount of research has been conducted into trade 
union merger activity. This concentrates primarily on the influences on the decision to 
merge at the point of the merger. Many commentators on mergers take as their starting point 
the time at which the merger is formally, legally sanctioned. Yet, in some key ways, this 
fi-amework for their research misses a key point. In reality a merger does not occur at a 
specific time. There is an identifiable process prior to the merger (when merger partners 
court each other and negotiate the terms of their integration) and afterwards (when the new, 
merged organisation is reahsed). To examine a merger at a single point in time therefore has 
the capacity to exclude important areas for research (the negotiation around the merger, for 
instance) and miss important evidence (the relative influence on the merger of the parties 
which may during the negotiations, for example). For these reasons the merger as a process 
starting with the general discussions on merger and encompassing the organisational 
outcome of the merger have been used as the starting point in this research. It is one
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important reason for the decision to supplement our survey findings with a dual case study 
in which the ongoing affects of a merger can be studied. One consequence of this, as we 
shall see, is that the investigation extends beyond formal union mergers to include other 
types of joint organisation such as amalgamation and federation. This is justified on the 
basis that the processes by which such arrangements are established and the organisation of 
the parties after the amalgamation are very similar to those arising fi-om a formal merger. 
This is an issue to which we shall return later
The process by which unions merge, the ways in which the integration of two separate 
organisations is achieved and the consequences of the merger, have largely been ignored in 
other studies. The research on mergers tend to have stopped with the signature on the 
merger agreement between the two parties. This study attempts to examine the wider 
consequences of merger activity and to go beyond the causes. It attempts to rectify the 
balance in the research which has seen the questions relating to how unions merge and what 
happens when they do, neglected in favour of an investigation of the determinants of a 
merger.
This study employs a combination of questionnaire survey and follow-up interviews 
combined with a detailed case study approach. The combination of techniques designed to 
restrict the impact of the limitations inherent in each approach. The questionnaire was 
aimed at both trade unions and employer respondents in order to highhght any discrepancies 
in the responses identified by the respondents. The responses could then be measured 
against data fi-om several external sources which would act as a control for the other
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economic, political and organisational factors which might have an impact on trade union 
bargaining power. At the same time, the constraints inherent in a study based entirely on the 
responses to questionnaires were recognised. In order to control for bias and subjectivity 
amongst the respondents who were directly involved in collective bargaining, it was 
decided to supplement this approach with detailed interviews with key respondents and in- 
depth case studies in two different sectors. It was felt that respondents may be partisan 
given the nature of their roles and that interviews may act as some control on this. Whilst 
the questionnaires and subsequent interviews may reflect a degree of subjectivity, it was felt 
that this might be justifiable given that the study was constrained by having to approach 
protagonists in the absence of a more rehable source of data. In the fight of both this and the 
many different potential determinants of trade union power in addition to union mergers, the 
study also includes case studies. These investigations, conducted in different sectors were 
designed to allow a more widely rounded view of trade union power, to be investigated 
from an independent viewpoint. As we have discussed, the case studies also allowed the 
merger process, including negotiations and outcomes, to be investigated overtime. A rolling 
camera as opposed to a snapshot.
That is not to say of course that the case study approach is in itself fi-ee fi-om criticism. The
validity of generalising fi-om the results of one or two individual case studies has been 
questioned by academics such as Cole (1976). However, the fact that the studies in this case 
are designed to compliment other methods of investigation was felt to justify the approach. 
In addition, a large number of case studies have been based on studies fi:om two sites such 
as Barley and Sullivan (1997), and PoweU (1990) in which authors have argued that the
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dual study approach effectively facilitates adequate comparison. As both Mitchell (1976) 
and Yin (1993) have argued, case studies should be evaluated in relation to the external 
environment in which the investigation was conducted. In addition, other researchers have 
stressed the advantages of using case studies to test the findings suggested by other research 
(such as a survey questionnaire) and to confirm its findings.. The case study approach 
adopted in this study concentrating on the merger between the AEÜ and the EEPTU in 
McVities (UK) and between BIFU and NORSA, in the Northern Rock are also important 
because they allow a combination of quantitative and qualitative research over time to be 
conducted. Given the complexities of the issues under investigation and the way in which 
factors influencing power, in particular, are inter-related the combination of a survey and a 
questionnaire approach to the study offers a way of collecting the full range of data on the 
effects of merger. Full details of the methods applied during the study are included in the 
appendix together with copies of the questionnaire surveys.
In focusing on the development of mergers over time, rather than on the point at which a 
merger is legally delivered, the study investigates the consequences arising fix)m the way in 
which mergers occur. As we have estabhshed the process and stages by which a merger 
occurs may provide important signals about where power resides in the organisation during 
the merger and the likely areas in which relations may change post-merger. The study 
investigates the effect of the merger process, the way in which unions merge, on union 
power. Little research has been conducted about how two previously entirely independent 
organisations draw up a single constitution and rule book and gradually integrate their 
organisation through a joint branch structure and services. The processes by which the
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merger is realised is one of the least studied aspects of merger activity and yet in defining 
the way in which the new organisation is structured and operated it may be an important 
influence on union power.
In this study I will investigate whether or not the processes by which a merger decision is 
implemented will have implications for the trade union which go beyond the formulation of 
a new organisation. Clearly, the objectives of the unions and the internal and external 
pressures upon the partners involved, will all exert some influence on the way in which a 
new organisation is structured. This is, as we shall see, the primary focus of the literature 
focused on union mergers. As well as commenting on and challenging some of the 
established theories relating to union merger, this study will examine those consequences of 
the merger which transcend the creation of the new organisation per se. It will look beyond 
the motives of merger towards the mechanism by which the merger is completed, as well as 
the impact of internal union politics, on the structure of the new organisation.
This investigation, focusing on the merger process as opposed to the point of merger, has 
been conducted assuming that there are likely to be significant organisational inefficiencies 
in, at least one, partner union before it embarks on the merger process. Some commentators 
such as Undy et al (1981), may challenge this assumption on the basis that, depending on 
the type of merger, unions may be structurally very efficient when they embark on a more 
aggressive merger policy to trap or attract smaller partners securing access to new areas of 
growth. Similarly, there may be an argument to suggest that a blanket assumption of this
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case is not sophisticated enough to address the wide variety of organisations embarking on a 
merger. However, my assumption is justified on several counts.
Firstly, academic studies, as we shall see, suggest that union merger is primarily a 
“defensive” or “consolidatory” response to harsh pressures on membership levels or 
service provision. Unions engage in mergers in periods of great economic change when 
either the ability to survive change, (or to take full advantage of it), is under question. It 
therefore seems appropriate to assume that organisations which choose to embark on a 
merger, may be subject to pervasive inefficiency and unable to sustain membership or 
services in the economic environment, or else inefficient because they are unable to realise 
the full potential of their environment within their current structure. The assumption of 
inefficiency is therefore directed at a union's organisational structure and whether or not it is 
appropriate, (either to preserve and protect current standing, or facilitate potential growth in 
the current environment). Some unions will be inefficient in protecting their members, 
whilst others will be inefficient because they fail to realise for their members the full range 
of potential benefits fi"om their environment.
Secondly, it could be suggested, given that economies of scale is one of the key drivers of 
merger activity, a recently merged organisation may be inefficient because it has not yet had 
the opportunity to remove the duphcation of functions and realise economies of scale. 
Finally, it may also be reasonable to assume a degree of structural inefficiency firom the 
lack of organisational reform, other than merger, with which unions have reacted to the 
economic pressures of the day. The functional responsibilities of union staff such as
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Negotiating Secretaries and Officers and the structure and composition of negotiating 
forums, if not the level at which bargaining is conducted, have remained broadly similar 
over the past 20 years. Moreover, there is tittle evidence that unions, in employing the 
services of consultants or on undergoing major structural change, have sought to address 
any organisational efficiency to any large degree. It may be reasonable to assume therefore 
that since there is tittle evidence of it having been tackled, a degree of structural inefficiency 
remains. Each merger will invariably involve a degree of rationalisation or re-organisation 
to take advantage of the structural benefits of economies of scale. The process of 
investigation or review which precedes this re-organisation may hold the key to an 
assessment of whether an increase in power attributable to a merger stems fi’om a 
rationalisation exercise conducted outside its parameters.
It became apparent that when a trade union merger occurs review processes are introduced 
in a preliminary stage in the merger. In other words, an exercise is conducted to ensure that 
the way in which the organisation is structured is efficient in relation to its bargaining and 
organisational objectives. A thorough analysis of the scale and efficiency of the current 
organisation currently, will inevitably play some role in determining the focus for any 
structural change. This study will investigate whether or not the review process takes on a 
momentum which goes beyond that directly related to the merger. It wifi look at the degree 
to which the reviews designed to deliver an efficient integration of partners actually goes 
beyond that remit to promote wider organisational efficiency. Participants in a merger may 
understand the rationale underpinning the decision to merge and, for this reason, accept that 
the merged organisation is likely to signal changes and rationalisation in organisation. For
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this reason a merger is accompanied by an acceptance of a period where services are 
reviewed and reorganised to deliver the benefits of the merger. In other words, an general 
wariness of and opposition to changes which may exist within an organisation may be 
'unfrozen' by a single policy change like a decision to merge. Given that it is only recently 
that trade unions have been prepared to engage consultants and / or conduct strategic 
reviews and efficiency audits, the facility to permeate change in disguise may have been a 
key aspect of the review accompanying mergers. The merger may de facto deliver an engine 
for ongoing change throughout the organisation.
Broadly speaking, my review of union structure and services which accompany the merger 
process will fall into four distinct categories minimal, focused, broad and ongoing. The 
minimal review will apply to those mergers where the two merger partners essentially bolt 
together their existing structures and, by and large, maintain the provision of separate 
services within separate structures. The unions do not undertake a review of services or 
structures because they continue to operate largely independently. This begs the question of 
why they merged at all, if even the most rudimentary benefits of economies of scale are 
ignored. It may be that there is some pohtical or industrial motivation.
In circumstances where the organisation and provision of services directly related to the 
merger are reviewed this might be said to be "focused ” The organisations involved study 
the appropriateness of those structures and services affected by the re-organisation. This 
category of review would involve steps to secure very basic advantages of economies of 
scale by partners through sharing research, publicity or legal services whilst maintaining
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separate decision making channels and so on. It would also include a complete audit of 
organisational structure within the area .directly affected by the merger, for example 
throughout a small partner and at the point of impact with a larger union. It would also 
include those reviews conducted in the formation of a federation where the unions merge 
support services but maintain separate, independent bargaining organisations.
A ""brocuf" review would be one which includes those areas of the organisation not directly 
affected by the merger, that is away .from that part of the organisation where the merger 
impacts on structure directly. For example, a review of the whole organisation including 
areas not related to or involved in the merger. It would include those reviews which occur 
when a new organisation is estabhshed from elements of two or more equally sized merger 
partners. The ""focused  ^ or ""broad' review may develop into the final category of an 
""ongoing' review where the merger process makes some provision for a review process to 
be conducted at regular intervals. This requires the acceptance of the notion that change 
originating from the merger might be used to promote an ongoing efficiency programme 
within the new structure. The constitution of the new organisation might, for example, 
specify that a review becomes an integral part of the new union structure. A culture of 
ongoing improvement and organisational development may be nurtured through this 
provision.
My research will investigate the extent to which a review process established as a direct 
consequence of the merger can be extended gradually into a broader and ongoing vehicle 
for continuous improvement. It will also examine the degree to which the efficiencies which
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accompany a merger arise from the merger itself or from the wider moves towards 
efficiency which are freed by the merger process. The degree to which the merger acts as a 
Trojan horse for wider or ongoing efficiency reviews will be examined. It may be that trade 
unions are no different from other organisations, including companies, in taking advantage 
of an upheaval within the organisation to set the entire organisation on an even keel, 
utilising a period of reorganisation to dehver wider efficiency and ongoing change. When 
the business at Rolls Royce collapsed at the end of 1994, the Company used the crisis to 
push through a major re-organisation which included team working and total quaUty 
improvement. They also used the period of change to deliver a system of ongoing reviews 
of efficiency which would assist in the management of change in the future. Of course, an 
investigation of whether or not the process of merger can be used to promote ongoing 
change in an organisation will have an important contribution to make to our study of union 
power. If it emerges that some of the benefits hitherto attributed to mergers result directly 
from the accompanying reviews then this may have implications for a the current trend 
towards mergers aimed at improving union organisation, particularly since in recent years 
union resistance to openly promote efficiency reviews and employ consultants to manage 
change programmes seems to have decreased.
Summary
Previous studies of merger activity have either focused on historic economic factors, in 
which it is assumed that unions have in response to broad economic trends pursued a 
strategy of merger that has concentrated power in fewer, stronger unions. Questions remain,
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however, as to the extent to which previous studies have a wider apphcation. Firstly because 
their primary interest is in the reasons for engaging in a merger and not the outcomes or 
effects of it the research has a historic focus. Secondly, because, by and large, studies have 
examined mergers at the point of impact and not over the period in which the merger 
develops, the merger process, studies have been constrained by the way in which the merger 
has been defined. A comparative case study approach, based on a detailed questionnaire 
survey, supplemented by interviews with leading practitioners, offers the opportunity for the 
consequences of a merger to be identified and isolated. In focusing on the people involved 
in the merger process, and die post merger development of collective bargaining, the 
approach also offers scope for investigating the benefits and costs of merger activity and 
whether they have been legitimately presented as such. One area of particular interest in this 
respect, and one which we shall consider in much greater detail, is the degree to which the 
merger process can legitimise a general move towards greater efficiency in the trade union. 
Since a merger requires such a detailed examination of the entire trade union organisation 
both pre and post merger it is arguable given the historical evidence, that merger opens up 
areas of union organisation to efficiency review that in its absence, would have remained 
protected from rationalisation. In focusing on the comparative case study approach and 
addressing carefully the source and extent of any move towards rationalisation, the thesis 
will shed some light on the degree to which mergers deliver efficiency benefits as opposed 
to simply legitimising them.
In investigating the impact of union mergers on the traditional arena of trade union power 
the thesis may contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of union organisation
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and provide some indication of whether the union member has been well served, 
collectively and as an individual, by the growth in union mergers. In questioning the impact 
of mergem on unfreezing union opposition to wider change and efficiency review the thesis 
may be able to indicate whether or not the most significant impact of mergers on union 
power has been outside the bargaining agenda altogether.
Before this can be attempted, however, it is important to outline the historical and 
conceptual fiamework in which this study of mergers will be conducted. In the first instance 
tiiis involves a detailed assessment of the academic research on mergers that has been 
conducted and an outline of the work on defining union power . Once there is some 
famiharity with the findings in both these areas the investigation will be better placed to 
examine and report the consequences of mergers essentially by constructing a model, based 
on my own primary research, Wiich bridges the two.
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3. POWERFUL ARGUMENT - REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON 
MERGERS AND ON POWER THEORIES
Reviewing the literature on trade union mergers and power theories is central to the 
investigation of the relationship between mergers and union power. It allows us to draw 
upon any relevant research to further this investigation and provides some useful parameters 
within which the concepts central to the study can be examined. As we have already 
discovered, literature on trade union mergers has concentrated up to now on the trends in 
union merger activity and the reasons that unions become involved in a merger. Questions 
relating to the consequences of a merger, the way in which merger activity is organised and 
developed and the implications of mergers for trade union power have not been investigated 
in the literature on mergers. Nevertheless, it is important a review of the literature to place 
the study in context. In examining both the focus and findings of previous research it \Vill 
contribute to an understanding of the background research on mergers and also where the 
debate on mergers has been focused up to now. Similarly a study of power theories , 
particularly in relation to studies of collective bargaining, wiU also promote a background 
understanding of the issues and help to place this study in context. More than this, however, 
the literature on power theory will also provide some useful pointers of the definition of 
power and the way in which it is exercised. Previous research can therefore contribute to the
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framework in which this study attempts to measure power and isolate particular 
determinants from each other.
The review of the background hterature therefore falls into two distinct sections, the work 
conducted on classifying merger types and examining the trends in merger activity and the 
research that concentrates on the work on power theories, both in general and relating to 
trade unions. Careful consideration of both these fields will be central to the creation of a 
viable model under which the relationship between mergers and power can be investigated.
Trade Union Mergers
The literature on trade union mergers has generally focused on placing mergers in a 
historical context and studying the determinants of mergers, the factors that influence a 
union's propensity to merge. These historical studies have taken a range of economic (and 
social) data and compared and contrasted movements in the economy with data on the level 
of merger activity within trade unions. Buchanen (1981) for example, heads those who 
examine mergers in the context of the economic environment and stress that changes in the 
economy precipitate waves of merger activity. This method has been criticised by, amongst 
others, Waddington (1994) on the grounds that it is based on the premise that unions 
respond in the same way environmental factors before, during and following a merger. He 
(op. cit.) argues that the links between mergers and economic environmental determinants 
compared with other factors such as membership concentration for example, are relatively
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insignificant. The analysis of mergers in the context of environmental factors is limited in 
its neglect of the structural determinants, the political or bargaining framework, for 
example, which may also have an impact on merger activity.
In addition to the historical study, merger activity has also been studied through a series of 
case studies, most notably by Undy et al (1981). Here the analysis of mergers identifies 
structural determinants but again the methodology has been criticised on the grounds that it 
assumes that a general categorisation can arise from a particular study. Undy et al may 
identify several categories of union merger but each classification stems directly from a 
single study in each case.
The view of mergers as a consequence of external factors or pressures in the wider economy 
has for the purposes of this study, been labelled "environmental determinism". The primary 
determinant of a union merger is the external economic pressures which a union is subject 
to. In contrast, the view that the internal dynamic for a union to protect or extend its 
influence through involvement in a union merger or the acquisition of other unions we have 
labelled "internal structural determinism". The trade union is seen as a master of its destiny 
pursuing a conscious policy of merger to meet the organisation's goals and aspirations. It is 
this difference in the importance of external and internal influences on trade union merger 
activity which has, until now, driven the debate on merger activity.
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Environmental Determinism
Buchanen (1981) identifies three waves of union merger activity between 1892 when there 
were 1,233 unions and 1979 when the number had fallen to 456. Buchanen (op. cit.) claims 
that waves of union mergers which occurred in 1918-24, 1944-48 and 1966-79 were 
essentially the result of environmental factors. He cites economic influences, notably the 
state of the labour market, and pohtical pressures in the form of the dominant political 
ideology. Buchanen (op. cit.) argues that the greatest spur to merger involvement may be 
the economic downturn in which unions merge to preserve the differentials in the level of 
membership and to increase their bargaining power in a contracted economy. He notes that 
waves in the economic cycle were matched by waves in union bargaining activity. In 
relation to the second wave of merger activity, in particular, he argues that the impact of 
inflation is central to the promotion of merger activity The onset of rising inflation makes it 
more difficult for small unions to preserve their independence and makes the size and 
efficiency advantages of larger organisations more attractive. Buchanen (op. cit.) concludes 
that trends in increased prices and wages are the most important determinants of merger 
activity. Buchanen (op. cit.) supports his analysis by arguing that there was a link between 
company merger activity and that of unions. Both employers and employee organisations 
expanded independently with economic expansion and looked towards merger as a way of 
maintaining market share or a position in the bargaining hierarchy when the economy was 
contracting.
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Geroski and Knight (1984) also establish a link between trade union merger activity and 
periods in which the structure and organisation of bargaining is changing. Specifically the 
authors find a link between periods in which there is a re-ahgnment of corporations and an 
increase in corporate merger activity and changes in trade union organisation, in particular a 
growth in trade union mergers. Changes in corporate structure provoke a variety of 
responses fi’om the unions but periods of corporate consolidation are reflected in a growth in 
union mergers. Geroski and Knight (op. cit.) conclude that trade unions will reform their 
blructurc lu reflect the prevailing model of corporate organisation and bargaining 
fi-amework, but ironically, this strategy has not been particularly effective in the 
preservation of trade union influence. Reflecting corporate merger structure in particular 
they argue has been "an insignificant response to prevent the erosion o f trade union 
bargaining power (p57)
In a later study, Buchanen (1992) studied the impact of union growth through recruitment 
and merger on union concentration which he defined as the prominence of larger unions 
amongst the population. He concluded that unions were increasingly dependent on merger 
activity to maintain their position and level of concentration in a hostile economic 
environment. As an example, he cited (op. cit. p63) the statistics which indicate that since 
1938 the top fifty unions in the US have remained largely unchanged and become a self- 
perpetuating group. In a similar study of American unionism conducted by Chaison (1980) 
it was argued Üiat up until the formation of the AFL-CIO in 1955, unions reacted to broadly 
environmental pressures through amalgamations and mergers but that the establishment of a
t
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regulatory framework for union amalgamations provided the impetus for unions to turn to 
formal mergers instead of loose federations to protect or extend their influence within the 
labour movement. Chaison’s (op. cit.) findings were based on a study of 143 union mergers 
in the US between 1900-78.
Buchanen's (1981,1992) work linking trade union mergers to influences in the wider 
economy can be viewed as a contribution to a wider body of material linking trade union 
change to external determinants. Cronin (1979), for example, claims that there have been 
five waves of strikes since 1888 each linked to the transition period between economic 
downturn and recovery whilst Bain and Elsheikh (1976) note that the growth in trade unions 
is greatest in periods of cyclical fluctuation of varying degrees of magnitude. In each study, 
including Buchanen’s (op. cit.), those which are primarily dependent upon theories of 
external or economic determinism can be criticised on the grounds that they do not 
investigate or control for other potential influences on trade union behaviour. In so doing, 
they neglect other factors outside the economic or political fi-amework that may have an 
impact directly on trade union behaviour patterns. Moreover, Buchanen's (op. cit.) studies 
seem to ignore the possibihty of the emergence of a more complex set of responses from 
trade unions to development in the economy. Trade unions are assumed to respond to a 
range of determinants in a set pattern through different economic cycles. Finally, 
Buchanen's (op. cit.) studies can be criticised for a degree of confusion between economic 
or external determinism and the influence of external factors on poHcies determined by the 
trade union. In other words, the degree to which trade unions are being influenced by their 
surroundings and the degree to which trade union are pursuing pohcies which take account
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of their surroundings remains unclear in these studies. All trade unions, for example, are 
assumed by Buchanen (op. cit.) to react in a similar way to the same external determinants.
Waddington (1988) identifies two periods of merger activity pre and post war, 1893-1939 
and 1946-79. He argues that whilst economic activity is an important determinant in each 
period the key influence is institutionalised collective bargaining. Whilst the impact of the 
economy, the political process and the level of unionisation are all important this is because 
of their influence on the degree of institutionalised bargaining as opposed to a more direct 
impact on union mergers. The relationship between political and structural factors is not 
constant. Waddington (op. cit.) concludes that it is the organisational stability combined 
with periods in which unions can exercise their bargaining strength which dissuades unions 
from engaging in the merger process. Union mergers are therefore more likely in periods 
when bargaining structures are fragmented and unstable and less likely when the structure 
of bargaining are formalised. Waddington (op, cit.) does not neglect the impact of structural 
factors, he surmises the level of institutionalised collective bargaining is the "intervening 
factor between structural factors and merger activity. " (op. cit. p426)
In another historical analysis, Waddington (1994) examined union mergers in relation to 
union growth using the Herfindahl index to measure the change in the concentration of 
union members. Waddington (op. cit.) attempted to study the relative effect of mergers and 
recruitment on membership concentration and to examine the extent to which union 
membership was concentrated into fewer, larger organisations. Again he identified two 
waves of activity and he extended the second period to 1987 in the light of his research. He
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concluded that between 1892 and 1946 the concentration of membership increased as a 
result of fewer organisations representing more members. Recruitment activity, as opposed 
to mergers, raised the concentration in membership until 1947 and it tended to lower 
thereafter when a lack of recruitment was seen to have a negative impact. Between 1946 
and 1987 unions retained a similar relative position to each other but there was a decrease in 
concentration as larger unions suffered from a greater level of membership decline. 
However, the large unions were able to maintain their relative positions primarily through 
engaging in merger activity. Recruitment was not a significant factor during this period 
because the larger manual unions were not able to compete with the union growth in white 
collar and public sector unions. Waddington (op. cit.) concludes that trade union mergers 
allowed unions to retain their position in the union hierarchy since 1946 and that the 
tendency to merge in order to protect this position was more apparent and more widespread 
in the 1980s. Larger unions were more likely to suffer membership decline in the 1980s and 
responded by using mergers to maintain their place in the pecking order.
In her historical analysis of merger activity Aston (1987) concludes that mergers result from 
an institutional weakness in the acquired union which results from a variety of 
environmental factors such as technological change, pohtical hostiUty, industrial decline 
and economic recession. The evidence relating to the acquiring union is, she concludes, 
more complex and she cites the impact of a desire to protect the sectional interests of 
members and the impact of competition in the recruitment of new members. There is 
evidence that unions are opportunistic and entrepreneurial in approaching partners witii a 
strong financial and membership base.
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Unions also seek mergers to diversify their membership and avoid the prospect of a sudden 
membership loss as a result of a single technological change or industrial decline. Merger 
activity, she surmises, is seen as an efficient method of union recruitment.
Ashton is less convinced by the evidence linking mergers with changes in bargaining 
structure arguing that multi-unionism has often persisted despite an accelerated merger 
process and even where unions have been absorbed into a larger organisation, sectional 
bargaining has been maintained post-merger. This analysis has important ramifications for a 
study of the relationships between merger activity and power relations particularly given the 
importance which, as we shall see, many commentators attach to union successes in the 
bargaining context as an indicator of union power.
Aston concludes her study by predicting a growth of consolidatory and defensive mergers in 
the public sector unions given the increasingly hostile environment in which they are 
operating and the pressures presented by membership decline. She also identifies the 
emergence of key industry-based unions in the private sector and the growth of the so-called 
'super-unions' amongst the large general unions.
Internal Structural Determinism
In contrast to the body of work that highlights the environmental determinants of union 
mergers, there is also evidence to suggest that internal structural factors within the unions
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have an impact on merger activity, and that unions chose to embark on a proactive policy of 
merger for a variety of internal, strategic reasons.
The growth in super-unionism was identified by Willman and Cave (1989) as the way in 
which large trade unions seek to preserve their "market share" of trade unionism. In this 
regard the study concludes that this is a relatively ineffective way of preserving strength 
giving rise to further membership concentration and contraction and leaving non-union 
areas untouched. Mergers deliver few administrative benefits for unions and lead to a more 
difficult representation of members as they become spread across a range of occupations 
and sectors. The main potential benefits of merger activity, avoidance of inter-union 
competition and control of finances are, they claim, rarely realised. They conclude that 
unions would be far better advised to pursue a ^ategy based on joint ventures, in which 
information and resources are pooled by two or more separate organisations which maintain 
their decision-making independence. Such a strategy has the potential to realise the 
administrative advantages of merging and it avoids the need for a baUot. The duo indicate 
that a joint venture operation of the type established by fPMS, STE and the Halifax 
Building Society Staff Association may provide a useful example of an effective union 
structure for the future particularly since it accommodates the partnership of TUC-affiliated 
and non-TUC affiliated organisations. Joint venture can have a positive impact on cost 
control by providing a means of sharing expertise and resources.
The authors conclude that, despite its prevalence, it is far from clear that merger activity is 
the best solution to the problems which unions face and, although joint venture also fails to
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provide a way of absorbing the non-union sectors, it does provide a more efficient method 
of deploying union resources to dehver the objective of maintaining a market share of 
membership. (Given that a joint venture, of the type that IPMS and its partners have 
embarked upon, was facihtated by a general pressure to merge by medium sized unions and 
given that many of the benefits in relation to economies of scale are similar to those 
anticipated by merger partners, it has been decided to include federated structures of this 
type in my study of the effects of mergers on union power. Despite the fact that component 
unions in the federation maintain political autonomy, organisationally, I wiU argue, they 
have more in common with merged organisations than independent unions).
Quite why the authors place their emphasis on what is essentially the avoidance of a ballot 
in championing the concept of joint venture over formal merger activity is unclear. 
However, the major limitation of their analysis is that it fails to examine the potential 
advantages in collective bargaining which may arise firom a merger. The impact of an 
increased membership in the sector combined with more resources and less inter-union 
competition may well have some impact on bargaining power as a union is able to focus 
more resources on bargaining objectives. The failure to even consider the potential impact 
of a merger on bargaining structures and union power is a serious omission.
In a recent study of the role of trade unions in the future Robert Taylor (1993) suggested the 
emergence of the federated structure at IPMS and the development of super-unions were 
both positive developments for the labour movement. He quotes evidence fi-om the public 
services union, UNISON, which suggested that the key advantages of the larger
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organisation were the avoidance of duplication and the establishment of a body which could 
more readily adapt to the changing patterns of public sector employment. In the book, IPMS 
stressed the advantages of a federated structure in terms of the abihty to maintain existing 
levels of membership service and independent structures despite falling membership levels 
and the ability to increase membership by attracting other management organisations to the 
federated structure. In an assessment of the development of the union movement in recent 
times, Taylor (op. cit.) confirmed a dramatic growth m merger activity in the eighties and 
reports the speculation that a few so-called “super-unions” would dominate the labour 
movement by the turn of the century. Taylor (op. cit.) claims that the growth in merger 
activity has probably been over defensive and a response to falling membership and 
finances.
Structural Determinism and Merger Classification
The analysis of merger activity conducted in Undy et al (1981) is a departure from the main 
body of the work m this area in that, although the work is concentrated similarly on internal 
structural determinants, Undy (op. cit.) identifies different types of merger activity arising 
from a different series of structural determinants. In the studies examined so far, external 
determinants are assumed to influence unions to behave in a similar way. The analysis, 
therefore, goes beyond that provided by other external structural determinists because it is 
able to identify different structural pressures as leading to a particular pattern of merger 
activity. In a series of case studies, attempts are made to analyse different types of merger 
process by identifying the different factors which may have an influence on a union's
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decision to embark on the merger process. The author claims that unions will be motivated 
to merge for either institutional survival or membership growth.
Three different types of merger are identified.
(i) A defensive merger - Undy (op. cit.) classifies the formation of UCATT fi-om its 
component unions ASW, ASPD and AUBTW, as a "defensive" merger to combat the 
changes in the working environment. The increase in self employment and contracting 
posed a Üireat to union organisation and in order to ensure the survival of the organisation 
against a back-drop of expensive officials and a declining membership, the decision to 
merge was taken. The expansionist pohcies of the TGWU in the late 1970s and a desire by 
the building unions to preserve a sectoral union were identified as being factors which 
pushed the partner unions together in an attempt to preserve their independence. Undy 
identifies four factors or "primary change agents" which may influence a union towards a 
defensive merger, these are membership and finance, technological change, demarcation 
disputes and the role of other organisations, particularly a broad expansionist policy adopted 
by a large general union.
(n) An consohdatory merger - The second type of merger activity is classified as 
"consolidatory" which is illustrated by a case study of the merger giving birth to the 
AUEW. In contrast to the defensive merger, in which action has to be taken to preserve the 
organisation, consolidatory mergers arise when the parties recognise that, whilst there is no 
immediate problem of survival or preservation, it is better to face problems of membership
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contraction before they become acute and seek the protection of a larger organisation. 
Where the defensive merger is based on an actual threat, the notion underpinning a 
consohdatory merger is that of a perceived threat. This acts as a spur to the merger process. 
Undy identifies membership forecasts, the perceived threats fi-om technological advances 
and the stabihty of membership in potential partners as being the key determinants of a 
decision to engage in a consolidatory merger.
(hi) An aggressive merger - Finally, the "aggressive" merger is identified, the only one of 
tiieir categories that does not equally apply to all the partners to the merger. In the 
aggressive merger the larger union effectively takes over the smaller one in order to secure 
more members and an advantageous position m the competition for future members 
(through a move to new areas of potential recruitment). Undy (op. cit.) illustrates the 
process in referring to both ASTMS and TGWU, both of whom pursued a strategy of
j
aggressive mergers in order to increase their influence throughout the wider union 
movement. The motivation of the smaller union will often be defensive since is likely to 
disappear as an independent unit as a result of the merger. Unions are, nevertheless, 
attracted to the larger partner because of the level of services and degree of expertise which 
a larger organisation is able to tap. Moreover, there is often scope for a smaller body to
maintain some degree of independence inside the larger organisation as general unions are 
usually organised along sectoral lines and governed by a series of section councils under the 
umbrella of a national executive.
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The analysis is useful in that it provides a way of categorising different examples of a trade 
union merger and in doing so breaks away from the notion that mergers are a uniform 
response by unions to a variety of external determinants. It identifies the determinants of 
merger activity from a union perspective in contrast to the wider economic and structural 
determinant identified by Buchanen (1981), Waddington (1994) and others. The motives for 
a merger should be easier to isolate and identify than the wider social and economic 
determinants of the merger process. This is partly because, where a merger is part of a 
formal union pohcy, there are likely to be documents making reference to the motives for 
merger held by the merger partners. In contrast, specific external determinants are likely to 
be difficult to identify in anything other than the broadest terms because of the complex 
inter-relation between factors, (which may exert conflicting pressures on the trade unions at 
any one time). The analysis is also useful in that it allows predictions of merger activity in 
the light of the factors identified. However, the true strength of the Undy (op. cit.) approach 
is that it identifies, not only increases in the level of merger activity, but also tiie mechanism 
for classifying the type of merger activity which occurs. In so doing, the approach, in 
addition to its contribution as a tool for classification, also provides a useful method of 
analysing the merger activity which falls outside broad economic determinants. Therefore, 
whilst the analysis of Buchanen (1981) is criticised on the grounds that there is no 
consideration of the inter-relationship between external determinants and internal union 
policy, Undy (op. cit.) is able to isolate the internal determinants of merger. These can then 
be linked to external factors to produce a more comprehensive study to the inter-relationship 
between internal and external dynamics. Moreover, the apphcation of the model to 
individual mergers as opposed to waves of merger activity, gives it an application that is
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wider than studies that concentrate on the study of mergers as a collective response to 
external determinants.
However, the model also suffers a series of limitations. Firstly, it fails to account for 
differences in the propensity to merge. The motivation of the parties in a merger is assumed 
to be equal. Unions involved in consolidatory or defensive mergers are assumed to be 
equally keen to activate the merger process. In reality, one of the parties is likely to be under 
more pressure to engage in the merger. In a defensive merger one of the parties may be 
considerably more interested in merger as a means of averting financial collapse. The 
differences between the types of merger classification, particularly the defensive merger and 
the consohdatory, may be difficult to identify in a particular merger and may even change 
during the merger process. Without detailed knowledge of union finances it may be difficult 
to asses whether or not the move is necessary for the organisations' survival or the result of 
responsible planning on the part of the union in recognising the potential threat of sectoral 
change in employment patterns.
Moreover, the situation may change over time and Undy's (op. cit.) analysis is also very 
dependent upon the particular time in which the merger process is examined. Since he roots 
his definition of a merger at the point at which it is legaUy ratified, the analysis cannot 
assess the development of the merger over time. Given that the merger process can take 
years firom initiation until formal ratification, it is not reahstic to adopt a single 
classification based on a snapshot of the motives underpinning the merger at a particular 
, time. A merger is a dynamic process in which the motives and aspirations of the partners
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develop over time. Undy’s (op. cit.) is unable to accommodate the dynamic in his 
classification system.
In reality, for example, a more flexible definition is needed to reflect the not uncommon 
possibility that whilst a merger may start off in one of the categories it may transfer to 
another as the process develops. If a union entering a consolidatory merger suddenly suffers 
a membership haemorrhage as a result of a major influx of new technology then it may be 
more accurate to describe it as a defensive merger on the part of one union or aggressive on 
the part of the other.
There is a general problem with the analysis adopted by Undy (op. cit.) in that the 
classification of mergers is dependent on the view adopted by the analyst. In some 
circumstances, whether a merger is defined as defensive or aggressive will be dependent on 
the perspective fix)m which the merger is viewed. From the viewpoint of the motives and 
influences on one protagonist the merger may be a defensive move; from the viewpoint of 
the partner the merger may be aggressive. Whilst different perceptions of the motives for a 
merger may be apparent between independent observers and the unions concerned, there 
may also be a different perception within the union. A small union may object to being seen 
as the victim of an aggressive merger when they have negotiated independence within a 
protective umbrella and the primary motive for merger is access to the skills and facilities 
available in a larger union. Similarly, whilst the membership may be encouraged to vote for 
a merger to consolidate union strength within a given sector, the General secretary and NEC
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may be aware that union finances require a merger in order that the union survives and that, 
in reality, the merger is defensive.
An article studying the attempts to conclude a consolidatory merger between the two main 
representatives of banking employees BIFU and the Clearing Bank Union by Morris (1986) 
is critical of the Undy (op. cit.) classification for failing to take sufficient account of the 
dynamic of internal politics within merger partners. Morris (op. cit.) argues that, despite the 
massive technological change in the finance sector and the perceived loss of members, talks 
between the two unions did not result in a merger. He argues that internal politics is the 
crucial determinant in a merger because it defines the fi-amework for merger discussions for 
each organisation. Whilst Undy (op. cit.) recognises that internal politics may have some 
influence on trade union merger activity, they tend to classify it as one factor amongst a 
group of internal determinants and not as the primary influence upon behaviour. Undy (op. 
cit.) does not accept that union mergers are primarily determined by conscious policy and 
internal political decisions, although he accepts that they may have some validity by 
including themi amOngst his range of influences oh merger activity.
Morris (op. cit.) argues that factors such as the inability to accommodate the two very 
different philosophies and cultures in a single structure, combined with the perceptions of 
each party about the likelihood of retaining single recognition rights, effectively killed off 
the prospects of the merger in the finance sector. Ironically, he concludes that a prospective 
merger may resurface as the external pressures on unions intensify. As membership 
continues to declme the pressures will grow on the unions to engage in a defensive merger
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despite their wish to maintain their own union culture and separate bargaining rights. (The 
current discussions between BIFU and the clearing bank staff associations, of course, give 
his Morris’ (op. cit.) some credibility.
Morris (op. cit.) concludes that ideological differences between unions may override the 
rational cost/ benefit analysis of merger activity which is central to Undy's (op. cit.) 
approach. He stresses that political differences may derail a merger which in all other ways 
would be a rational development for the parties. Whilst Undy's (op. cit.) model would 
suggest that as membership falls, merger activity will increase. It is notable diat, in some 
cases, mergers stumble at the negotiation stage, suggesting that internal politics can have a 
determining influence on mergers.
Finally, Morris (op. cit.) also argues that Undy (op. cit.) underestimates the impact of 
employer strategies and attitudes. He argues that the laissez-faire attitudes of the bank 
employers has contributed to the maintenance of separate unions. He also suggests that the 
impact of Human Resources Management in encouraging employees to identify more 
closely with their organisation may dissuade members from merging into a larger 
organisation which they perceive as being more distanced from their working environment. 
Morris (op. cit.) suggests this may be particularly important in circumstances where a small 
staff association is approached to join a large trade union.
A further problem with the Undy (op. cit.) classifications is that they can be seen as being 
subjective in their definitions and this may lead to them being unsuitable as the basis for my
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own research. The definitions may prejudice any research based on the classifications. The 
"defensive" category, for example, may imply a position of weakness in the participating 
unions that union officers may be reluctant to admit and therefore it is likely that if the 
classifications were used in research such as this, there would be a tendency by respondents 
to over-emphasise the consolidatory action over the defensive, in order to disguise what 
may be perceived as weakness.
Although the classifications will cover most merger activity between unions there will 
invariably be some mergers which do not rest happily in any of the categories. Unlike the 
defensive and consolidatory mergers, the aggressive merger only adequately accounts for 
the predatory motives of the larger union and says nothing about the motives of the smaller 
body. The categories thereby fail to reflect the often quite different circumstances of a union 
being taken over. The circumstances in which UCATT approached a merger with the 
TGWU including huge financial deficit, high staff turnover and hostile in-fighting are, as 
we shall see, entirely different fi'om the circumstances which surrounded the merger of the 
Northern Rock Building Society SA with BIFU. Here the smaller union was able to 
negotiate very favourable subsidised subscription rates for members, a guaranteed level of 
staff cover and an independent executive council within the banking union. This is hardly 
the position in which a union would expect to find itself having undergone an aggressive 
merger.
The categories also do not encompass the growing trend of cross-sectoral mergers which do 
not result fiom an expansionist policy of aggressive merger by a large trade union.
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Increasingly, unions are showing an interest in joint ventures aimed primarily at obtaining 
services and administrative economies of scale rather than consolidating organisation in a 
given sector. The formation of the Federation involving civil service union IPMS, the 
Society of Telecom Executives, the Communication Managers Association and the Halifax 
Building Society Staff Association, covers a wide range of different sectors and, whilst it 
stops short of a formal integration of organisations, it may be legitimate and useful to class 
this development as a formal merger for the purposes of the study. The federation was 
formed in response to many of the pressures that have pushed other organisations towards 
merger and the perceived benefits of the organisation are couched in the same terms as a 
horizontal merger (shared services, economies of scale, greater access to the media, for 
example). Undy's (op. cit.) categories fail to adequately address such developments.
Despite the limitations of Undy’s (op. cit.) categories however, they are more important 
than the simple, easily understood, environmental mechanism of classification. The analysis 
has some theoretical significance identifying the range and impact of internal union 
dynamics on the merger process. The analysis allows commentators to study and classify 
mergers in a historical context and also to predict merger activity when unions face a series 
of influences. The model allows a snap-shot classification of union merger activity and as 
such provides a vehicle for a study of inter-union power relations at a particular point in 
time. The study has the advantage over studies which link merger activity to broader 
political and economic determinants because factors which determine the classification are 
more easily identified. Moreover, although there are limitations to the Undy (op. cit.) 
analysis, these can be adjusted for by subjecting the classifications to a greater degree of
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analysis than Undy (op. cit.) undertook. In simply setting out to categorise union mergers 
and identify their determinants^ Undy (op. cit.) neglected the theoretical qualities of the tool 
they developed. In seeking to study the relationship between union power and mergers in 
this thesis, an attempt has been made to strengthen the categories by widening the definition 
of mergers (to include developments over the time of the merger process and include joint 
ventures which share common objectives with mergers) and ensuring that the analysis does 
not focus on one partner at the expense of ignoring the motivations of the other.
Undy - Causes and Consequences
In Trade Union Mergers - Causes and Consequences, Undy (1993) goes on to identify some 
of the implications of the merger activity he has identified in his earlier work. He identifies, 
the majority of mergers in recent times (1978-93) as being consolidatory with a tendency 
for unions to merge in order to break into new sectors (for example, BIFUs merger with 
GRESU opened up the wider finance sector to the banking union) and to stifle inter-union 
conflict (for example, the SOGAT/ NGA and NUPE/NALGO mergers led to a reduction in 
inter-union competition for members). Undy concludes that the primary determinant of 
merger activity is as a method by which unions increase recruitment when confronted with a 
declining level of union membership.
The main determinants of a decision by unions to embark on a merger are, Undy (op. cit.) 
notes, financial (with only a minority of mergers, in fact, offering initial savings), 
bargaining considerations and a desire to dominate job territory, the internal political
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balance of the union and the level of membership services on offer. In summary, Undy 
declares that merger activity amongst smaller unions has primarily been defensive whilst 
the motives of larger unions are more diverse. Some unions have developed a focused 
strategy of activity within a given sector (BIFU in the finance sector for example) whilst 
others TGWU, GMB and MSF have sought mergers to bolster membership and increase 
influence in what Undy describes as "market share unionism" (op. cit. p i5).
Although the title of his work refers to the consequences of merger activity, these are 
relegated to a largely secondary section of the study and are, in summary, rather narrow and 
internally focused in their conclusions. Undy (op. cit.) finds, for example, that the 
consequence of merger activity is a concentration of union members in fewer organi^tions 
but it falls short of industrial unionism. The financial benefits of merger are only apparent in 
the long-term and the eradication of inter-union rivalry is an important element in savings. 
Whilst the bargaining position for unions is generally improved post merger, unions are still 
often compelled to operate in a hostile environment. The opportunities for growth diminish 
in the short-term as the merger leads to less activity on individual recruitment but in the 
long-term the merger provides additional resources for growth. Undy (op. cit.) concludes 
that merging will form a key part of a union’s role in the nineties and that whilst there will 
be benefits in terms of savings, central control over finances and reduced inter-union 
competition. The strategy will not open the low density, new job territories to unionisation 
and essentially, he concludes, it is a defensive strategy.
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Undy (op. cit.) fails to link his analysis of the consequences of merger activities to his 
earlier study in which the classification of the different types of merger were presented. His 
study is weaker as a result. Undy (op. cit.) fails to explain, for instance, why a pattern of 
consolidatory mergers is essentially a defensive strategy when the pre-emptive nature of 
such mergers may leave unions well placed and resourced to tackle the non-unionised 
sector. In the latter study, Undy (op. cit.) has illustrated some of the external determinants 
which may have an impact on power relations between employers and the union, which 
may be affected by changes in government, bargaining strategy and inter-union 
competition. However, he fails to link tiiese factors to his own earlier analysis of the 
underlying internal determinants of the merger process and in so doing tends to produce a 
study more rooted in the historical process fi'om which he had distanced himself, than in an 
investigation of the dynamics of union power post-merger. The study does not present any 
Jformal model or mechanism for the study of the consequences of union mergers other than 
Undy’s (op. cit.) own observations of union behaviour over time. No attempt is made to 
isolate the consequences of merger from other determinants of behaviour or to compare the 
influence of unions who have been involved in a merger with those who have not. There has 
been no attempt to study relate, in anyway, the union’s performance in collective 
bargaining to its involvement in a merger. _____
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A Unified Approach
The study of trade union mergers has traditionally focused on the impact of environmental 
factors such as the economy, structure of collective bargaining or government as the 
primary determinants of merger activity, or else, primarily through case studies research, it 
has examined the internal features of union structure which influence union policy in 
relation to mergers. Studying merger activity between 1892-87 Waddington (1995) attempts 
in his latest work to bridge the dichotomy between the environmental and internal theorists. 
He labels them the 'Industrialisation' and 'Institutional theorists.
Waddington (op. cit.) traces the development of the industrialisation or internal theorists 
such as Berstein (1960) and Dunlop (1986), who focus on an internal explanation for the 
structural cycles of merger activity. Unions are seen as reacting consistently over time and 
theorists attempt to define and identify the merger types. Waddington (op. cit.) questions the 
validity of an approach which attempts to glean some general insight into merger activity 
from specific case studies. He questions the validity of an assumption that case studies will 
have a general and consistent application. Waddington (op. cit.) cites Chitayat (1979) who 
has argued that there was no future for a general study of union mergers because each union 
was an independent organisation working to different policies and priorities vrith a different 
set of resources. Similarly, Waddington (op. cit.) also critically reviews the work of the 
institutional theorists such as Clegg (1976), who relate union behaviour primarily to 
environmental factors such as tire activities of employers and the state.
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He questions the extent to which the internal dynamics of a union, merger can be separated 
from their external influences. In short, Waddington (op. cit.) is critical of both the 
traditional schools of union merger theory on the grounds that neither properly reflects or 
classifies merger activity, in doing so he puts forward a new theory, which draws on the 
findings of both schools, to take the debate on mergers a step forward.
Waddington (op. cit.) now accepts that both traditional approaches have some merits and 
attempts to link the two through the examination of the inter-relationship between three sets 
of relationships (bargaining position in relation to the employer, position in relation to other 
unions and factional bargaining within unions), which he calls 'VAe politics o f bargaining". 
Waddmgton (op. cit.) contends that this approach, as well as incorporating key features 
from the environmental and structural determinants, also gives some scope in which to 
analyse changes in the rate and character of a unions structural development, Using the 
Kondratieff cycles of economic boom and slump, Waddington (op. cit.) locates key changes 
in union merger activity within two distinct historical periods, pre-war (1892-1939) and 
post-war (1946-1987). This primarily environmental approach is expanded to include 
reference to the internal dynamics in his analysis of the differences between the two periods.
Waddington (op. cit.) identifies the move to national collective bargaining as the key 
component of trade union merger activity in the first period. He argues that the development 
of national multi-employer bargaining led to unions merging in order to secure rights to 
national bargaining by merging with organisations that had national coverage. This pattern
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of trade union mergers into national organisations set limits on the scope of mergers and the 
range of partners. Waddington (op. cit.) stresses that employers were compelled to grant 
recognition to the merged union when faced with an increase in the bargaining strength of 
the unions, whilst for the trade unions, the merger was a means of securing greater 
bargaining strength. As Waddington states: "Structural and constitutional centralisation to 
accommodate changed bargaining structures was the object o f the merger process before 
7PiP".(op. cit. p7)
In the second wave of merger activity, 1946-1987, union structural reform results, he 
argues, from the move away from multi-employer and towards single employer bargaining. 
Union structural reform is heralded by rising costs of professional bargaining services and 
attempts to preserve influence within the TUC. The state and employers were both able to 
influence the transition in merger activity. The state was able to raise the costs of bargaining 
indirectly by developing a carpet of employment law which required a class of union 
professionals to enforce and regulate its provisions replacing non-specialist negotiators. 
Employers were able to carve out a more direct impact through moves towards 
decentralised bargaining. The resultant economic pressures on trade unions led to a re- 
invigoration of merger activity but this time vertical mergers aimed at securing national 
bargaining were abandoned in favour of horizontal mergers, based on a similar political 
outlook within unions, primarily designed to control costs and defend bargaining services. 
The political position in 1979 had a particular impact on merger activity by creating within 
unions a recognisable desire to preserve their autonomy and independence in a hostile 
pohtical environment. It is argued that mergers were adopted as a mechanism by unions to
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address a decline in membership and a result of a requirement to protect a level of union 
services.
Waddington (op. cit. plO) notes that the breakdown of the “Praetorian Guard'” influence of 
TUC policy, by which the central organisation was able to safeguard regulation of inter­
union competition which previously maintained a degree of control within unions and 
secured adherence to a centrahsed labour movement pohcy and created a further tension of 
competition in merger policies. It is argued that a shared pohtical outlook which formed the 
basis u f fair cumpcliliun between unions was no longer possible once the TUC had 
relinquished some authority in this area. Waddington (op. cit.) cites the aggressive market- 
based unionism of the EEPTU, which was attractive to many of the staff associations which 
joined it, as being a direct consequence of a weakened central line on merger pohcy within 
the TUC (which at the time had greater concerns with the onset of the first wave of trade 
union "reform"). In this respect Waddington's (op. cit.) analysis owes something to Morris' 
analysis of the way in which mergers in the banking unions have been deflected by the 
different pohtical outlooks of the organisations involved.
Waddington (op. cit.) also notes that, in contrast to the first wave of merger activity, a
structural mechanism which allowed autonomy in bargaining by estabhshing trade groups 
was a key component of the second wave of merger activity. Indeed, he argues the degree of 
autonomy in bargaining that was offered often influenced the acceptance of union mergers.
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On the basis of his historical analysis Waddington goes on to predict that the "urge to 
merge" (op. cit. pi 53) will remain integral to the development of unions who will continue 
to face increasing administrative costs, membership decline and bargaining weakness 
relative to the employer. The trend which developed between 1966-87 in particular will 
continue, and may even accelerate, as small unions seek transfers or acquisition in order to 
protect their bargaining services and larger unions merge in search of economies of scale.
Towards a New Approach
Waddington's (op. cit.) analysis marks a departure from estabhshed theory in the 
development of trade union mergers in that he attempts to marry the concept of 
environmental determinism with the view that merger activity is primarily defined by the 
union's internal structure and objectives. This is an exciting development but one in which 
Waddington (op. cit.), in the writer’s view, is only partially successful. In attempting to 
marry the two arguments together Waddington introduces a factor "the politics o f 
bargaining" (op. cit. p4) which is designed to act as the bridge by which the internal 
structure of the union adapts (through rational action) to the environmental determinants 
which surround it. In short, the internal goals of the union are viewed, not simply in relation 
to the internal determinants of union organisation, but also on how these factors are affected 
by developments in the surrounding environment. The case study technique of Undy (1981) 
and others is revised to examine the impact of external factors on internal structures whilst 
the environmental determinism of Clegg (1976) or Buchanen(1981), for example, is
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translated into one (important) factor which unions must take into account when pursuing 
their organisational strategy.
Waddington (1995) claims that his work spans the divide between a view of iinion mergers 
based on the internal or external dynamic yet in this he is not wholly successful. The merits 
of a comprehensive identification of the range of determinants which influence union 
mergers is tarnished by the conclusions which in a sense re-confirm the essential
I
intemal/extemal dichotomy. Despite a model that claims to step outside the traditional view 
to give a wider outlook, the conclusions derive fi'om as a mixture of the established theories 
of which he is critical. In the first period, merger activity moves unions towards national 
bargaining. This is seen as the key motivational factor in merger activity pushing unions 
directly into amalgamations which would give access to multi-employer bargaining 
structures. Broadly the environment, through developments in collective bargaining, is 
viewed as the key element. In contrast, the financial crisis in unions is seen as the key 
(internal) determinant for unions to embark on what Undy (1981)would identify as a 
strategy of defensive or consolidatory mergers in the second wave of merger. In each case 
one can argue that Waddington (op. cit.) has inadequately addressed the excluded dynamic. 
For example, in the first period, internal dynamics in the move towards national bargaining 
are downplayed and the question of whether union's consciously pushed for access to 
national bargaining largely ignored. Yet it does not seem questionable that unions should 
seek to drive national bargaining to increase their access to pohtical influence and secure 
access to a wider range of members. Similarly, the focus on internal influences when 
merger activity was a concerted response by the organisations to protect membership and
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services means that the impact of external determinants is downplayed. Waddington (op. 
cit.) recognises that the hostile economic and financial environment had an impact on the 
policies adopted by the TUC during the eighties. However, he does not properly address the 
proposition that the changing political environment and the development of employment 
legislation may have been indirectly responsible for the financial crisis affecting other 
unions and a decline in membership. Whilst the proposition is considered, the main weight 
of the argument focuses on merger activity as a rational and concerted internal union 
response to external difficulties and pressures.
It is to be recognised, however, that the attempt by Waddington (op. cit.) to develop a 
theory of union mergers which embraces environmental and structural determinism is to be 
applauded. The difficulty identified in Waddington’s (op. cit.) attempt s to bridge the 
internal / external debate can be explained by the fact that unions are independent operators 
widlin the labour market and economy they vrill always be in a position where they will 
take the decisions which govern their structures. Sometimes these will be directly traceable 
to an internal strategy and sometimes they will be in response to environmental influences. 
The fact that similar unions may react differently in relation to their own strategy for 
growth, for example when faced with similar pressures externally, means that ultimately the 
focus on union merger activity must rest on the decision making process and the political 
outlook and activity of the various components of the trade union. The approach owes 
considerable debt to Morris, but recognises that the political outlook of a union is made up 
of a variety of views and expressed by shifting alliances and personalities. The structure of 
the work also owes a debt to Undy, (op. cit.) whose categories of union merger provide the
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starting point for an analysis which, given the emphasis on political outlook, will be rooted 
in a case study approach. It is intended, however, to develop both the categories themselves 
and the case study technique in order to identify, not the factors and processes which 
underpin a union merger, but also the development of the merger process and, in turn, the 
impact of the new organisation.
Whilst Waddington (op. cit.) claims that the second wave of merger activity resulted from 
the desire by unions to preserve bargaining services when faced with a declining 
membership and rising costs, these mergers is seen primarily as a defensive mechanism to 
stave off further decline, or at best maintain the status, of existing services and membership. 
However, this analysis ignores the degree to which the merger may be a vehicle for 
extending the interests of membership and increasing union power, particularly in a hostile 
environment. For this reason, it is important that the effects of the merger on union structure 
and bargaining power are examined in a study such as this, Whilst such an approach will 
invariably have to examine the circumstances and motives for the merger amongst the 
partners, it will also involve a departure from a traditional focus on the internal structure of 
the union and the impact of external factors upon it and move towards an approach which
examines the internal structures of the union and then assesses the impact of these on the
.. . - : . - . '  - - - -   -  ■ '  --------
external bargaining environment. In so doing, a study may be able to address the question of 
whether the second wave of merger activity identified by Waddington (op. cit.) has actually 
succeeded in shoring up membership and bargaining services as he implies or whether, in 
advancing union bargaining power, union members have been well served by the trend 
towards merger activity.
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The other difficulty that can be identified in Waddington’s (op. cit.) analysis is the 
concentration on only two periods of merger activity (each spanning approximately fifty 
years) and three waves of mergers. In basing his analysis on the long trends in rising and 
falling economic activity identified by Kondratieff, one can argue that Waddington (op. cit.) 
is not in a position to differentiate sufficiently between different developments in politics 
and collective bargaining. For example, Waddington (op. cit.) identifies his third wave of 
merger activity as being after 1979 on the grounds that this period marks the a change in the 
cultural and political support for collective bargaining and an acceleration of move towards 
company and local bargaining that had its roots in the fifties. This clearly ignores the 
complexity of developments in this period. The move towards company and local 
bargaining was not a constant, gradual development over the period but the direct result of 
pohtical and economic initiatives. Waddington (op. cit.) notes, for example, that the 
increase in union instabihty became much more pronounced after 1979, when the changed 
pohtical environment resulted in less pressure on employers to concede recognition and 
more freedom to extend lower wages and fiexible work practices against a background of 
mass unemployment. Waddington (op. cit.) notes that dissolution or break-ups amongst 
smaller unions increase during this period as membership and pohtical influence waned. 
Merger activity, he argues was the direct result of the decline m membership and the failure 
of unions to secure a substantial recruitment foothold in the areas of employment growth. 
Yet whilst the first of these elements can be traced to 1979 and a departure from the 
consensus supporting corporatism in relation to industrial relations; the second was a failure 
of unions in the seventies to anticipate the growth of private sector services at the expense
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of the manufacturing sector. The latter was compounded in the eighties with the growth in 
flexible employment poUcies and a decline in traditional sectors of employment. The long 
waves of union merger activity identified by Waddington (op. cit.) mask a range of 
pressures upon unions and organisational responses to them.
Finally, in his analysis, Waddington (op. cit.) claims that declining membership, combined 
with the move to localised bargaining led to a policy amongst unions to merge in order to 
avert financial difficulties and protect their bargaining services. In this study on the impact 
of union mergers upon organisation and bargaining power, it is hoped that we can consider 
not only the degree to which the strategy was successful in preserving estabhshed services, 
but also whether or not developments had a positive impact on union power within a hostile 
environment.
Power Theories
Having explored the hterature on trade union mergers and the primary determinants of 
union merger activity, it is necessary to evaluate the definition and determinants of union 
power so that we can focus on the relationship between these two concepts. If anything, the
determinants of union power will be more difficult to isolate given that there will be a 
greater range of potential influences on power and power relations, which may operate in 
several dimensions. Moreover, an investigation of power wih also be complicated because 
several factors other than the exercise of power may influence outcomes, and the analyst 
must take steps to control these in order to produce a credible assessment. For example, a
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measurement of trade union bargaining power that did not in some way allow for the 
economic environment in which bargaining occurs would not properly investigate union 
power. It is clear that factors such as the level of unemployment and inflation have a clear 
impact on union bargaining power and the outcomes of negotiations between union and 
employers.
A brief conceptual study of power and theories relating to union power will be followed by 
a short discussion exploring an assessment of union power for the purposes of this study 
and how determinants and dimensions of power identified in the hterature might be of 
assistance to us in isolating the impact of union mergers fi'om a more general study of union 
power.
The First Dimension of Power
Conceptual studies of power are rooted in the seminal work on the issue published by 
Weber (1968) in the 1870s. Weber indicated that the exercising of power could be identified 
in the "securing o f wills" (op. cit. p. 87) to a particular behef or course of action. The two 
components of comphance (and therefore power) were legitimacy, that the body exercising 
the power had the right to do so and force, the exercise of power through violence. Weber 
(op. cit.) identified government as the organisation that maintained control over the 
legitimate use of violence within a state.
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Weber's (op. cit.) analysis was hugely influential on the work of Dahl (1961)in his study of 
the application of power in New Haven in the sixties. In 'Who Governs?' Dahl (op. cit.)) 
deconstructed the decision making process in a small New England town in order to 
discover whether participants in decision making had put forward alternative courses of 
action to those proposed by the authorities and whether these were accepted, vetoed or 
amended, (and then accepted). In studying the number of successes and defeats, which 
resulted fi'om various propositions, Dahl (op. cit.)established a league table in which the 
participating groups that secured the greatest number of successes were identified as the 
groups exercising the greatest amount of power. Dahl's (op. cit.) work has much in common 
with a later study of power in trade unions conducted by Martin who identifies power as 
“the success o f one group in obtaining compliance with its wishes regardless o f the 
opposition o f others ”( 1986 p.4).
In the analysis of power adopted by Dahl (op. cit.) and Martin (op. cit.), the processes and 
place in which the concept is measured become the central determinant of the definition 
adopted. Power is assessed in relation to the range of decisions made and measured against 
concrete observable processes, either decision making in a town or in a company. 
Underpinning the analysis is the assumption that the different groups involved in the 
decision-making process are in conflict and that there exists what Polsby has termed “an 
objectivity o f interests, "(1963 p i36) since observable conflict is seen in specific policy 
preferences realised through political participation.
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Dahl's (op. cit.) analysis, and his conclusions that different groups won the struggle for 
power on different occasions depending on the issues dehated and the alliances formed, 
quickly resulted in the work becoming the central tenet of pluralist interpretations of power 
relations in the ÙS. Dahl's (op. cit.) work boosted the established order view of power and 
decision-making in the US. Politicians responded primarily to the view of the majority 
whilst interest groups were free to form and lobby local decision-making, (which they may 
or may not influence depending upon the support that they could muster for their 
propositions). Conflict of interest and controversy are evident but power rests across the 
community, (and not with any single interest group), the outcomes of a decision are 
therefore dependent upon the processes which groups adopt in order to secure their interests 
and not on the will of any single body or individual.
The Second Dimension of Power
Dahl's (op. cit.) vindication of the status quo in relation to the decision making process was challenged 
by Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) in their analysis of race relations in Baltimore. They concluded 
that the overt mobihsation of support studied by Dahl (op. cit.) was an important measure of power, 
however, it did not examine those situations where parties to a decision obtained a successful outcome 
by acting to prevent a decision being made or a proposal being discussed. There is no recognised 
'success' because no formal decision has been made although one of the party's has secured an 
objective in preventing the decision being made. The Bachrach and Baratz (op. cit.) analysis examined 
power in relation to the decision making process and agenda, where individuals and groups can be
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seen exercising power through control of the decision making process. In their study, Bachrach anc 
Baratz (op. cit.) found that decisions were limited to uncontroversial, safe issues on which ar 
unanimity of view could be secured.
They concluded therefore that any realistic attempt to measure power must focus on both 
the decision making process and the process of what they termed 'non-decision making'.{op. 
cit. pl21-346) In reaching these conclusions the debate about power shifted from a focus 
on the political issues to examine decision making as a dynamic political process.
The Third Dimension of Power
Lukes (1977) re-invigorated the power debate in the 1970s with a fierce critique of power 
studies which concentrated on observable behaviour. Lukes derided Dahl's (op. cit.) 
pluralist view of power as being 'one dimensional'{op. cit. p28) in focusing exclusively on 
decisions taken. He stressed that, in concentrating the analysis on decisions taken, the study 
was simply reaffirming and perpetuating the values and bias inherent in the system being 
studied. Dahl's (op. cit.) assertion that New Haven government was open and responsive on 
the basis that decisions are shared amongst participants vyas misleading because it 
concentrated solely on those parties who had access to the decision-making process in the 
first place. Dahl's (op. cit.) analysis failed to capture those exercising power to ensure that 
some groups were excluded from the decision making process and some issues were not 
decided or even discussed.
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The Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) view, which Lukes terms the ’two dimensional' (op. 
cit. p76) or reformist view, went some way to recognising that power may be exercised 
outside the formal decision-making structures but it also lacked a comprehensive analysis. 
The Bachrach and Baratz (op. cit.) study, in concentrating on the measures adopted by the 
mayor of Baltimore to prevent discussion on a range of proposals arising from the black 
community (poverty task-force, new appointments and welfare reform), neglected the 
complex and subtle structures such as institutional discrimination which resulted in blacks 
being excluded from the decision making process. Power, Lukes (op. cit.) argued, operates 
within a much wider fi'amework than either Dahl (1961)or even Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 
1963) were prepared to appreciate. The study of power is not simply confined to a study of 
the decisions which were or were not taken but, more importantly the way in which systems 
operate to prevent an issue arising or being pursued.
In order to obtain the full picture of the way in which power operates, Lukes(op. cit.) argued 
that the notion of power in the second dimension must be superseded by a radical view 
which tackles the exercise of power in a further dimension - where the latent power is 
exercised to prevent a grievance ever arising. In effect such a concept, focusing on what is 
prevented and does not occur, is extremely difficult to measure. Lukes (op. cit.), however, 
concluded that a study is possible and cited a study of air pollution in the US by Crenson 
(1971). He studied the emergence of air pollution legislation in a number of US states and 
discovered that legislation occurred much sooner in some cities than it did in others. 
Crenson (op. cit.) argued that the reason for this was that newly formed anti-pollution
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groups found it easier to engage the political process in some states than in others. 
Moreover, he identified this process by the relative latent power that the formal decision 
makers attributed to industrial interests in the state. For example, a large US steel company 
was able to delay the adoption of pollution legislation in several states and to influence the 
structure of legislation when it was adopted.
This was achieved without any direct participation in the decision making process. Crenson 
(op. cit.) concluded that the reputation for power in the company was enough to influence 
the political debate without direct intervention and that this constituted the exercise of 
power without activity.
Drawing extensively on this view, Lukes (1977) identified several difficulties with his 
analysis of power in the third dimension but stressed that these are not insurmountable. 
Firstly, whilst the interests of the populace are fairly clear and indisputable in relation to air 
pollution, few issues are likely to be as clear cut as Crenson's (op. cit.). The scope for 
determining the interests of a group are much more likely to be subjective and as a result it 
may be difficult to establish where latent power has been exercised. There is also the 
difficulty of why, if latent power is acting against the interests of the populace, measures are 
not forthcoming to protect their interest and bring the decision making processes into the 
observable second or first dimensions (where power is accountable). Lukes (1977) argued 
that the populace are prevented from acting in their own interests because of the process of 
'ideological hegemony'. This process, which was identified by Gramsci (1971), results in the 
dominant group within a society being able to instil the prevailing ideology to the
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subservient group so that, in time, the latter come to embrace the ideals of dominance. 
Lukes (op. cit.) illustrated his proposition with examples from the Indian caste system in 
which lower caste members were prepared to adopt the aspirations of a higher caste even 
though to do so is theoretically forbidden by their own caste structure, 'Sanskritisation' 
(p38).
The practical difficulties of measuring a concept rooted in activity by far outweigh all the 
others. Lukes (op. cit.) concept of power is based on the suppression of views and the 
process of inaction which may even be unconscious. He addressed this difficulty in 
stressing the causal relationship between inaction and the non-appearance of a political 
event arguing that inactivity can be identified in tracing processes historically from when an 
expected political outcome failed to materialise. As for unconscious inactivity, Lukes (op. 
cit.)argued that the role of political structures in a non-decision needs to be separated from 
intentional action. He cites the debate between Poulantzas (1973) and Milliband (1973) 
which discusses whether the primary determinant of latent power is structural (the state) or 
intentional (the class). Poulantzas (op. cit.) argued that outcomes can be confined solely to 
the inter-relation of structure, whilst Milliband espoused the view that social groupings and 
not structures, determine outcomes and criticised Polantzas (op. cit.) on the grounds that his 
"structural determinism essentially creates a different view between the state, and the 
institutions within it" (op. cit. pl36). Lukes (1977)appeared to support Milliband's (1973) 
analysis which, in stressing that an analysis of power is useful only where the responsibility 
for an outcome can be identified, claims that the social groupings and not structures must be 
the focus for a study of latent power.
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Power Theories and Industrial Relations
These theoretical frameworks of power relations have been applied, to differing degrees, to ' 
the relationship between employers and trade unions. Kirkbride (1984) in his article on 
power attempts to apply a multi-dimensional view of power to the industrial relations 
environment by studying the outcomes of decision-making in the context of collective 
bargaining. The study focuses on both the study of outcomes and environmental factors in 
an analysis of power. In his study of the one dimensional view, Kirkbride (op. cit.) describes 
those commentators who believe that power can be determined by the extent to which one 
party to the negotiations can secure their aims over the other. Power is determined, 
therefore, in relation to those activities which influence the degree of success in negotiations 
directly, such as union density and prevalence of strike activity.
Pluralist View
The pluralist view in industrial relations has attempted to assess the primary determinants of 
union power solely in the first dimension of power (the formal bargaining process). 
Different pluralists have stressed the importance of single factors influencing success but a 
lengthy critical analysis by Martin (1986) suggests that the notion that there is one indicator 
of union successes in collective bargaining is misguided.
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Flanders (1965) suggested that the key determinant of trade union power was union density, 
arguing that the higher union density was the more powerful the union. Since density is in 
no way an accurate indication of the degree of union activity this view has been criticised 
by Martin (op. cit.) amongst others. High union density far from guaranteeing lots of union 
activity may, ironically, suggest less activity. Unions may become complacent and inactive 
or may choose to concentrate on areas where density is lower seeking to increase the overall 
level of membership.
Closely alhed to the work of Flanders (op. cit), Hines (1964) suggests üiat the key way in 
which union power can be assessed is in the rate of change in unionisation. Again Martin 
(op. cit.) is critical, this time because he claims that the rate of change in unionisation is not 
linked to bargaining strategy or earnings. Whilst one would expect individuals to join where 
a union was effective in negotiations, it is clear that the individuals may choose to fr^-ride 
when the union is effective, choosing not to join because they perceive no individual 
advantage in doing so. Similarly, individuals faced with ineffective bargaining may choose 
to join the union on the grounds that they will be better protected as individuals if a hard­
line in bargaining by the employer signals the need for job losses in the future.
Other plurahst analysis focuses on strike activity as the key determinant of union power in 
negotiations. However, strikes may be more likely when management are confident that 
they can withstand them as well as when unions are confident that they are in the stronger 
position (strikes are probably most likely when both sides are confident of victory). Martin
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(op. cit.) criticises the focus on strike activity at the expense of other industrial action, such 
overtime bans and working to rule etc.
He also suggests that analysts, like Clegg, (1976), who look to the result of strike activity 
may reach unrepresentative conclusions because the determinant of power is identified 
within a specific time period and not examined in the long term. As a result, the analysis 
may ignore longer term factors such as the concept of a party strategically losing a strike in 
the short-term in order to place themselves in a better position in the long term. The short­
term focus may suggest a different distribution of power than the longer term outlook.
In a study in the US, Bachrach and Lawler (1980) attempted to link trade union power to the 
bargaining tactics adopted by the union negotiator. The study examined how bargainers 
evaluated their own power, considered the likelihood of it having to be used and attempted 
to anticipate the bargaining tactics adopted by their opponents. Similarly, Abell (1975) 
attempted to measure power through successes in the formal bargaining arena by focusing 
on the perceptions of those directly involved in negotiations. However, he was forced to 
admit that any model focusing on the degree to which demands are met is likely to ignore 
the intricacies of the bargaining process in which the true aims of bargainers are shielded 
behind rhetoric and claims, where goals are attained at a sacrifice during the bargaining 
process. Martin (op. cit.)is critical of the studies, suggesting that a focus on bargainers may 
be misleading because bargainers rarely, if ever, hope to achieve a claim in full and will 
always seek to justify the outcome of bargaining in terms of having achieved their
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objectives. Industrial relations, like politics, is a victim of a culture which places an 
emphasis on “selling” a deal or putting “spin” on an outcome.
Having identified the arena and main proponents of a single dimension of power in 
industrial relations, Kirkbride (1984) argues that an analysis of power which focuses on 
successes in bargaining is insufficient because it fails to address adequately the win/win 
outcome which accompanies the vaist majority of collective bargaining. The pluralist 
analysis is restrictive because it fails to consider the depth or scale of a single successfiil 
outcome focusing purely on quantitative indicators. Kirkbride (op. cit.) notes that, in reality, 
a single victory in pay bargaining may be a more rehable indicator of power relation than 
several failures in negotiating car parking facihties and questions the validity of a measure 
which attributes a similar level of importance to both outcomes.
Kirkbride (op. cit.) has more sympathy with the two dimensional view of powCT which 
focuses on control of the bargaining agenda. He is supported by the study of the coal 
industry conducted by Christine Edwards (1978) which indicated that managers placed 
great emphasis on being able to control the 'mobilisation of bias' on issues and in doing so 
determined the bargaining agenda. Edwards (op. cit.) champions the view that focusing 
exclusively on observable behaviour may seriously underestimate the abiUty of dominant 
groups in our society to get their own way. She quotes the analysis by Fox that "it is 
precisely in the power relationships where power disparity is greatest that its active 
exercise is least necessary" (1976 pl27). Edwards (op. cit.) found that there were a variety 
of ways in local negotiations in which power was exercised to prevent items being
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discussed at the bargaining table. She cited the fact that unions did not raise matters which 
they knew had been turned down in the past and the fact that neither local managers nor 
unions became involved in decisions which were the recognised prerogative of those further 
up the respective hierarchy. Edwards (op. cit.)concluded that resolution of conflict through 
the exercise of bargaining power, which she defined as a situation where the issue is 
resolved at the expense of one of the parties, was a relatively rare occurrence.
Social Theory
Kirkbride's (1984) own analysis of power focuses on the social and cultural processes that 
surround collective bargaining as the primary determinants of bargaining power. He 
identifies two determinants which can influence the outcomes of bargaining in the first and 
second dimension of power - rhetoric and culture. Rhetoric can have a positive impact on 
union power in clarifying arguments and, in so doing, influencing the degree of legitimacy 
and support which the union can muster. Similarly, managers use rhetoric to shore-up and 
advance their own power and legitimacy, primarily through the concepts of managerial 
prerogative and economic efficiency. Cultural factors are also likely to influence power 
relations. Kirkbride (op. cit.) highhghts the relationship between the subordinate and the 
superior as a key determinant of union and managerial power. Using international and 
historical data he concludes that individuals are more likely to disagree with their employer 
in large factories, where the relationship between a manager and the subordinates is less 
close than in a smaller workplace. He cites the history of what he calls 'conflictpreference'
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(Thomas 1997), how ingrained confrontation is ingrained in organisational culture, as being 
an important factor. Kirkbride (op. cit.) concludes that the key factors of rhetoric and culture 
are the subtle processes by which power is exercised during collective bargaining. In 
modem collective bargaining neither managers or employees have a direct interest in 
mobihsing their resources throughout the bargaining process, so the key to success is the 
strength of argument and the degree of legitimacy which can be promoted by either side. 
Kirkbride (op. cit.) suggests that only when the mask of the bargaining process shps is the 
overt exercise of power necessary at all. Power it seems is, for the most part, only exercised 
on the peripheries of tlic bargaining structures.
Kirkbride's (op. cit.)argument that power is essentially a feature of social and cultural 
determinants finds some degree of support in the concepts of organisational development 
and human resource management which place particular importance on cultural change and 
shift and on the language of bargaining. Kirkbride (op. cit.) might argue that the rhetorical 
phrases such as "downsizing", "empowerment", "team working" and "consultative bodies" 
are in fact subtle manifestations of power relations being exercised in the bargaining forum. 
Whilst at first glance Kirkbride's (op. cit.) emphasis on secondary or indirect factors being 
the primary determinant of power relations may seem to echo Lukes' (1977) emphasis on 
power, in the secondary and tertiary sphere, the theories are different. Whilst Lukes (op. cit.) 
concentrates on the way in which power is exercised in different spheres of activity, he 
nevertheless attaches overwhelming importance to exercising power either directly or in the 
primary or secondary dimension. In contrast, Kirkbride (op. cit) concentrates on the
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bargaining culture as being the major determinants of bargaining parameters, and therefore 
power.
The importance of cultural and rhetorical factors as major factors to be mobihsed in 
opposition to change is a well-documented argument particularly from UK manufacturers 
driving change on brown field sites. A paper by Bernard Preston of Rolls Royce (1996) 
clearly demonstrates the emphasis that the company placed on cultural change as a 
prerequisite to improvement in business practices, reduction in staff numbers, new 
individualised pay structures and reform of the trade unions - all clearly symptoms of 
change in the bargaining power relationship. Preston (op. cit.) is keen to contrast the 
requirement to change culture at the Rolls Royce site, from a standard hierarchical model to 
a team based system with the practice of Nissan who on opening their Washington site 
immediately introduced a team-based culture.
In bargaining, the importance of legitimacy is demonstrable in the methods which 
bargaining parties employ to persuade their members or employees of the merits of the case. 
This pitch for support often culminates in a struggle for the support of employees in a ballot 
on the proposals or on measures to oppose them. The battle for legitimacy also stems 
outside the bargaining frumework when parties launch appeals on issues to the wider public. 
Huge importance is attached to winning pubhc support for one of the partners involved in 
bargaining. The huge publicity campaigns launched by workers in dispute with their 
employer(such as those of the Railway Signalmen or Post Office staff two years ago), the 
presence of the General Secretary of the union and his opposite number in the Company on
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the Today programme or television and articles by Companies and unions involved in 
disputes in the newspapers, all indicate the importance of winning the public's support.
However, despite the persuasiveness of the argument and the ample empirical evidence of 
firms seeking to change organisational culture and drive change in employee relations 
securing legitimacy for their proposals, there are several difficulties with the Kirkbride 
(1984) model. Firstly, social determinism places undue importance on the bargaining whilst 
ignoring other factors which may have an impact on power relations. The model does not 
account for the impact of external factors such as unemployment or internal factors (such as 
the level of union membership), both of which may have an impact on bargaining power. 
Moreover, the cultural emphasis appears to ignore the possibihty that culture and rhetoric 
may be a symptom of power relations as opposed to a determinant. In other words, the 
change driven in culture pursued in the late eighties may reflect wider changes in power 
relations in bargaining which allowed managers to pursue a programme of change. Finally, 
the model places emphasis on the bargaining cultures as opposed to the bargaining itself. It 
appears to down play the fact that bargaining cultures form the parameters for decision 
making but decisions are still taken within these fiumeworks. The evidence presented by 
Kirkbride (op. cit.)does not include a study of decision outcomes in a variety of different 
bargaining cultures and it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which the conclusions of 
bargaining can be held to be determined by the prevalent culture. Kirkbride, (op. cit.) in 
stressing cultural determinants and social processes, neglects the. determination of power in 
the first and third dimension. He comments on the determination of the bargaining agenda 
but fails to explore circumstances where overt or latent power is exercised. The
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investigation by Kirkbride (op. cit.), in contrast to, that of Lukes (1977), is a more thorough 
examination of power determin^ts in a narrower field.
Secondly, there are several difficulties with the emphasis on the importance of legitimacy. 
Securing the support of employees or members is obviously a key indicator of power but 
begs the question as to the degree to which power is exercised in attaining support and the 
degree to Wiich it is exercised subsequently. The degree of support amongst the 
membership for a strike is one factor in its success but there have been several examples of 
disputes which have been well supported by members (Wapping, P&O, Bumstalls, for 
example), that have not resulted in a victory for the union. Similarly, disputes in which the 
pubhc has expressed a strong degree of support for the union, for example support for the 
nurses action against local pay bargaining or support for the miners struggle against pit 
closures, have stiU proved unsuccessful. Similarly, pubhc discontent with the strikes by the 
teachers over the national curriculum did not prevent the union from securing fundamental 
changes in workloads. Moreover, approaches to the employees/members and the pubhc 
may be conducted for a number of reasons that may influence the conduct of a dispute but 
are not in themselves related to the outcome. For example, a range of communication may 
be apphed to securing support for an issue on which employees have only very limited 
impact - such as human rights abuses in Brazil. Likewise, pubhc support may not be aimed 
at support (and power) per se but on a financial impact on the decision making process, or a 
way of persuading or dissuading the Government (or other external sources of power) from 
becoming involved.
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Finally, the social analysis focusing as it does on bargaining culture and the importance of 
legitimacy, does not adequately address those situations where the parties to bargaining 
agree measures to change culture or structures and do not struggle to secure support 
amongst their employees or members. In recent years, for example, bargaining partners 
have been supportive of joint initiatives on training such as the National Education and 
Training Targets or the TECs in-work training programmes whilst the employees/members 
and the public have remained broadly sceptical or apathetic in relation to these initiatives.
Environmental Determinism
Whilst Kirkbride (1984) focuses on cultural determinants of power in bargaining, others focus on the 
environment in which bargaining is conducted. In the US, Mishell (1986) suggests that union wage 
gains are greatest where a discretionary pricing power enhances the company’s abiUty to pay higher 
wages. For example, in a situation where there are entry barriers to a concentrated market with low 
import competition prices can be raised and demand is relatively inelastic. He also highlights the 
importance of high union coverage, centraUsed collective bargaining and the avoidance of union 
fragmentation. The key concept of Mishell's (op. cit.) argument is that unions must be. effectiyely 
organised to take advantage of a permissive economic environment. He draws heavily on a study by 
Craypo (1981) in which it was argued that unions were not all in a similar position to take advantage 
of favourable economic conditions and that there were three key determinants of union power: the 
degree of union organisation, a sufficient degree of centrahsation in bargaining and the elimination ol 
competition for members.
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Drawing heavily on bargaining and behavioural theories, Martin (1986) produces a complex 
matrix to measure power within an industrial relations context. He places the study of 
power firmly in the bargaining context of bilateral monopoly theory outlined by Hick's in 
"The Theory of Wages" (1932) in which the bargaining agenda is confined to the zone 
between the maximum wages that a union can demand before a trade off between wages 
and jobs, and the minimum wages that a manager can pay and still recruit and retain staff. 
Having set the parameters of the study, Martin (op. cit. seeks to measure it through 
monitoring the behaviour of the parties in collective bargaining, drawing on the work of 
behavioural theorists like Chamberlain and Walton. Martin (op. cit.) recognises the 
limitations of investigating power through observable behaviour in a bargaining arena 
where bargainers are unlikely to ever truly reveal their true goals or an objective assessment 
of bargaining successes. In order to take account of these difficulties Martin (op. cit.) 
examines power as a feature of the degree of interdependence which he claims can be 
measured in relation to observable behaviour. This is on the understanding that, where one 
party is entirely reliant on the other for success, then that party is not in a position of much 
power. For example, where a union is wholly reliant on management to participate in the 
bargaimng agenda at all (for recognition for c^^plc). dmt mion is unlikely to hayç much 
power / success at the bargaining table. Similarly, a firm wholly dependent on labour 
turning up to work for its economic survival is likely to be vulnerable to demands from the 
workforce.
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Martin's (op. cit.) proposition rests on the assumption that management will need labour and 
that labour depend on management but he recognises that this relationship will vary over 
time. The factors which influence the degree of dependence are those that determine how 
power is exercised. Martin(op. cit.) claims that the key determinant of the degree of 
dependence is the bargaining environment. He identifies a series of environmental factors, 
labour market conditions, economic and political and social and cultural issues all of which, 
whilst not determining the power relationship per se, provide the resources by which 
bargaining parties can mobihse their latent power and exercise it overtly. Resting his 
premise on environmental determinism Martin (op. cit.) argues tliat his analysis applies to 
both power exercised in the formal context, the first dimension and power exercised through 
the process of non-decision making in the second or third dimensions.
Having identified the key environmental factors Martin (op. cit.) then takes his analysis 
further and deconstructs each factor into a series of elements. For example, he suggests that 
the economic environment affecting bargaining will be dependent upon the state of the 
product market, level of demand, degree of competition, company ability to pay, 
profitabihty and type of product / perishability. Martin (op. cit.) argues that unions will have 
more scope to exercise power in a t i^ t  labour market but that the skill levels and 
occupations of the workers involved will also be important. He draws attention to the size of 
the employment unit, degree of technological innovation and whether the operation is 
capital intensive, the level of productivity and the payment systems (which may influence a 
collective or individual outlook amongst workers).
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Similarly, the non-economic environmental influences on bargaining are also deconstructed 
into factors such as the pohtical environment, judicial context, media and public opinion 
and with reference to Lukes’ (1977) radical definition of power based on inactivity, the 
prevailing ideology. Martin (1986) notes the development of HRM as an important factor, 
for example, in that it may lead to workers to identify with capital and see fewer common 
goals with other workers.
Martin (op. cit.) is critical of plurahst power theories which identify a single factor as the 
primary determinant of power relations in bargaining. From emphasis on the labour market 
to championing of the rate of change in unionisation, Martin (op. cit.) consistently 
chaUenges the analysis and the focus of single determinant power theories. As a result he 
produces a complex matrix of influences detailing the key determinants of power relations 
together with the degree of inter-dependence between them. The factors he identified as 
having an impact on these determinants mean that his proposition is much more complex 
than a theory emphasising a singular determinant. Moreover, the recognition of factors 
which directly influence bargaining, (such as the size of plant) combined with factors which 
have an indirect impact, (the operation of the labour market and ideology) means that the 
analysis transcends the differentiation between the three diinensions of power.
However, perhaps the complexity and coverage of the model is ultimately responsible for its 
failure to contribute to furthering the study of power relations in collective bargaining. In 
basing his model on the identification of several key environmental factors and sub-factors 
Martin's (op. cit.) proposition runs into difficulties when he comes to apply the model to a
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real bargaining environment. As a result, he was obliged to study the model through a 
series of case studies in a series of different bargaining environments and to compare 
outcomes. Martin (op. cit.) then used this to assess power relations. Given the complexity of 
the model and the emphasis that Martin (op. cit.) had placed on the separate impact of his 
range of determinants, it could be seen as a significant weakness in the study that he failed 
to create a model which could be apphed in practice to a bargaining situation where power 
could be quantified. Instead, Martin (op. cit.) goes on to apply a different technique for 
investigating power fi"om the one based on the model he has constructed.
Martin (op. cit.) went on to conduct three very general case studies in different bargaining 
environments, a poorly organised and fi'agmented hotel and catering organisation, a 
traditional manufacturing plant with a shrinking product market and a local authority where 
he identified the union participation in the pohtical process as a key element in the 
preservation of national bargaining. As a result of the studies, he concluded that unions 
would develop in three different ways in response to different bargaining environments. 
Where the union was poorly organised in smah workplaces, it would concentrate on 
individual recruitment initiatives offering individual services and discounts to individual 
workers and by playing down a collective role. In manufacturing plants, faced with the 
shrinking product market, unions would shift their focus to recognise their dependence on 
management for work and so a shift in power relation would herald the development of 
single company unionism.
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Finally in the pubhc sector, unions would exert their strong membership base and pohtical 
influence to emphasise their collective role and defend national coUective bargaining. As a 
result there would be an increasing gap between developments in the pubhc and private 
sectors.
Whilst Martin's (op. cit.) is the only model which attempts to transcend a study of power in 
different dimensions and takes account of structural and environmental factors, the 
thoroughness of the analysis leads to a model of great complexity and one which even 
Martin did not attempt to apply in anything other than an indirect and general way. There 
are many environmental factors to consider and measurement is difficult given the 
broadness of the categories and the concepts involved. The various determinants are 
extremely difficult to measure particularly where they are inter-related such as the pohtical 
environment and the labour market in which bargaining takes place or where the impact of a 
factor may be to both increase dependence in one sphere and lessen it in another. For 
example, a large pool of unemployed workers may undermine the union position in 
bargaining in the short-term but in the long-term the inabihty of the unemployed to compete 
effectively for jobs due.to skill shortages, for example, may place the union in a stronger 
p o s i t i o n . ____________ _______ _________________________________________
Nevertheless, when confronted with these problems Martin (op. cit.) attempts to analyse 
power relations through a behavioural model based on case studies which inevitably fail to 
provide a tool subtle enough for the myriad of inter-related factors which influence power in 
anything other than the broadest terms. The absence of a more sophisticated measure
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suggests that for all the thoroughness and care inherent in the analysis the proposition is 
unworkable in anything other than its broadest terms.
Martin's (op. cit.) model also suffers from difficulties in that the determinants are not 
weighted and so the model gives equal importance to clearly unequal factors such as the 
media and company abihty to pay. Whilst it is clear that factors such as the media, operating 
in the third power dimension, is relatively less important than company abihty to pay 
(which has a direct impact on the first dimension of power, the formal bargaining process). 
The model also neglects to consider circumstances where the importance of factors changes 
at a particular time. For example, legislation may increase the impact of the judiciary in the 
short term but the model does not explain the circumstances which determine the relative 
importance of factors or the relationship between factors which may influence power over a 
given period.
Summary
Despite the serious problems with Martin's (op. cit.) model it remains the first reahstic 
attempt to assess all the determinants of power in a bargaining context. He has effectiyely 
taken the three dimensions of power identified by Lukes (op. cit.) and apphed them to his 
own fi-amework in which power is exercised - economic (operating in the first dimension), 
institutional (operating in the second) and political (operating in the third) from which a 
wide variety of sub-factors stem. It is a fuU and comprehensive study, the most important 
criticism of which is that it was never apphed to a study of power relations in anything other
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than a general way. Nevertheless, the analysis remains a useful reminder of the different 
dimensions of power within bargaining and the environmental determinants of that power.
In constructing a comprehensive analysis of the factors and sub-factors which determine 
power, Martin's (1986) analysis is a useful basis from which to construct a model for the 
study of power relations within the bargaining framework. In effect, he has provided us with 
a key to unlock the study of bargaining power even though he chose not to venture outside.
The complexity of the model illustrates that the study of power is complex and difficult. As 
well as paying particular attention to the type of power being measured (latent or overt) and 
the dimension in which it is exercised (first, second and third) the analyst must take account 
of a variety of determinants. The model will be compHcated not only because of the number 
of potential determinants but also because of the way in which they inter-relate to extend or 
constrain the impact of other determinants and the degree to which their impact may be 
inconsistent. Given the complexity involved in a comprehensive study of bargaining power 
the best that any model can achieve is a robust model which approximates a measure of 
power with a degree of consistency over time. Since the aim of this thesis is to isolate the 
impact of trade union mergers on union bargaining power then the creation of a robust 
model of union power (which is outlined in Appendix 2) Ues at the heart of this.
Having completed a comprehensive overview of the literature relating to both mergers 
and power theories the study is now well placed to link the two by researching the 
consequences of a union merger on the concepts of union power and how this can be
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assessed. Before this is attempted, however, it is important to complete the framework in 
which this study will be completed by examining the historical context in which union 
mergers have developed over the last ten years. In studying recent mergers across the 
economy and with reference to sectoral developments, it is hoped that the study will be 
able to benefit fully from the research on the internal and external determinants of 
mergers that has thus far dominated the merger debate and to glean some indication of the 
environment in which trade unions have been operating over the last ten years.
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4. MERGERS IN ACTION - A REVIEW OF TRADE UNION MERGERS 1988-1997
Union mergers have been a key factor of post war trade union organisation. Although there 
may be other reasons for a fall in the number of trade unions, mergers are far and away the 
largest determinant of the fall in the number of unions affihated to the TUC. From a peak of 
182 affihates in 1962 the number has fallen to just 69 in 1994. The intensity of union 
mergers in recent times can be seen from the fact that in 1978 there were 112 unions 
affihated to the TUC. Since the majority of mergers involve the amalgamation of smaller, 
mainly occupationally based or craft unions into larger more general organisations, it is not 
surprising that the degree of concentration of union membership within fewer unions has 
also accelerated. In 1993, just five unions accounted for over sixty per cent of the TUC's 
total membership. These were UNISON, the TGWU, the GMB, the AEEU and the MSF. 
Interestingly, these are all unions which have broken away from the narrow occupational 
make-up of their component parts to embrace the principles of general unionism, 
representing different occupational groups across a range of sectors, industries, or 
occupations. The GMB, for example has dropped the name General, Municipal and 
Boilermakers’ Union since this no longer properly reflect its broader membership. The 
union is now known only by its initials.
Moreover, there is no sign that the trend in union merger activity looks set to decline. In 
1998 alone two new unions, the Public, Tax and Commerce Union and the 
Communications Workers Union, both with memberships of over 150,000 have come into
91
existence as a result of mergers. The likelihood is that there will be still fewer unions, and a 
greater degree of membership concentration within them, by the turn of the century.
In their evidence to the House of Commons Employment Select Committee enquiry into the 
Future of Trade Unions (1994) the TUC stated that the savings associated with the more 
efficient use of resources and personnel together with the release of assets was a crucial 
determinant of merger activity. Certain union services, it was argued, could be provided 
more efficiently and economically to a large union membership rooted in a secure financial 
base. The TUC added that the hostile economic and industrial relations environment of the 
1980s had exacerbated the*'trend in merger activities forcing unions to develop ways of 
consolidating and preserving existing members and deflecting attention fi"om the 
recruitment of new members.
It has been decided to focus this study on merger activity over the past ten years. There are 
several reasons for this. Firstly the mechanism of a questionnaire survey supplemented with 
interviews is dependent on the responses of individuals directly involved in the trade union 
mergers and collective bargaining. It is reasonable to assume that the power of recall 
amongst respondents, combined with the turnover in practitioners in unions and employers, 
will make responses beyond this period unrehable. The natural capacity of human memory 
and the tendency to review developments in the hght of current developments will 
adversely affect the quality of information provided by respondents outside this period. 
Secondly, there are considerable advantages in focusing on a period of consolidation 
following the dramatic changes in collective bargaining which preceded the political reform
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initiated by the Thatcher governments. The diverse responses with which many unions met 
the challenges of the previous nine years might be reasonably assumed to have converged 
given that each sector would have had some direct exposure to changes in the bargaining 
environment. As a result the likelihood of arriving at conclusions with a more general 
application might be greater.
Finally, in focusing the analysis on 1988 and beyond, the thesis follows on directly from the 
period on which Buchanen (1981) and more latterly Waddington (1995) conducted major 
historical analysis of union mergers both of which have been considered. In focusing on the 
link between trade union mergers and waves of the economic cycle, Waddington (op. cit.) 
concludes his analysis in 1987. This affords the advantage that the thesis can concentrate on 
a period where the data is as yet unresearched and in so doing contribute to the wider debate 
both descriptively and through its conclusions.
The period covered by this study, 1988-97, has been a period of intensity for trade union 
mergers. Given the number of unions involved in, often several different, mergers (and the 
very different factors that can act to encourage involvement in the mergers), a short 
historical review of this period may be useful in setting this study in some historical context. 
The years 1988 - 97 will each be reviewed separately. The date on which a union merger is 
officially registered with the Trade Union Certification Officer, as opposed to the date a 
merger has been approved by union members, is the date of classification for the purposes 
of the review. On studying the types and scale of mergers over the decade it becomes clear 
that the growth in merger activity is not confined to those unions affihated to the TUC but is
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also reflected in a trend amongst non-affiliated staff associations and unions (and also, 
ironically, amongst companies). A table summarising union merger activity from 1988 to 
1997 is set out in Appendix One.
Definitions -  Union Mergers: Affiliations and Transfers
Before we turn to a historical review of merger activity during the period under 
investigation, it may be useful to clarify the terms applied during this study and come to 
some common understanding as to what is meant by the term merger. Union mergers 
generally fall into three distinct categories, all of which are referred to in this document 
under the generic term 'merger*. In his latest work on union mergers Waddington (op. cit p3) 
defines a union merger as a "combination o f two or more unions to form a single union." In 
the process of the merger, at least one of the unions involved loses its independence and is 
subsumed into the other. When it becomes necessary to describe or classify the different 
types of merger the study will use the following definitions drawn up by the author. A 
merger involving two or more unions of a similar size and resulting the formation of a new 
organisation will be referred to as an 'amalgamation'. In this case, the component partners 
are required to wind up their old organisations and effectively reorganise themselves in a 
new structure. Each section of the partners' organisation will be directly affected by the 
union and the amalgamation will usually be identifiable by a new name being given to the 
resultant organisation. Those mergers involving a union between two organisations of 
different size where the smaller organisation is, in effect, incorporated into the larger are 
classified as 'transfers'. The smaller union transfers its organisation into a section of the
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larger body. There is no name change and the move is usually preceded by a formal transfer 
of engagements. As we shall see, the impact of such a merger on the host organisation is 
usually limited to the area directly involved in the merger whilst the union transferring its 
engagements is either reconstituted as a part of the larger organisation or effectively 
preserves its identity as a component part of its partner. Mergers where the component 
unions organise to share services, office space and personnel, but where the partners 
preserve independent decision-making authority and a separate legal identity, are classified 
as 'federated'. The period of the study encompasses all the different types of merger activity.
The latter, which falls outside the strict legal definition of merger, is included in the study 
for three reasons. Firstly, a federation is often expressly presented by the partners as a 
response to the s ^ e  pressures and an attempt to secure the same organisational benefits as 
a formal merger. Partners are on record as stating that the economies of scale attainable 
through a federated organisation are a way of dehvering economies of scale and shared 
services for members whilst retaining pohtical independence. Secondly, given this and 
because this study unlike Undy’s (1981) investigates the merger process over the entire 
period (as opposed to the strict point of merger), the formation of a federated structure will 
have much in common with the process by which a merger is delivered from the 
negotiations which precede integration to the organisational reviews that proceed it. In the 
hght of this, and with the focus of the study firmly on the impact of organisational 
integration on union power, it seemed as if there were more grounds for including the 
federated structure development than for excluding it. Particularly if, as the participants
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claim, the federated structure is set to develop into the primary alternative to merger for 
small to medium unions.
Although the technical and legal differences between the different types of trade union 
merger are important, for the purposes of studying the consequences of the union their 
importance can be overstated. For an analyst focusing on how the merger develops in 
practice and what happens as a result of the merger, the definition of the type of merger will 
be less important in the investigation than the outcome. Commentators, like Waddington 
(op. cit) and Undy (op. cit), who are primarily interested in the motives underpinning a 
merger, will identity crucially different factors in the reasons for an amalgamation or the 
creation of a federated structure, as we shall see. However, power relations in an 
organisation post-merger are likely to be determined less by the framework in which the 
merger was legally completed than the degree to which the component organisations are 
integrated, share services and deliver economies of scale and the extent to which the merger 
facilitated a review across the new organisation. The balance of power between the parties 
is crucial in explaining post-merger developments because it will determine the extent to 
which the parties integrate to form a new, revised organisational structure or maintain the 
organisational characteristics of the partner unions. Similarly, the process and extent of the 
organisational review adopted post merger may also reflect power relations between the 
parties. These power relations and their effect on the organisational structure will have an 
important impact on the power and efficiency of the new organisation post merger which 
may be masked by an investigation rooted in Undy’s (op.cit) classification of merger alone.
96
For example, where a large union merges with a smaller one it does not necessary mean that 
the larger body will control the integration of the smaller body (particularly when the 
smaller body is enjoying a healthy bank balance, growing membership or has been courted 
by several other large unions). Similarly, an amalgamation of two similarly sized union 
suggests a balance of power which may not reflect the economic reahty in which one union 
may be on the ascendance and thereby come to control the structure of the new organisation 
whilst its partner is declining. As has been seen, any analysis of union merger based on the 
technical and legal definition of merger alone (which favours a snapshot study of the merger 
at the point of amalgamation over a study of the merger process which encompasses the 
preceding negotiations and organisation structure post merger. The former is hkely to miss 
the political and organisational nuances which will determine how the merger is completed 
and thereby the consequences of the merger.
In addition to an assessment of the relationship between union mergers and union power the 
study also aimed to investigated the trade union efficiency reviews. These were 
organisational reviews, conducted during the merger process and aimed at improving 
efficiency within the merged organisation. Aspects of union structure were evaluated under 
the terms of a review to ensure that the way in which the union was structured and 
organised was efficient. The review was thereby a mechanism for eradicating historical 
inefficiencies jfiom a new organisation. The review process, under which a study of the way 
in which the union was organised and provided its services was conducted by a working 
party reporting to the NEC, was a common feature of mergers. As a new union partner
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joined or amalgamated with the existing organisation it was accepted that a project should 
be conducted to see that the structures binding the organisations were efficient, that the joint 
organisation would operate effectively and that any economies of scale would be realised. 
The study aimed to consider how the review was implemented and the degree to which
r
efficiencies were delivered. Whether organisations also used the merger process to 
implement an efficiency review across a much wider range of the organisation (thereby 
using the merger process to facihtate a greater degree of change) or whether a regular 
review of services and structure was to be ongoing (by, for example, stipulating regular 
efficiency reviews in the new constitution ) was also to be investigated.
Union Mergers - 1988 to 1997
The most important union merger completed in 1988 occurred in January when the ASTMS 
merged with TASS to create the Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union. The new 
union represented a wide range of members across diverse industrial and commercial 
sectors. The organisation represented workers in both the pubhc and private sectors, in 
manufacturing and the finance sector, in research organisations and in engineering, The 
merger was hugely influential involving two of the TUC's largest affihates with very 
different sectoral bases. The merger was also a tribute to the negotiating skills of the 
executive committees and fuh-time officials involved bringing together as it did two unions 
with very different cultures and pohtical outlook. The merger had an impact outside the 
union movement, and on the Labour Party, creating as it did the fourth largest Labour
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affiliate, and providing the new organisation with a degree of pohtical influence that neither 
of the partners had previously enjoyed. Moreover, the scale of the merger which brought 
about the creation of MSF and the degree of re-organisation which this entailed did not 
prevent the union from pursuing an aggressive merger policy with a series of small, 
primarily white collar, non-affiliated organisations. A merger with the United Friendly Field 
Managers' Staff Association was quickly followed by a merger with the Imperial 
Supervisors' Association, representing junior and middle management at Imperial Tobacco. 
In November, the MSF attracted the Church of England Children's Society Staff 
Association into a merger.
Two other mergers aimed at consohdating union membership and exploiting organisational 
efficiency also took place during 1988, albeit involving far fewer members. In March, the 
union representing lecturers in Higher Education in Scotland merged with the Educational 
Institute of Scotland and so consolidated die union’s position as the single representative 
body in Scottish Higher Education. In December, the Association of HM Inspectors of 
Taxes, representing senior civil servants in the Inland Revenue merged with the FDA which 
represented senior civil servants in all other Government Departments. Also, the union 
representing Greater London Local Authority Staff joined the Boilermakers' Union (now 
GMB) in September.
The other mergers which took place over the year fell into two distinct categories, those 
reflecting a merger between the companies or organisations in which their members were 
employed and those designed to facilitate organisational simplicity. A merger between the
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Staff Associations representing members in both the Alliance and the Leicester Building 
Societies, was completed in June following the approval of a merger between the two 
employers. A.merger between the staff associations representing members in the Gateway 
Building Society with the Woolwich followed the take-over of the Gateway by the 
Woolwich. The deregulation of the finance sector, combined with the opportunity for 
societies to offer a wider range of financial services and increased competition in the sector, 
led smaller societies to amalgamate as a way of preserving independence from, and 
competing with, the larger societies.
Mergers for purely organisational reasons occurred in January 1989 when, prior to 
transferring to the Manufacturing, Science and Finance (MSF), the unions representing 
Assistant Managers in the United Friendly Insurance Company merged with the union 
representing Divisional and District Managers. In August, the organisation representing 
admimsfrative, technical and clerical grades in Yorkshire and Humberside Council merged 
with the body representing the manual workers. It is possible to see these mergers as a 
consequence of a new confidence amongst employers who were keen to drive change in the 
structure of bargaining through the initiation of single-table arrangements.
The key union merger of 1989 was the amalgamation of the Boilermakers’ union and the 
white collar union. Apex, which occurred in January. This merger was not simply important 
because it represented a merger between a staff union and a large general organisation 
(albeit one with strong roots in occupational unionism) but also because Apex had rejected 
merger overtures from several larger white collar unions. The merger also signalled the end
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of the Boilermakers' Union and in an overt rejection of occupational unionism. The general 
organisation was to be known simply as GMB.
Merger activity during the year was led, in the main, by larger unions absorbing smaller 
non-affiliates often tied to a single employer. Unions had accepted the rationale that, in the 
short term at least, it was economically more efficient to allocate resources to attracting 
other organisations than it was to recruit individual members or identify recruitment 
grounds in areas of growing employment.
Leading the way on this policy was the electricians’ union (EEPTU) who were using their 
period of expulsion from the TUC to act as a magnet for small, white collar unions seeking 
the support of the larger organisation and keen to avoid links with a TUC affihate. Many of 
these small unions were often in direct competition for members with a TUC affiliate and 
the expulsion of the EEPTU allowed it to recruit these organisations without falling foul of 
the TUC's Bridlington Agreement (designed to regulate inter-union competition for 
members). During the year the EEPTU absorbed five smaller organisations, the Association 
of British Professional Drivers, the MOD Staff Association, Springfields Foremans' 
Association, the Nelson and District Power Loom Overlookers Society and the National 
Association of Senior Probation Officers.
Other larger unions such as BIFU and the MSF were pursuing similar policies of trying to 
attract non-TUC affiliated representative organisations. In March 1989, the MSF 
compounded its amalgamation with the union representing the managers at Imperial
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Tobacco by attracting the larger staff association representing all other employees in the 
company. In May, BIFU recruited NORSA, the organisation representing staff at the 
Northern Rock Building Society Staff Association, (and the subject of a case study later in 
this thesis). The non-TUC affihated Federated Union of Managers and Professional Officers 
recruited both the Association of Scottish Local Government Directors of Personnel and the 
Greater London Senior Staff Guild (who were also representing members in local 
Government) during this period.
Mergers between trade unions during 1989 were reflected in a trend in merger activity by 
employers' organisations who, given the harsh economic environment and the decline in the 
manufacturing sector, were also under pressure to secure efficiencies through economies of 
scale. Two mergers of employers operating in Local Government occurred in the South 
West and the North East and the Rochdale Engineering Employers' Association joined the 
Engineering Employers' Association organising in the North West.
Many of the merger policies initiated in the previous year were carried over into 1990. In 
January, the EEPTU recruited the National Integrated Caring Employees organisation 
which was the first of some eight mergers with smaller, organisations during the year. Tlie. 
EEPTU recruited non-TUC organisations representing members in the Fire Service, the 
Prison Service, journalism, fihn and television and manufacturing. Following the 
consolidation of its merger with Apex, the GMB began to attract other white collar 
organisations. It merged with the National Union of Labour (Party) Organisers in May and 
the Law Society's Legal Aid Staff Association in June. BIFU compounded its success in the
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North East by recruiting the Staff Association representing employees at the North of 
England Building Society. The latter highhghting one of the problems inherent in a strategy 
of boosting membership through merger with smaller organisations as the employer 
derecognised the staff association when it transferred engagements. BIFU was forced to 
fight, (and eventually won), a lengthy battle for recognition rights. In August, the MSF 
diversified further by absorbing the Health Visitors' Association operating in the NHS.
In September, NATFE recruited the organisation representing Agricultural Education Staff 
in a fairly conventional sectoral merger whilst IPMS, traditionally a public sector union, 
recruited the union representing managers at Unilever, although once again, the transfer of 
engagements was met with derecognition of the union by the employer.
The two major mergers of 1990 were the merger between the railwaymen and the seamen to 
form the Rail, Maritime and Transport Union (RMT) and the merger between the footwear 
and knitwear workers. Both mergers were designed to consolidate the new unions' position 
as the central representational body within a given sector and provide a sound base for 
expansion. The formation of the RMT was completed on the back of huge financial 
problems in the Seaman's Union following a lengthy period of industrie action against P 
and O during which the union's funds had been sequestrated.
In 1991, the staff associations at the Nationwide and Anglia Building Societies merged 
following the merger of their respective employers.
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During the year merger talks between the financially vulnerable NUM and the TGWU 
broke down following speculation that Arthur Scargill, NUM President, was demanding a 
prominent position with the TGWU in return for bringing his members into the fold. 
Moreover, a potential problem of union diversification was highlighted by the conflict of 
interest within the TGWU who already represented workers in the nuclear industry. The 
NUM, who continued to suffer financial pressures and membership decline well beyond the 
1984/5 strike, eventually called off the merger talks.
In 1991, the formation of BECTU, from a merger between the technicians working in 
cinema and television and other employees based in broadcasting and entertainment, 
highlighted the continuing trend in consohdatory mergers between unions operating in the 
same sector. In September, the NGA and SOGAT merged to form a single union, the 
Graphical, Media and Print Union, in the print industry. It had been intended to create a 
single union representing all media employees but late on in the negotiations the NUJ opted 
to preserve an independent organisation. This followed a period in the late 1980s of very 
hostile employer activity in the sector culminating in exhaustive and costly industrial action 
at both Warrington and Wapping and the relocation of national newspapers out of Fleet 
Street where the unions had created a powerful organisational base.
Other unions continued in the race to recruit smaller unions and staff associations. The 
GMB attracted the National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers into the fold and IPMS 
continued their foray into the private sector with the recruitment the Staff Association at the
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Potato Marketing Board. MSF merged with the staff association at the Australian Mutual 
Insurance Company and the EEPTU merged with the Colne and District Overlookers 
Association. Mergers also continued to affect the structure of employers' organisations. In 
August, a new organisation representing employers in all industrial sectors across the South 
East was formed.
The amalgamation of the engineers and the electricians was confirmed in May 1992, 
following a lengthy period of negotiation and complicated by the fact that the EEPTU was 
still exiled fi*om the TUC. The merger, a classic case of consohdation within trades and 
across industry, effectively created the third biggest union in Britain. The merger did not 
prevent the EEPTU from pursuing its strategy of recruiting smaller, non-affiliate white 
collar organisations. A merger with the British Cement Staffs Association was completed in 
March.
In a relatively quiet year, 1992, only two other unions were involved in mergers. NALGO 
completed the organisationally logical move of merging with the Association of National 
Health Service Officers. NALGO already represented some staff grades in the NHS and the 
merger consolidated the union's position. The takeover of the Town and Country Building 
Society by the Woolwich was reflected in a merger between their respective staff 
associations in December.
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A structural re-organisation of the British Furniture Industry Association in which regional 
organisations were brought into a single national framework accounted for four separate 
mergers amongst employers' associations during the year.
One significant development in November 1992, was the launch of the (previously 
discussed) federated structure involving the Society of Telecom Executives, the 
Communications Managers' Association and the Institute of Managers, Professionals and 
Specialists. The move, spearheaded by the IPMS, was designed to offer unions the 
opportunity to secure the organisational benefits of merger and still retain separate executive 
fimctions and policies. Services such as legal advice, membership records and research were 
centralised for all the unions with each partner retaining their own conference, executive 
and decision making machinery. 'The Federation' as it was called began to market the 
arrangement to smaller unions, TUC-affihates and others, as an alternative to merger. In 
1993 the organisation arrived at a pivotal arrmigement with the Halifax Building Society 
Staff Association and in 1995 the FDA confirmed their interest with a provisional 
arrangement.
In 1993, the growth in merger activity amongst the trade unions culminated in the formation 
of UNISON fi-om a merger between the public service unions NALGO, NUPE and 
COHSE, (famously described as a merger between COHSE, NUPE and NASTY by Chris 
Patten at the 1993 Conservative Party Conference). The new organisation which represented 
clerical, administrative and junior and middle management across local Government and the 
NHS was the first of the so-called "super unions". With almost 1.5 million members the
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union easily became the largest union in the UK. Later in the year, merger talks between the 
two largest unions prior to the merger, the TGWU and the GMB, began (prompting 
speculation that union membership was to be concentrated into two or three "super unions" 
by the turn of the century). The talks between the TGWU and the GMB came to nothing 
however, and broke up a few months later.
The TGWU was involved in mergers with two small organisations, the Yorkshire 
Association of the Powerloom Overlookers and the Lancashire Box Packing Case Workers 
during the year whilst the GMB attracted the weighty membership of the Furniture, Timber 
and Allied Trades Union into its Construction section. The EEPTU Section of the AEEU 
continued to attract small white collar organisations and completed mergers with the 
Association of Staff of Probation and Bail Hostels, the Association of Preparatory Workers 
and the union representing employees at A. Monk and Company. In September 1993, the 
MSF merged with the Hospital Physicists Association and, in December, a merger was 
completed with the National Union of Scalemakers.
In 1994, in the finance sector, a re-invigorated Barclay's Staff Association was the only 
major non-TUC affiliate in the sector not to become involved in the Financial Services Staff 
Association Federation. (The Barclays' SA has since been re-named Unifi and has now 
affihated to the TUC.) The FSSAF organisation, under the stewardship of the Lloyd's and 
National Westminster Staff Associations, was intended to become a focal point for the 
variety of staff associations operating in the sector. It would provide a forum for them to 
exchange information and launch joint campaigns. The initiative foUowed a period of major
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job losses and the growth of casualisation, temporary and short term employment contracts, 
in the finance sector. The Clearing Bank Staff Associations have since opted to pursue a 
merger with BEFU to create a single trade union for bank employees.
The key merger in 1994 was that between communication workers employed in the 
telecommunications industry, represented by the National Communications Union and 
those working in the Post Office, represented by the Union of Communication Workers. 
The merger which created the 170,000 member Communication Workers' Union was 
completed in April. The new union quickly demonstrated the benefits of a single 
organisation representing the interests of employees across the industry when it launched a 
successful campaign to defend the Post Office fi’om privatisation.
Merger talks between the two unions engaged in representing members in the higher 
education sector, the AUT and NATFE also began in 1995.
Later that year, the PTC (Public Services, Tax and Commerce Union) was created firom a 
merger between the Inland Revenue Staff Federation and NUCPS, the union representing 
middle management in the civil service. The new union, with a membership çf 170,000, 
was the product of merger talks across all the civil service unions which were intended to 
create a single union body for all civil service employees. This was prevented by a steadfast 
decision to preserve union independence by the executive of the CPSA and the decision of 
the FDA and IPMS to pursue the federal alternative to merger offered by the Federation.
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The CPSA has since sanctioned its executive to open merger negotiations with the PTC
umon.
The announcements, in February 1996, that there was to be an initiative to afford employees 
in the finance sector a single representational body, uniting for the first time bodies 
affihated to the TUC with those who were not, was greeted with some suspicion. A body, 
including representatives from large organisations such as MSF, BIFU and non-TUC 
affiliates like the staff associations in the High Street banks met smaller staff associations 
from insurance companies and building societies with a view to forming a single employee 
organisation in the finance sector. The move was undoubtedly a response to the severe 
economic and competitive pressure in which finance sector staff have been operating and a 
removal of the traditional differences between the services they are able to provide. The 
move was also an attempt to address the trend towards mergers between employers, banks 
and building societies in particular, within the sector. MSF are no longer engaged in 
discussions but BIFU and the staff associations in the High Street banks have announced 
their intention to merge and form a single union for representing bank employees in 1999.
Summary
Trade union merger activity over the past decade has had two distinct patterns. On the one 
hand, amalgamations between major TUC-affiliates have resulted in large, sectorally-based 
bodies representing a large range of different occupation and grade of employee within a 
particular industry. On the other, a much larger degree of activity has resulted in large
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unions, often TUC affiliates, merging with much smaller unions and staff associations 
(often based on a single employer and outside the TUC) to deliver a one-off influx of union 
members. The sheer scale of merger activity involving the transfer of engagements by one 
union to another is demonstrated by the fact these transfers outnumber the amalgamations 
between two or more unions by about seven to one.
It appears that we are no closer to employee representation by two or three "superunions" by 
the turn of the century. All the evidence points to the emergence of large sectoral or trade 
based union representation in areas such as printing, transport, finance and engineering. A 
single union representing an entire sector is large enough to attain economies of scale and 
yet specific enough in the provision of its services to provide meaningful support and 
tailored advice and guidance on the specific issues important to employees employed in that 
sector. Where unions are operating to represent employees in an occupation or sector not 
large enough to support a large union organisation the federal approach based on a cluster of 
unions with centralised services is being presented as a way in which some of the benefits 
of a larger membership can be reahsed without the loss of specialist representation and 
pohtical autonomy. There is no evidence that unions are looking to create larger more 
general organisations or indeed that members want them.
Finally, given the intensity of merger activity within the trade unions, there has been 
relatively little merger activity recorded from employers' organisations. Although there have 
been some organisations like the British Furniture Association which has taken radical steps 
to change its structure, the majority of these organisations have not considered merger as a
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way of improving services and securing membership. As a result, it may be fair to speculate 
that given that the organisational structures adopted by union and employer organisations is 
generic, a relatively high degree of structural and organisational inefficiency rests currently 
in the majority of employers' organisations.
Having constructed a framework for the study in which the findings can be assessed in 
relation to the academic literature on union mergers and the definition and determinants of 
union power, it was important to give some historical background to merger activity during 
the period under investigation so that the study could be placed in context. Given this has 
now been completed we are in a position to turn to the evidence on mergers and power 
generated by the questionnaire survey. The information submitted by respondents from 
trade unions that have been engaged in mergers will be considered separately from the 
responses submitted by the employers with whom these unions negotiated. The conclusions 
will attempt to draw out the common themes arising from the survey data which will then 
be compared and contrasted with that arising from the two detailed case studies. In the first 
instance however, we turn to a general overview of the survey.
I l l
5. MERGERS IN PRACTICE
A brief assessment of the academic research on trade union power and union merger has 
highlighted the absence of any investigation that attempts to bridge two distinct areas of 
research and produce a credible investigation of the link between merger activity and union 
power. This becomes more interesting when, in the previous chapter, merger activity is 
placed within its historical context and it highhghts the intensity of union activity in this 
area. It suggests an ongoing commitment to merger amongst larger unions in particular, to 
combat a decline in union membership and to open new, developing areas of employment 
to collective bargaining. The summary of the academic hterature reveals a gap in the current 
research available and the historical overview justifies the pursuit of this investigation given 
unions propensity to merge. Both the academic and historical context of this study are 
useful in mapping the terrain of my investigation and placing it within the appropriate 
fiumework.
It is now time to turn to the evidence uncovered in this investigation and to collate the 
findings into a meaningful assessment of the relationship between mergers and power. The 
evidence wül be presented in three separate sections. A general overview in which the 
general findings will be presented will be followed by a more detailed study of the private 
and public sector in the following two chapters. The overview will be useful in drawing out 
some key themes on bargaining power and mergers. However, whilst the impressions of 
employers and unions operating across all economic sectors will prove valuable in defining 
some general conclusions on union power and mergers these overall impressions risk
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masking some of the sector specific differences which may have a distinct impact on the 
study. For this reason chapters six and seven consider in more detail evidence collected 
from unions and employers operating in the private sector (including the newly privatised 
utilities) and in the public sector (including voluntary organisations). The private / pubhc 
sector division is justified on the grounds that separating the key findings will assist our 
understanding of prevailing determinants of both union power and propensity to merge. For 
example, the impact of product markets, shareholder pressure, flexible working and union 
derecognition in areas of the private sector can be investigated; In the public sector, the 
impact of factors such as public spending targets, pay restraint, privatisation and 
Government employment policy can be assessed. In this chapter and chapters six and seven, 
the aim is to draw out general themes on union power and union mergers in the context of 
previous research and then to expand on these with a series of observations in which the 
generalities can be considered against developments and trends in the economic sector and 
industry.
Whilst accepting that the context in which this study takes place is important, this is a 
secondary consideration when compared to devising a comprehensive and flexible method 
of research which will dehver good quality, reliable primary data. In this investigation a 
three pronged approach was apphed. The evidence from a comprehensive questionnaire 
survey of employee relations practitioners was supplemented with follow-up interviews and 
two case studies. General and sector specific findings are thereby available for comparison 
with the findings from case studies which are conducted over time and compiled from a 
standpoint not directly involved in bargaining. It is to the evidence collated from the overall
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survey, however, to which we turn our attention first.
The questionnaire survey, conducted across all sectors and industries which experienced 
merger activity in our time frame, focused on key personnel involved directly with mergers 
or collective bargaining. The responses were supplemented with interviews which allowed 
practitioners to expand on their responses and address any issues not captured by the 
questionnaire. Representatives of both unions and management were surveyed so that the 
views of both sides of industry were reflected. Individuals were asked to recall their views 
and experience at the time of the merger and in the period since the merger took place. As 
such, the survey presents the perceptions of individuals working within the organisation as 
opposed to the development of the organisation as a whole. This is not necessarily a 
weakness of the research given that the way in which events pre and post-merger are 
perceived by practitioners is a valid source of information on the consequences of a merger. 
That said, the inclusion of case studies in the research has been designed to strengthen some 
of the conclusions arising from the investigation.
Overall, the survey concluded that there are several factors (eg. market growth, skill 
shortages, legislative regime) which mean that union power may vary between economic 
sector as was expected. In this sense the overview of the research may be seen as a “macro” 
level investigation of the link between power and mergers. (A “micro” level view of the 
finding at individual firms and workplaces will be presented when the different sectors and 
companies are analysed in the next two chapters and in the case studies.) Several trends can 
be identified in the responses that were received from employers and from trade unions.
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Although there were identifiable discrepancies in the responses from different respondents 
reporting on the same merger, particularly in relation to collective bargaining outcomes, 
there was also a large degree of unity in the responses. The parties largely reinforced each 
other in their responses on the background to the merger and the impact that it had had on 
the structure of bargaining and facilities on offer. There was general agreement on the scope 
of collective bargaining and the issues subject to the bargaining process (if not on the 
successes of the outcomes). For the purposes of the study where employers and unions 
registered similar views this was held to validate the views expressed. Where discrepancies 
were apparent, or where the questions were only addressed to one of the parties, (as in the 
case of those relating to union efficiency reviews) this evidence was controlled by reference 
to external factors and developments by sector and checked in follow-up interviews with 
respondents.
Employers
Amongst the 120 employers surveyed the overall response rate was 62%, of which 34% of 
respondents returned a fully completed questionnaire. Responses from public sector 
employers and private sector manufacturers dominated the survey accounting for almost 
80% of responses. Just under 20% of responses came from private sector service employers, 
predominantly in the finance sector where the prevalence of Building Society merger 
resulted in a wave of mergers in associated unions/staff associations. There was only one 
response from a privatised utility, British Telecom. In the vast majority of cases the 
individual completing the survey was the person primarily responsible for collective 
negotiations within the company, for example the Personnel Controller, Employee
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Relations or Human Resources Manager.
Employers across all sectors anticipated several benefits Jrom the trade union merger. Most 
respondents, 56%, anticipated more stable bargaining arrangements resulting from the 
merger. Employers saw the merger as an opportunity to revise bargaining structures and to 
make them less complex and more streamlined. Whilst other reasons for supporting a 
merger were also cited as a potential advantage of union merger, none had the degree of 
cross-sector support of the potential for reforming structures. For example, employers were 
divided on the question of whether union services were likely to become more professional 
as a result of the merger. They were also divided on the question of whether unions were 
expected to pursue a narrower bargaining agenda post merger and whether this was 
advantageous or not to an employer. The chance to reduce paid time-off for employee 
representatives and facilities such as office premises and equipment was cited by several 
respondents as an advantage arising from the merger. Whilst the likelihood that there would 
be a reduction in the propensity to take industrial action following a merger or securing 
access to a wider range of cross-industry comparative data in bargaining, were not identified 
as potential benefits by any of the respondents. In summary, the primary benefit anticipated 
by employers following a merger was the opportunity to reform bargaining structure (along 
the lines, for example, of a single bargaining forum) which they suggested would make 
meetings more effective and improve the management of change. Stability in bargaining, 
through the opportunity to establish long-term working relationships with employee 
representatives, and the removal of complex, historical, bargaining arrangements were seen 
as the key potential benefits of merger. Employers also anticipated negotiating with a more
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efficient organisation post-merger (a factor to which we will return in our assessment of the 
evidence on union organisational reviews). The emphasis placed by employers on the 
structural benefits associated with a merger can lead us to conclude that the merger acts to 
complement other managerial initiatives designed to simplify collective bargaining - 
ranging from hostile steps like derecognition, to more positive attempts to reform the 
structure o f bargaining like single table arrangeménts andjoint negotiation. The evidence 
on bargaining structures uncovered in the survey is complemented by the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey (WERS) (Millward et al 1992) which identified a trend amongst 
employers in tire late 1980s to move to less complex, single table bargaining arrangements . 
or to arrangements with a single union which was, in general, resisted by trade unions. It is 
interesting that the employers view the merger as an opportunity to push forward the 
general pattern of change in bargaining structures.
Of the employers who anticipated any disadvantage associated with the trend in mergers, a 
fear of the union becoming stronger and more powerful was the most common. Just under 
30% of respondents identified a potential increase in union influence as the most important 
potential drawback. Employers also feared the union becoming more professional after the 
merger, leading to a more effective union presence at the workplace. Given the importance 
attached to a potential increase in union power, it was interesting that only one respondent 
anticipated more industrial action as a consequence of the merger. Reflecting the responses 
on perceived benefits, the opportunities for greater cross-industry information or a wider 
bargaining agenda froin the merged organisation were not viewed as important by 
employers. Employers did fear a greater distance developing between themselves and a
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larger union and several cited the ability of the union to negotiate around company specific 
information and developments as a potential disadvantage.
Employers were divided generally on the political implications of a union merger. Over 
50% of respondents expected the union to become less representative of employees at their 
workplaces as a result of the merger. Of these, around half cited this as the primary 
disadvantage of merger activity. It is difficult to reconcile this view with the view which 
arose from other employers who feared that the influence of full-time officials would 
dimmish after the merger (and the opportunity for unrepresentative activists to secure some 
influence would grow) unless we account for inter-employer differences stemming from 
factors specific to their sector. Overall, however, only two respondents cited less shop floor 
involvement in negotiations as a potential drawback of mergers (and even then it was seen 
very much as a secondary issue). Twice as many employers feared a decline in the influence 
of full-time officials than feared a growth in their influence arising from the merger. Only 
one employer cited the devolution of power from full-timer to stewards as being the single 
primary potential disadvantage of the union merger whilst several others noted the issue 
without attaching a similar degree of importance to it. No employers suggested that a 
growth in the unions^poHtical influence follovring a merger was a potential disadvantage . . 
and only two respondents feared that the merger might lead to an increase in legal action 
against the Company. As we shall see, the difference in responses concerning a potential 
growth in influence for the full time officials is explained by the bargaining framework and 
culture prevalent in different sectors. In some sectors, like finance for example, the format 
of negotiating is that the employer negotiates directly with a union professional representing
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employees and direct shop floor involvement is minimal. In small manufacturers and 
printing firms the reverse is true.
It is perhaps surprising that, generally, employers do not perceive a larger union 
organisation as a barrier to communication with the workforce . The survey indicates that 
the opposite view may prevail amongst employers. The major concern appears to be that in 
a larger union the officials will have greater areas o f responsibility which they will find  
difficult to manage. The survey suggests that, overall, the views offull-time officials are 
more compatible with those o f the employer than those o f the local shop steward in the 
workplace. In this respect the survey seems to confirm the claims made at the re-launch of 
the TUC in May 1995 (and developed by Taylor (1993) and Watson (1988) that union 
officials are moving towards a formal partnership with their employers. In doing so, it is 
argued, they are facilitating business objectives through the recognition that business 
efficiency and competitiveness is the best way of protecting their members jobs. The fact 
that some employers expressed a fear that a union merger would loosen the ties between the 
company and the local union official may suggest that the employer views the union 
hierarchy as being a useful ally in developing a joint approach which is not always shared 
by the shop-floor membership. Responses suggest that the views of officials, perhaps in _ 
contrast to those of stewards, are more reflective of those of the employer than of the 
workforce as a whole. These responses may give some weight to the view that the union 
official acting as “a manager of discontent” (Watson 1988) performs a useful function for 
its employer at the expense of the membership. That said, it is important to recognise that 
as noted in the responses there are strong differences between employers on this point
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reflecting the differences in bargaining culture between sectors. Overall, however, the 
responses from employers suggest that the potential advantage of simplified bargaining 
arrangements is neutralised by a concern that mergers will lead to a less representative 
union in which local activists will have more influence.
As a group, then, employers expressed neither support or opposition to mergers. Where 
employers adopted a partisan stance on the question of specific mergers it was interesting
that just over 40% opposed the merger whilst about 10% were supportive. This suggests
/
that whilst the majority of employers were content that there would be a balance between 
the potential difficulties arising from the merger and the anticipated benefits. A significant 
minority, however, felt that the political implications of the merger were important enough 
to warrant outright opposition to the process. Interestingly, where employers identified a 
hostile attitude towards the merger amongst their workforce (this was present in about 25% 
of responses) they were more likely, in turn, to oppose the merger proposals themselves. 
Again, when we examine the responses by sector, we shall see a strong industrial 
determinant to employers' opposition to mergers.
In the view of employers, trade union mergers seemed to have little effect on collectiye 
bargaining following a merger. Trade union density remained at the same levels as it was 
pre-merger. (Eighty eight per cent of respondents claimed that the merger had had no effect 
on the level of union density in their organisation). Eight per cent of respondents indicated 
that there had been an increase in membership post merger and 12% recorded a decrease. 
These figures may be important given, as we have seen, that the level and density of union
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membership are identified as an important factor in Martin's assessment of union power. If 
employers had recognised a positive correlation between union density this may have 
suggested that mergers, far from being a mechanism for increasing union power in the 
workplace, are a way in which unions have sought to consolidate their position and prevent 
further decline. Whether all the mergers in which a subsequent increase in membership 
would be classed by Undy as 'consohdatory' (i.e. one of the primary reasons for merger was 
to protect against an anticipated fall in membership levels) is difficult to say, but employer 
responses indicate that mergers can provide a useful springboard for future growth. In 12% 
of responses, however, the merger failed to consolidate the union's position and the decline, 
specifically in density and membership but also in influence by implication, was ongoing. 
This implies that in a significant minority of cases mergers cannot provide the consohdation 
of influence that is anticipated.
The limited impact of the union merger on membership and density may help to explmn tiie 
marginal effect that, employers claim, mergers had on the scope of bargaining at different 
levels within the company. Only 20% of respondents reported that the merger had any 
impact on collective bargaining within their company. Where an impact was identified, 
employers reported that the merger had contributed to moves away from plant level 
bargaining and towards national level negotiations. No respondents claimed that the range 
of issues determined at plant level increased as a result of the merger, whilst about 10% 
suggested that it had decreased. A minority of employer respondents reported that the issues 
determined at company or divisional level had also increased. At national level.^  5% of 
respondents recorded a decline in the range of issues discussed but 15% claimed that there
121
had been an increase. This goes against the trend identified in WIRS which reported a 
general move towards plant level bargaining. This may reflect the concern, highlighted by 
some employers, that the mergers transfer undue influence to unrepresentative stewards 
locally. In returning issues to the national forum employers might be hoping to protect 
bargaining from the newly acquired influence of local activists. The overwhelming majority 
of respondents (82%), however, suggested that mergers had had no impact on the level at 
which bargaining was conducted. This reinforces the view that mergers did not extend 
union influence (by facilitating a move away from local level negotiation) but preserved the 
status quo. Given that WIRS highlights a general move to local bargaining, the preservation 
of current arrangements may in itself represent an increase in union power.
Employers reported that mergers did not facilitate a change in the range of facilities offered 
by employers to the union post-merger. Unions were unable to maintain their level of 
facilities in any of the four areas listed (paid time off for stewards and lay officers, time off 
for union members, deduction of union subscriptions at source (check off), and office 
facilities for the union). Given the importance which unions attach to their facilities, 
particularly time-off arrangements, a dechne in levels of time-off for lay officers and 
members must be seen within the context of declining union influence. At best, some 
nnions have maintained their facilities according to employers. This may again demonstrate 
an increase in power because WIRS data indicates a trend in employers clamping down on 
time-off arrangements in particular and the withdrawal of check off facilities by some 
employers following the changes in legislation requiring membership authorisation has 
been reported. At worse, there were significant erosions in time-off and check-off
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arrangements according to employers (although this may reflect the 1993 legislative 
changes as much as a decline in union power). The relationship between merged unions and 
the contraction of facilities will be examined further when we study mergers by sector.
The lack of impact on the level of bargaining within the organisation, noted by employers, 
is also reflected in of the consistency o f issues discussed before and after the merger. In the 
vast majority of cases union claims across the full range of bargaining issues did not 
become more ambitious following the merger. Indeed in a significant minority of cases they 
became more moderate according to employers. Only about 5% of respondents reported 
that pay claims become more ambitious after a merger and only 10% stated that the union 
sought improvements in working hours. There was a little more ambition in union claims on 
managers' pay, training issues, equal opportunities, stress management and pensions.
Around 20% of employer respondents claimed that these claims had become more 
ambitious or improvements related to these issues on tiie claim for the first time.
Nevertheless, in each case, 80% of employers detected no significant change in the way in 
which claims were presented or improvements requested. On average 15-20% of employers 
noted less ambitious claims, particularly in relation to working, hours, holidays, stress and 
violence at work, following the merger. Again the degree to which the increase or stability 
in the scope of a union's bargaining agenda will be investigated against the emerging trends 
in the sector since WIRS reports a contraction of the bargaining agenda in general. A failure 
to exploit a wider agenda may not illustrate a loss of power or influence it may demonstrate 
the opposite if it suggests that influence has been protected in an environment where unions
123
overall have suffered a loss.
Employers claimed that the union merger had had no noticeable effect on the Company's 
aims, structure or performance. In relation to each category all the respondents noted a lack 
of change resulting from the union merger. Only in the category relating to a change in the 
climate of collective bargaining we re employers able to report that the merger had had 
some impact. Two thirds of respondents claimed that the bargaining climate had not been 
affected by the merger, whilst a third admitted that the merger had contributed positively to 
the climate in which bargaining was conducted. Given the emphasis that employers placed 
on dealing with full-time union officials, it might be assumed that this relationship is one 
contributory factor in this assessment. In two cases, whoUy related to sectoral issues, the 
employer recorded that the merger had had a positive effect on the pohtical environment in 
which the firm operated.
Overall employers saw the structural changes which accompany a union merger as a 
positive development in industrial relations. Employers were generally concerned, however, 
that a merger might place a greater degree of influence in the hands of unrepresentative 
local stewards by increasing the areas over which the official was responsible. Employers 
reported that the collective bargaining agenda had been largely unaffected by the trend in 
mergers with the exception of a move to centralise the collective bargaining structure in 
some companies. This may have resulted from attempts to maintain negotiating links with 
the union officials since it goes against the general trend in bargaining patterns identified in 
WIRS.
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Employers suggested that union mergers have left the negotiating process largely 
unaffected and the degree to which industrial relations systems have been unaffected by the 
mergers implies that a merger consohdates a union's place in the bargaining process as 
opposed to extending influence and acting as a springboard for growth.
Overall, whilst employers may have an interest in interpreting the evidence on mergers to 
suit their own political interpretation of developments in bargaining, the variety in employer 
opinion recorded by the survey suggests a degree of reliabihty in the survey responses. 
Moreover, and as we shall see, the responses do not show employers in a consistently 
favourable light. Since many of the responses related to perceptions and assessment, it 
seems that employers have replied to the questionnaire with a degree of objectivity. Since 
we are aware, however, that any questionnaire will be tainted with some subjectivity we 
turn now to the responses from trade unions so that we can make a balanced assessment of 
developments based upon die degree to which (and how) their interpretation of the evidence 
relating to mergers may differ.
Trade Unions
The response rate amongst trade union negotiators was significantly higher than that from 
employers (sixty two per cent of those unions included in the surveyed responded and in 
50% of cases the questionnaire form was fully completed). In almost every case the person 
completing the questionnaire had some direct knowledge of, or involvement in, the merger 
under investigation. The majority of those unions who responded to the survey had 
membership concentrated in the private sector. Around two thirds of respondents had a
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majority of their membership employed in the private sector and one third of respondents 
represented mainly public sector employees. Of the unions working primarily in the private 
sector, the majority of respondents had membership concentrated in the manufacturing 
sector.
The responses received from unions indicated that the pressure to embark on a merger 
policy came from all sections of the union (including the general Secretary, the NEC and 
the activists) with the exception of the union membership and officials based in the regions. 
Regional officials were opposed to the merger in about 50% of cases perhaps fearing that 
the merger might have a direct impact on job security. Unions claimed that in about 40% of 
responses the.merger was opposed initially by the union membership. In the partner union, 
the merger was supported by all elements of the union with the exception of the 
membership, which at its highest was spht 50/50 on the issue. The responses show a high 
degree of unity amongst elements of the union hierarchy, the NEC, officers and activists in 
their attitude to the merger. Where the groups were less inclined to support the merger, the 
degree of inter-group on their position was far less. The support amongst particular groups 
was reflected in the amount of importance attached by the unions to particular parties 
involved in the merger process. Whilst General Secretaries, in particular, were rated as very 
important in the process (in 75% of cases) and were generally in favour of the merger, the 
impact of ordinary union members was not very highly rated and this group was, initially at 
least, more ambivalent to the process. In 50% of cases, respondents reported that the 
membership had played no part in the decision to embark on a merger. Such responses are 
not unusual. Given that merger discussions will often be quite advanced before the
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proposals are put before the members it is likely that support for the merger within the 
hierarchy will develop well in advance of that in the membership. Members may not have 
access to the information (membership level, financial pressures, opportunities to recruit in 
new areas) which, as we have seen, can underpin the decision to merge. Moreover, 
members, particularly those with a substantial period of involvement in the union, may 
attach a great deal of emotion to the union organisation (name and structure, in particular) 
that is not shared its employees. (Given the number of employees and the increasing 
development of career trade unionism, the average length of service with a union as an 
employee is likely to be far less than the average period of membership (Watson, 1988). As 
a consequence of the way in which the unions are organised, the resources and poUcy which 
can be directed towards a merger may rest under the control of the hierarchy as opposed to 
the membership. The hierarchy, NEC, General Secretary and officials, will control the 
process by which any merger is to be conducted and implemented. The union hierarchy will 
conduct the negotiations with the hierarchy in the partner union. Only at the end of this 
process are the membership entitled to become involved directly in the process when they 
are given in effect the power of veto over the proposals. Up to this point there may have 
been little involvement by the membership. Not only can this lack of involvement fi-om the 
membership translate into less support for the merger but because of this exclusion, latent 
hostility to the way in which merger has been conducted may be carried over to the new 
organisation.
That unions were influenced by a range of both internal and external factors in their 
decision to embark on merger was demonstrated, evident fi’om the wide range of responses
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on the background to the decision. The most important factor highlighted in the survey was 
a fall in the level o f membership subscriptions, which was rated as the primary influence on 
the decision to merge by over 50% o f respondents. A fall in subscriptions suggests a 
financial incentive to merge but it may also be indicative of a desire to merge as a way of 
protecting influence and status. The desire to exploit new areas of potential membership 
growth, as a way of addressing a decline in membership, was identified by a significant 
number of respondents as a factor underpinning the decision to merge.
The need to grow in order to address rising expenditure and a sinking asset base were also 
identified as influences by respondents. Some unions also indicated that the decision to 
merge was in response to external pressures such as the need to improve the bargaining 
structure, the need to attract a broader range of expertise in-house and, perhaps most 
interestingly, a response to employer pressure -  a point to which we shall return later. 
Clearly, the major reasons to engage in mergers was not an attempt to extend bargaining 
power in the workplace as much as a pragmatic response to a range of financial and 
economic pressures and membership decline.
It appears that the process by which unions joined together to create a new or expanded 
organisation was broadly similar in each case. No formal moves towards integration were 
made prior to approval for the merger amongst the relevant membership group although the 
process of negotiation which preceded the merger meant that strong links between the 
partner organisations were already in place. The majority of respondents reported that the 
joint NEC and the new rule book/consultation were prepared shortly after the ballot on the
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proposals. The decision to merge union services was also carried out shortly after the ballot 
by the majority of merged unions. Although there was less consensus on the timescale for 
establishing a joint head office and integrating the branch structure, the majority of 
respondents (67%) agreed that the joint head office was set up in three months of the merger 
whilst branch integration did not occur until some time in the medium term, between three 
and six months, after the decision to merge.
In contrast to employers who claimed that union membership has remained broadly stable 
since the merger, the trade unions were split almost evenly on the question o f whether 
membership increased or declinedfollowing since merger. Such responses seem unusually 
candid for organisations that have traditionally presented merger as creating, if not 
opportunities for union growth, at least a strategy for halting decline. The opposing trends 
in membership may reflect directly the fact that, as we have suggested, the level of 
membership will be affected by several factors at any one time other than mergers. 
Economic indicators, such as the level of inflation or wages growth ,will have an impact at 
the national level but there is also a strong sectoral trend to patterns of union membership.
The WIRS study (1992) suggests that this may simply reflect trends in the employment 
levels in the industry. The decline in the membership levels in the printing unions and the 
growth of finance sector unions, for example, was almost entirely the result of sectoral 
growth or contraction. However, the trend in membership may reflect other patterns such as 
the careful policy of membership growth pursued by the GMB which may explain how they 
bucked the trend in membership decline suffered by other unions representing manual
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workers. Union membership as a solitary indicator of either the success of a merger policy, 
or indeed an increase or decrease in union power, will be dependent on other, particularly 
sectoral, factors. The particular impact of sectoral specific factors is an issue to which we 
will turn in the next section of the thesis.
If the question of union membership is inconclusive, the evidence in relation to the union 
branch structure may be of more assistance. In the survey, union respondents were asked to 
list the number of membership branches (defined either by location or sector/occupation) 
that existed in the partner unions before the merger and which the new organisation had 
after the merger. The responses to the survey indicate that unions have failed to fully 
integrate their branch structures following a merger. Far firom demonstrating economies of 
scale in a smaller network of bigger branches, the unions reported that the union post 
merger has largely preserved the branch structure which it inherited, or even in some cases 
(17%) increased the number of branches following the merger. This increase in the number 
of branches may indicate several developments. The union may have been forced to create 
more branches to place an influx of new members into the structure although this seems 
unlikely given the responses on membership stabihty or decline. Alternatively, the growth 
in branches may indicate that the same number (or fewer) members may be organised into 
the same (or a greater) number of branches. This may indicate that in a minority of cases, 
fewer union members may be being represented in a larger number of branches demanding 
funding and attracting significant secondary costs in terms of staff and administration. The 
branch structure might be one of the more obvious candidates for economies in the new 
union both to save money and to facihtate integration. It appears strange that unions have
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not sought to integrate their branch networks more speedily. Alternatively, the increase in 
branches may be indicative of a greater spread of membership either across a larger areas, a 
number of sectors or a number of occupations. It might be inappropriate, for example, for 
the new organisation to organise managerial staff and employees in the same employer 
within the same branches and this may explain an increase in the number. However, around 
33% of respondents reported that their branch structure had been curtailed after the merger, 
which suggests that some unions have been able to rationahse the branch structure to secure 
economies of scale. Fifty two per cent of respondents claimed that they had maintained the 
same number of branches in the new organisation as they had in two partner organisations.
Whilst trade unions are more likely to be funding a branch structure of the same size or 
greater than that which they inherited upon merger, most unions claim that there has been a 
significant change in the scale and quality of the services provided to members. All the 
union respondents suggested that the range of personal and financial services such as legal 
advice, car insurance and mortgages had increased significantly after the merger. The 
majority of respondents (78%) also maintained that they have been able to keep or extend 
the range and scope of issues pursued in collective bargaining post merger. Over 60% of 
respondents claim tq^Mve m ^tainW  or increased the number of fiill-thne officers in the _ 
new organisation. An increase in the number of sponsored MPs, and greater involvement 
with the European Union (often demonstrated by the establishment of a European office or 
union staff based in Brussels) are also cited as benefits for members arising fi"om the merger 
by respondents. Although the unions claim some success in extending their range of 
personal union services and political influence at home and in Europe, there is less evidence
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that unions have been any more successful in achieving their aims in workplace 
negotiations post-merger.
The employer respondents broadly confirmed that the number of issues covered in 
bargaining has been extended since merger, but there is little evidence that this has been 
accompanied by more success in achieving their aims. Here the respondents report that they 
do not perceive any increase or decrease in effectiveness in bargaining! When we examine 
the evidence by sector we shall see that unions post merger have not increased wage levels 
for tiieir members compared with unions operating in the sector that were not involved in a 
merger. Similarly, the evidence suggests that unions involved in merger were no more 
effective in opposing employer moves to reform bargaining structure that, as WIRS 
indicates, was a key managerial objective over the period. As has been noted, however, the 
fact that unions have not achieved notably higher degrees of success in obtaining bargaining 
objectives, like higher pay post merger, may not indicate that union power has remained 
stable or even declined. The maintenance of a particular level of achievement in bargaining 
may be indicative of an increase of power where the merged union has succeeded in 
maintaining the power relations against a hostile economic or legislative fi*amework.
From the responses that unions have returned about the organisation of services and 
bargaining post-merger, one can argue that the benefits available to the union through 
realising economies of scale have been directed to extending power in the secondary and 
tertiary dimensions of power identified by Lukes (1977). (Although it may also be that 
changes in power relations in these dimensions are easier to identify because they are
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subject to fewer external indicators.) Unions may have concentrated on dehvery of a greater 
range of individual services to individual members or on extending their pohtical influence 
at home and in Europe, by the sponsorship of MPs and the allocation of resources to 
pohtical lobbying. The determination of a general cross-sectoral trend or change in power 
relations in the primary dimension of cohective bargaining is more difficult to identify and 
to quantify given the impact of other factors. However, the responses which relate to the 
maintenance or extension of the branch network after the merger and the employment of 
more fWl-time officials does raise interesting questions as to the extent to which the 
potential efficiencies arising from a merger have been reahsed. We shall examine this - 
matter further when we investigate the mergers, by sector, within their specific bargaining 
environment.
In addition to studying the general impact of trade union mergers on union power, this study 
attempts to determine the extent to which an efficiency review process, when associated 
with a merger, can secure efficiencies which may usually be attributed to mergers. An 
investigation of whether the merger process unfr-eezes union organisation, and in doing so 
allows reviews to deliver increased efficiency is a key component of this study. For the 
purposes of the study a review usually consisted of an exercise, sanctioned by the union 
hierarchy, in which a team of senior lay members and professional staff were obhged to 
conduct a review of union services and structures post merger. They were required to 
examine any opportunities for initiating cost savings, any chances of securing economies of 
scale and any changes which may make the new structure more efficient. At the end of their 
investigation the review team would present a report, usually to the NEC, in which case
133
they would recommend a series of reforms to union structure and organisation on the 
grounds of efficiency.
The NEC would usually endorse and authorise the changes. Although it was usual for the 
review process to be conducted in-house with a team appointed by the NEC from existing 
union members and staff, some unions appointed an external individual or body to examine 
efficiency in the pew body. During the merger in the communications sector, for example, 
Lord Wedderbum was appointed by the union to recommend the way in which the new 
coirnnunicaliun workers union was slruclurcd efficiently. The review process is essentially 
an audit of cun-ent structures, services and practices to see whether or not they are working 
efficiently and can be revised to work better.
Overall, the survey suggests that union mergers are accompanied by a formal efficiency 
review in about 50% o f the survey responses. Of these, in the vast majority o f cases (around 
97% o f reviews) the review takes place within twelve months o f the final decision to merge 
(reviews are concentrated in the first six months after the merger). Sixty per cent of 
respondents reporting a review indicated that the review process covered the entire 
organisation whilst in 20% of respondents the review was confined to the section of the 
union directly affected by the merger or transfer of engagements. This seems to suggest that 
the review process can be extended beyond the area of the organisation affected directly by 
the merger to cover the union structure in its entirety. In so doing, it may indicate that the 
merger process is a useful framework in which to introduce a cross-organisation efficiency 
review.
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In most instances, the responses indicate the review process is driven by the same elements > 
as the merger process itself. In the vast majority of reviews conducted (97%) the terms of 
reference and the area of coverage were determined by the General Secretary of the union in. 
consultation, to a greater or lesser degree, with the NEC. Whilst the General Secretary and 
the NEC indicate a degree of commitment to the review process (which, given their direct 
involvement in and sanction of the process, might be expected) the survey highlights that 
union officers at head office, usually those charged with conducting the review, also 
demonstrated a significant commitment to the review process. Over 60% of respondents 
indicated that union officers were strongly in favour of the review process.
WhCTe respondents reported any opposition to the review process, this was said to emanate 
from regional officers of the union and from activists. However, only around 12% of 
respondents recorded any opposition to reviews at all and even those who did stopped short 
of rating it as outright opposition in their responses. Surprisingly, given that the union 
membership was identified as the group most likely to initially oppose the merger process 
in this survey, responses indicated that members were generally supportive of the review.
The general support for efficiency reviews throughout the union was demonstrated by the 
degree o f unity within each level o f the union on their support for the review. The National 
Executive and union officers were generally held to be united in their support, activists, who 
expressed some initial reservations, less so. The membership were broadly united in their 
support for a review. The degree of support for the review process throughout the union 
may be indicative of a genuine acceptance by the parties that in creating a new organisation
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steps should be taken to ensure that it is structured efficiently. It is not surprising that the 
groups driving the merger process forward are those most united in their support for a 
review, nor that opposition is concentrated in those groups (activists and regional officials) 
who may judge have the most to fear from a process of rationalisation, such as a loss of 
influence or job security.
Given that the survey highlights a degree of support and unity around the review process, 
this may encourage the new organisation to initiate a wide-ranging review. It may also 
suggest that the review, with this degree of support and involvement from the union 
hierarchy, will have the status necessary to dehver real efficiencies and challenge any 
opposition to the process. Moreover, the survey of unions suggested that in 40% of 
responses reporting a review there are arrangements for the review to be to be ongoing. 
About 30% of respondents indicated that a review would be conducted every six months 
and 10% every 12 months. Almost 50% of respondents suggested that the reviews would be 
ongoing but conducted on an ad hoc basis. Of course, it may be that the way in which the 
questionnaire was structured, unions were encouraged to indicate that a review had been 
implemented and that it would be ongoing (particularly where this was said to be an ad hoc 
arrangement). In practice the review process, on which there were no questions from 
employers to act as a balance, may have been smaller and less formal than the responses 
have suggested. Interestingly, for example, there was not a single survey response which 
specified a single change in the structure or services provided by the new organisation as a 
result of the merger process. This is despite the fact that several examples emerged later in 
the study in post merger publications and in interviews. The responses on union efficiency
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reviews have been subjected to a critical examination and where conclusions relating to the 
reviews are raised later they are done so when there is a specific example of the review's 
impact and not where the union simply alludes to an efficiency programme. Having drawn 
some general conclusions firom the responses to the survey, it is now appropriate to delve a 
httle deeper in order to explore the differences in the responses by economic sector.
From this brief overview of the general responses fi’om employers and unions it is clear 
that the sector in which the parties operate can have a significant impact on the way in 
which merger activity can affect bargaining and union power. For this reason, whilst a 
general overview may be useful in providing a top-line indication of the overall 
consequences of an increase in mergers, the exercise is limited by the lack of a general 
application, given the strong internal differences in responses. Given that the 
consequences of mergers are largely dependent upon the sectors in which activity occurs 
it is appropriate to turn now to a more detailed investigation of union mergers, with 
particular reference to the economic sectors in which they have occurred and the 
particular developments within the industry or service which may have had an impact on 
collective bargaining in general and on the outcome of merger activity in particular.
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1CHAPTER 6 - UNION MERGERS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
I will now turn my attention to the more detailed findings on union mergers at a sector 
and industry level. Clearly, there are a number of factors which impact on the sector or 
industry, not least employment patterns and level of business, which have a fundamental 
impact on the outcome of a merger. In order to uncover the effects of a merger it is 
necessary to study mergers within the context in which they have occurred, both at the 
economic and industrial level. After a brief overview of the economic sector individual 
mergers will be studied within the context of relevant industrial developments and 
activity within that particular sector. I will begin with a brief assessnient of the private 
sector in the period of the study before I move onto some consideration of developments 
in the primary private sector industries.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s the private sector was the focus of economic policy 
and activity. Government intervention was aimed at creating the conditions for private 
sector growth. Initiatives were launched to consolidate some of the legislative changes of 
the 1980s in relation to trade union power in particular and there was a much heralded 
drive for deregulation under which regulations and red tape were to be removed from 
private sector employers in a drive to enhance competitiveness. The latter combined with 
a strong Euro-scepticism m an attempt to shield the UK economy from regulation 
emanating from the Economic Union. Monetarism again formed the central strand of 
economic policy and the economy suffered a severe recession in the early 1990s which 
culminated in increases in male and female unemployment and economic inactivity
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between 1990 and 1995. Employment in the private sector during the period became 
increasingly fragmented and there was a strong growth in part-time and casual 
employment. Employment levels in the private sector were also boosted by continued 
privatisation initiatives which brought a number of larger employers into the private 
sector. Social commentators noted for the first time the emergence of work rich and work 
poor households where better off families were increasingly working longer hours in a 
number of different jobs (typically in the emerging service industries) and work poor 
households rooted in unemployment and inactivity by an out-dated benefits system.
Against this backdrop developments in particular industries influenced the nature and 
effects of the general trend towards fewer, larger trade unions. Several of the mergers 
across different industries are examined below starting with the private manufacturing 
sector which, although, cushioned from some of the general trends in employment 
patterns in the private sector, was nevertheless significant in relation to merger activity 
during the period. After this other industries such as printing and finance and a couple of 
the newly privatised industries shall be considered.
Manufacturing
In the survey on union mergers manufacturing unions and employers reported little 
discernible difference in industrial relations, other than structural rationahsation, arising as a 
result of mergers. The largest and most influential merger in manufacturing during this 
period was that which formed the AEEU from a merger between the engineers' union (the 
AEU) and the electricians' union (the EEPTU). The merger had been under discussion for
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many years before it was finally agreed. The merger was formally sanctioned in 1994, and 
whilst there was general support for the merger amongst engineers, there was less support 
amongst the electricians. According to the survey responses, the merger was supported by 
the General Secretary and the NEC but opposed by union officers in the regions, activists 
and the membership in general. There was a great deal of debate prior to the merger within 
these groups and divisions on the issue at the NEC. In the end, the merger was spearheaded 
by the General Secretaries and the NECs, with the other groups, officer, activists and 
members, largely peripheral to the process. At the end of negotiations the merger was 
confirmed by a large 6-1 majority in both unions following a large campaign for the merger 
in both unions.
The merger was a classic example of Undy's consohdatory merger. Both organisations had 
been suffering a membership decline as the reduction of craft positions in manufacturing fed 
through to the unions. A large national structure and a lot of property throughout the 
country was imposing severe financial pressures on both organisations. The natural affinity 
of craft groups and the large number of joint concerns and issues made large economies of 
scale a realistic expectation firom the merger. PubUcly, at least, the union down played the 
financial incentives for the merger, choosing instead to stress the pivotal role which the 
union claimed it now held in industry and the labour movement. Following his election as 
General Secretary, Paul Gallagher told the union journal in April 1992 "..The amalgamation 
was not done for financial reasons, even less political ones. At our birth we are the 
dominant union in manufacturing o f every sort. . We can offer current members and new 
members a full trade union service at every level o f industrial negotiations ...As other
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unions follow us down the amalgamation path, we will be well placed to be a major player 
in the trade union gameT (AEEU Union News, April 1992, p3)
As one might have expected from a merger that followed from years of discussions and 
dehberations and under which both parties had an eye to preserving an element of historical 
independence, the merger process was lengthy and complicated. Although a joint NEC was 
established on day one following the merger, the amalgamation of union services which 
was started at the same time is still going on. A joint head office was estabhshed three years 
after the merger (the EEPTU former head office was sold) and a joint rule book was agreed 
(with some difficulty) in 1996. The integration of the branch network is ongoing.
Following the merger, union membership continued to decline and the union organised 
fewer members into fewer union branches. The wide range of services available to 
members of die partner unions have been maintained, The respondents stated diat the 
merged union still received a wide range of financial and legal services, training and 
education, convalescence homes, death benefits and a benevolent fund. The union 
maintained the sponsorship of the 20 domestic MPs and the MEPs that were supported 
under arrangements in the partner unions. An increase in involvement with the European 
Parliament was reported.
The merger between the EEPTU and the AEU reformed bargaining arrangements for 
skilled, apprentice-trained craftsmen employed in maintenance and skilled electricians 
following the ongoing decline of employment in the manufacturing industry. All the
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responses from employers on this merger indicated that the merger consolidated bargaining 
arrangements for the craft group. Typically, at both Rover and British Aerospace, this 
facihtated the move to single table bargaining arrangements for about 30% of the workforce 
which had previously negotiated separately by trade (about 25% of the workforce were 
mechanical engineers and electricians made up about 5% of the workforce).
The survey uncovered a range of bargaining structures in place within British 
manufacturing. In both British Aerospace (BAG) and Rover, bargaining had been devolved 
to plant level and national officers were only involved in a supportive role to the local 
stewards. In contrast ICI, had maintained bargaining across different levels of the 
organisation. Negotiations were structured at local, divisional and national levels. Local 
representatives led the plant level negotiations and local full-timers led negotiations at 
divisional levels. At national levels the bargaining was led by national union officers.
Each Company, ICI, Rover and BA had all maintained union facilities despite the changes 
to bargaining structure facilitated by the merger. The unions were afforded a full range of
,r
facilities including time off for members and officers, company check off arrangements and 
office facilities.
In BA and Rover, the structural advantages of a single union structure representing craft 
employees was seen as a positive development in terms of facihtating flexibility across 
disciplines and moving towards a multi-skilled craft group. In removing the representational 
dis^ction between groups of sMUed craftsmen, the Companies identified a potential 
advantage in terms of facihtating joint initiatives on multi-skiUed training and team-based
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working. BAC and Rover also identified positive advantages arising fi-om simplified 
bargaining structure facilitating more stability in negotiations. In addition. Rover reported 
that the merger was important as a move towards better representational of members' views 
and a more focused bargaining agenda. Neither company identified any potential 
disadvantages arising from the merger.
The response of the food manufacturing company United Biscuits also identified the 
importance of the merger in facihtating initiatives in cross and multi-skilling across their 
craft groups. Whilst competitive pressure was given as the primary reason for pursuing 
developments in this area, the Company reported that a single union to represent the 
interests of the craft jointly had simplified difficult negotiations and amplified the logic of 
multi-skihed craftsmen represented, as they now were, by a single body.. The Company 
suggested that the added complication of negotiating separately with different unions in the 
craft would have been a major obstacle to cross-skilling and single grades of craftsmen in 
the Company.
In contrast, ICI told us that in their experience in the chemical industry no tangible 
advantages had arisen within the Company from the merger in the craft group. It argued that 
far from simplifying bargaining arrangement the merger had clouded lines of responsibility 
and lines of authority. Full-time officers had been isolated from the bargaining process and, 
as a result, the merged union was less representative of members' views. The Company 
reported that the demise of the EEPTU had left a genuine gap in the bargaining structure 
which could not be filled properly by the new union. The AEEU were in such disarray
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throughout the chemical industry, according to ICI, that any benefits of the merger were 
difficult to identify. ICI reported that they had lost the highly professional EEPTU to the 
"general shambles" of the AEEU. There was little sign that the new organisation was a 
genuine amalgamation of its two components. The evidence so far was that the engineers 
had extended their influence over the electricians who, whilst previously receptive to 
initiatives on change and development, were now a minority in a reactive organisation 
which actively opposed managerial initiatives, both structurally and politically. The 
Company claimed that the inefficiency of the merged union was apparent fi-om the 
duplication of officials at every level. This made bargaining time-consuming and 
cumbersome and allowed scope for disgruntled local officials to extend their influence.
In manufacturing, the degree to which the responses of these employers genuinely reflect 
the impact of the merger is not fully apparent. It seems that where the merger was genuinely 
supported by the employer this was because it contributed positively to moves on single 
table bargaining or cross-skilling which were already underway or would have been pursued 
regardless of the merger. In this respect it is the appropriateness of the merger to 
developments in the Company which the employers support as opposed to the changes 
brought about by the merger. In the case where the merger contributed to a worsening 
industrial relations climate at ICI, this is largely because it upset an environment where the 
Company had accommodated the management of change in their existing industrial 
relations structure. The merger, in extending the influence of a reactive work group, might 
have been held to extend union resistance to change. The merger did not create the 
difficulties at ICI, it served to exacerbate conflict in the workplace which existed prior to the
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merger.
Both Rover arid BA reported that the merger was a positive influence on the climate of 
industrial relations within the company. BA reported that the flexibihty between 
Mechanical and Electrical staff had improved since the merger. It was conceded that there 
may be a variety of reasons for this, of which the merger was only a contributing factor. 
Rover claimed that, in addition to making a positive contribution to the climate of 
bargaining within the company, the merger had contributed to the aims of the Company in 
acting as a facilitator for multi-skilling of the craft function. In addition, the Company also 
confirmed that the new union was concentrating on a narrower bargaining agenda, viiere 
improvements to pay, training and pensions were the primary objectives. Less energy, it 
claimed, was being directed to holidays, hours and equal opportunities initiatives. ITie 
Company saw this as a positive contribution.
ICI told us that the merger had no affect on the issues pursed in the negotiating arena and 
that the merger had had no impact on company aims and performance. The Company 
claimed that the merger had done nothing to halt the decline of the influence of the craft 
function over the last ten years caused by membership decline and neglect by full-timers. 
The opportunity for improvement, had the electricians extended their influence as a result of 
the merger, had been lost as the revised structure gave more prominence and clout to the 
traditional (and obstructive) engineering function.
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Just as there was a division between BA and Rover on the one hand and ICI on the other on 
the impact of the merger, other manufacturing companies were similarly divided. A merger 
between the National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear Workers and the National Union of 
Footwear, Leather and Allied Trades was primarily to consolidate the new organisation's 
(NUKAFT) position in the industry. The merger, completed at the beginning of 1991 was 
supported widely in each union with the exception of some activists in NUFLAT who were 
largely ambivalent to the proposed merger. Respondents indicated that both parties to the 
merger were driven to seek a partnership for primarily financial reasons, a combination of a 
decline in membership, rising expenditure and a shrinking asset base. Both parties noted the 
importance of a merger in opening up new areas of the industry to membership by re­
defining the position of the new organisation to meet the needs of all workers in the 
industry. The merger process was completed quickly. A joint NEC was established within a 
month of talks being completed. Union services were merged an a joint head office set up at 
the same time. A rule book and constitution were Rafted for die new organisation over the 
next twelve months and over the following three months the branch networks of the 
partners were integrated.
After the merger union membership has continued to decline and fewer members are 
organised in fewer branches. Both partners offered a wide range of membership services 
prior to the merger and these have been maintained. Although the union responded that the 
increased expertise within the union had allowed the organisation to extend its bargaining 
agenda to reflect the full range of employee's concern within the industry, it is interesting 
that the organisation reported a decline in the number of full-time officers conducting
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negotiations. The new organisation has not embarked on the sponsorship of domestic MPs 
post merger but does claim to have become more involved in lobbying the European 
Parliament.
In the same sector, the incorporation by the GMB of the FTAT, which represented manual 
grades in Remploy, was generally seen as making a positive contribution to the bargaining 
climate. The Company reported that the merger had led to a more representative union 
which would pursue a narrower bargaining agenda, including more moderate pay claims. 
The company also anticipated more stable bargaining arrangements. Remploy's reservations 
were that the union would become more powerful within the Company and that local 
stewards may be marginahsed by full-time officials. The Company was also concerned that
the union would increase its political influence as a result of the merger. This latter concern
\
is particularly important in a Company which is the largest single employer of disabled 
people and the merger presented a real opportunity for the union to tap into the political 
processes used to pursue equal rights for disabled people generally. Despite these concerns 
however the Company was supportive of the merger.
Since the merger the Company reported that the merger had had a positive impact on 
industrial relations in terms of the social partnership approach to negotiations adopted by 
the GMB. The Company were able to maintain key relations with union personnel post­
merger which was obviously reassuring given the concern that the merger would dilute 
local influence on bargaining agenda. Where the company reported a change in the 
bargaining agenda this has been in the union's willingness to discuss training issues and
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pensions and since WIRS confirms a growing interest by negotiators in these issues 
generally, their emergence onto the agenda may have little to do with the merger.
Courtaulds, the clothing manufacturer, reported that the merger between the union for 
Hoisery and Knitwear Workers and the National Union of Footwear, Leather and Allied 
Trades had no discernible impact on industrial relations in the Company. Prior to the 
merger, the Company knew nothing about industrial relations in the footwear sector but it 
had neither aspirations nor fears in relation to the merger. It remained neutral. Since the 
merger, although union membership in the Company has remained constant, there has been 
no change whatsoever in either the structure of collective bargaining, the issues pursued, or 
the intensity with which they have been pursued according to the Company. In the plant, the 
Company tend to negotiate with the same representatives and deal with the same full-time 
officials.
The craft union EEPTU was engaged in a merger in the cement industry during the period 
of this study. The merger involving the British Cement Staff Association and the EEPTU. 
was completed in 1992. As with mergers in car, food and clothing manufacture, the move 
was met largely with ambivalence within the EEPTU, the enthusiasm and support for the 
merger firom the General Secretary and officers was sufficient to drive the process on and 
overcome some initial opposition to the proposals fi-om within the membership of the Staff 
Association. The main reason for the merger, reported by the union in its response, was the 
impending retirement of the General Secretary of the Association and a lack of any obvious 
candidate to take over running the organisation. Underpinning this were a series of financial
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problems for the Association arising from a falling membership resulting directly from a 
contraction of employment in the cement industry. For the EEPTU the merger was seen as 
opening a doorway to a new area of potential membership growth within the cement 
industry and a way of securing expertise on the industry by recruiting the Association's 
staff.
The merger process itself was conducted remarkably quickly with the entire membership of 
the Staff Association transferred into a single branch of the EEPTU. This made the process 
extremely easy to administer and allowed the union services to be amalgamated with effect 
from the merger date. The negotiations on the rule book and constitution of the Staff 
Association (which sought to maintain a healthy degree of independence post merger) was 
completed in two or three weeks prior to the merger. The Association retained most of its 
internal Committee structure. Retention of the Association’s identity post merger was 
important for the organisation to preserve recognition rights within the Blue Circle Group.
Following the merger, the decline in membership in the former British Cement Staff 
Association has continued, primarily as a result of the general trend in job losses and 
redundancies within the firm which reflected those in the manufacturing sector industry.
The Association stated that post merger "the Association has proved vulnerable to the 
fortunes of the Blue Circle Group with rationalisation of the cement operations having an 
almost proportionate effect on the Association’s membership". The Association indicated 
that the merger with the electricians has done tittle to address its reliance on the employer 
but it is difficult to see how, other than by improving membership retention amongst Blue
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Circle employees, the union could exert any influence over such a concentrated section of 
its membership.
The range of individual member services, one tool for retention, available to Staff 
Association members has increased significantly with the merger. Prior to becoming a 
branch of the EEPTU, the Association offered education and training and legal advice for 
members. This has been maintained following the merger and supplemented to include 
death benefits, convalescent homes, car and travel benefits and a full range of financial 
services.
Despite the major increase in the services available to members of the unions individually, 
the collective bargaining agenda has been curtailed in British Cement post merger. There 
has been, according to the union, a marked curtailment of the issues on which the Company 
is prepared to negotiate with employee representatives. The union report that the Company 
has rolled back the bargaining agenda and excluded a variety of Company policy areas, 
such as the management of change and equal opportunities. For many employees, the union 
reported bargaining barely extends beyond the confines of an annual pay review. Given the 
range of pressures and influences on the company's employee relations policy, it is unlikely 
that the merger itself had any significant role in this curtailment. The financial pressures 
under which they were operating, combined with increasing casuahsation and contract- 
based employment, may have provided the Company with an incentive to dismantle some 
of its policies and procedures as the requirement to recruit and retain permanent, skilled 
employees became less important.
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Blue Circle Industries reported only positive developments arising from the merger. For 
example, staff representation became more professional. They noted that negotiations were 
focused on a narrower negotiating agenda and stressed that the professionalism of the 
union's response had improved. Given the prevalence of multi-site bargaining, the resources 
a larger union was able to direct to training union representatives was particularly welcome 
according to the employer.
The integration of the staff association representing white collar staff with the trade union 
representing production and craft grades (as well as some white collar posts) had a positive 
impact on the climate of bargaining at a large tobacco manufacturer. No disadvantages 
arising from the merger were reported and the Company welcomed the prospect of 
simplified bargaining stmctures and a more representative union pursuing a narrower 
bargaining agenda. The Company reported that the merger did not actually result in any 
significant changes to the way in which bargainiug was structured, but that the merger did 
contribute to a positive climate in industrial relations.
Finally, the consequence of the merger on industrial relations at Unilever was to end the 
collective representation of managers in the Company. Following the merger there were no 
negotiations with a collective body and terms and conditions were effectively imposed on 
the group. In what can clearly be seen as a diminution of its power, the union maintained 
some influence in representing members on individual issues and providing a range of 
membership services.
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Summary
Any analysis of the change in power relations between collective bargaining parties in 
manufacturing that have resulted from a union merger is almost impossible to quantify. The 
range of economic, poUtical and competitive influences on bargaining across &e sector 
during the period of the study means that in most cases mergers simplified either the 
bargaining structure and/or the bargaining agenda (to the benefit of both parties reportedly). 
In one or two cases however, employers reported that the merger had consolidated sectional 
interests and disrupted collective bargaining arrangements which may imply a growth in 
power for the union. There is no evidence that links union merger within a group to a 
greater degree of change or adoption of a new managerial technique, nor do union members 
appear to do better or worse than other groups of workers in the same Company that have 
not been affected by a recent merger. For example, in both United Biscuits and Rover over 
the last 5 years the pay settlements negotiated with the craft group were the same in 
percentage terms as that agreed with other groups of employees.
Where the merger appears to have some influence on power relations in the sector is in 
facilitating or exacerbating an existing trend or series of difficulties. The WIRS survey 1992 
indicates that, in general, the move towards integrated bargaining and single employee 
status is opposed by the trade unions and reflects a decline in their influence when it is 
introduced. Similarly, for craft employees whilst the move to cross skilling is not opposed 
per se by unions, it is negotiated carefully with unions keen to secure strict control over its 
development and implementation given the impact the initiative can hâve on craft jobs. The 
survey conducted for this study suggests that where initiatives on these issues are underway,
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the union merger amongst the craft group could have a positive impact on hnplementation. 
In legitimising structural change in bargaining the move made it easier to perform a wider 
review of bargaining structure and pursue cross skilling. Given the position that unions have 
adopted in relation to these initiatives, their facilitation may indicate a contribution to the 
diminution of power resulting from the merger.
In contrast, where there is a strong culture of resistance to change and opposition to 
managerial proposals is already underway, as we can see at ICI, a union merger may extend 
the scope of influence over the resistant group. The merger may result in a shift in power 
relations by the union when an element of the union is in ascendance by extending their 
sphere of influence. The determining factor in whether the merger may have any impact on 
power relations depends upon the shift in bargaining power already underway.
In companies Wiere the merger does not result in a union between two previously separate 
bargaining groups, the effect of the merger on power relations is less clear. Employers 
continue to deal with the same individuals pursuing more or less the same issues. Structural 
change is not related to the merger according to respondents. In these cases, whilst a union 
merger may herald a re-organisation within the organisation, the net effect for the employer 
is that business as usual is pretty much maintained.
In manufacturing companies the survey indicates that a union merger may have some 
impact on power relations where it removes a separate bargaining line for a group of 
employees, but where bargaining lines within the Company are maintained the impact of
153
the merger on bargaining power is very difficult to identify. Occasionally, however, as the 
survey indicates, the merger may have an impact on power relations beyond the primary 
power dimension of collective bargaining. At Re-employ the merger with the GMB gave 
FT AT a greater access to the pohtical and economic dimension of power, Dahl's third 
dimension. Moreover, in this case because of the political sensitivity associated with the 
employment of disabled people, access to a wider number of employees, a professional 
press and pubhc relations made a substantial impact on the companies plan to cut the 
workforce and impose a pay deal in 1995. The opportunity to utihse the pohtical 
environment as a source of power was a key factor m reversing the Company's power and 
marked a shift in power relations towards the union despite being outside the bargaining 
arena. A similar noticeable shift in power relations directly attributable to the merger (this 
time towards the employer) was apparent following the decision to derecognise the 
Unilever's Managers union following its merger with the EPMS. Effectively, in 
derecognising the union's authority to negotiate collectively on pay and conditions, the 
merger marked a fundamental shift in power towards the employer.
Having consoUdated the information relating to mergers in the manufacturing sector and 
draw some headline findings and pointers on power relations and changes in bargaining 
structures, a related sector, printing, can now be investigated. Although similar in function 
to the wider manufacturing sector and, by its nature subject to the same competitive 
pressures, printing is very different in one crucial aspect. Whilst a number of different 
mergers took place over the period across manufacturing with a range of different and 
related effects, in printing collective bargaining across the sector was affected by the merger
154
of the two industrial unions responsible for all employees working in the industry. As a 
result the impact of a particular merger on bargaining relations should be easier to identify 
since no collective bargaining within the sector has been unaffected by what Undy would 
term a classic consolidatory merger.
Printing
The merger of the two major printing unions, the NGA and SOGAT '82 to form the GPMU, 
in October 1991 had a significant impact on union organisation in the private sector. The 
merger brought together craft employees in the NGA with a range of non-craft and clerical 
employees in SOGAT to form a union represented across the printing industry. The merger 
formed the sixth largest union in the TUG. The merger was a classic case of unions 
consohdating a position in the industry when faced with a declining membership base and 
an increasingly hostile bargaining environment. Employers in the industry, the unions 
reported, had continued to pursue a move away from collective negotiations and towards 
individual contracts for employees with some vigour. The need for a single voice for print 
employees in the labour movement and the decision making bodies of the European 
community, the IGF and the EGF, was also a major factor in the decision to merge. The 
merger was actively supported by all areas of both unions and with a strong degree of unity 
across the organisations. The enthusiasm for the merger amongst both General Secretaries, 
Brenda Dean of SOGAT and Tony Dubbings of the NGA, was seen as instrumental in 
ensuring that the merger went ahead.
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The respondents told us that the need to improve bargaining arrangements and react to 
employer pressure were the key reasons for the merger process. A desire to consolidate a 
central position in the industry was also cited and illustrated by the attempts to recruit the 
NUJ into a united union organisation covering all aspects of the printed media sector.
Whilst the need for a collective resistance to employer pressure to derecognise was one 
factor in the decision to merge, the unions also sought to review their bargaining structures 
with employers seeking to retain collective representation in order to simplify the structures. 
A merger between the two unions, often represented in the same workplaces, had the effect 
o f  simplifying bargaining arrangements and facilitating single table arrangements in some 
companies.
The merger did not stabilise union membership in the print industry and the union has 
continued to lose members as a result of job losses (primarily due to the introduction of new 
technology, and continued employer hostihty) according to the union. The range of issues 
pursued in collective bargaining has not been affected by the merger, but the number of full­
time officials has been increased. There has been no change post merger in the range of 
services available to members because both partners offered a very wide range of 
membership services. The GPMU has kept up the five sponsorships of the five Labour MPs 
supported by its component union but it has sought to increase its influence at a European 
level.
The Paper Federation of Great Britain reported that the formation of the GMPU, from 
SOGAT and the NGA had had httle demonstrable effect on the paper-making industry. The
156
officers responsible for national negotiations remained in place and, as a result, continuity in 
bargaining structures and the bargaining agendk had been maintained. At the level of the 
individual company, plant level bargaining, against the backdrop of high union membership 
with a full range of union facilities supplied by the employer, was the norm according to the 
responses. SOGAT and the NGA jointly represented all operating and craft employees, with 
white collar employees not generally represented by a union. Where employers reported any 
changes arising from the merger, these were reported to be of benefit to the Company. 
Waddington Cartons did not report any changes in bargaining arising from the merger 
whilst JaiTold Printing and SCA Packaging reported that they had supported the merger and 
realised benefits from it. Jarrold Printing indicated that the merger had led to more stable 
bargaining and better representation of members. It had led to a decline in industrial action. 
SCA reported simplified bargaining arrangements which had contributed to stability in 
union negotiations.
Summary
In many ways the responses from the printing industry mirror those from the manufacturing 
sector generally. Where the merger between the unions destroyed a separate bargaining 
arrangement then this was deemed to be advantageous by the employer who was already 
involved in some revision of structural bargaining arrangements. Both Jarrold Printing and 
the SCA reported that the move to merger effectively contributed to the ongoing policy to 
simplify bargaining arrangements within the Companies. In this respect the merger was a 
facilitator of change rather than the instrument which drove it (the real determinant of power 
relations which is made up of complex and inter-related factors including perhaps merger).
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The merger assisted a process that was underway and given the prevalence of single table 
bargaining identified by WIRS would, in all probability, have gone on in any case. 
Nevertheless, given that WIRS has identified union opposition to bargaining structure 
reform the merger may have contributed in some way to a shift in bargaining power towards 
the employer. Where the merger does not result directly in a structural change in bargaining 
within a workplace or where there is no wider move to reform bargaining, no impact on 
bargaining power is identified.
Workers in the printing sector have historically been represented by industrial union’s 
covering all jobs and occupations. Other groups of employees are represented not in relation 
to the sector in which they work but the job or role they are employed to perform. As a 
representation of these employees takes place across a range of industries and even sectors. 
One might expect union mergers affecting members firom this disparate group of industries 
to be difficult to investigate given the nature of the members involved and the variety of 
factors which may impact on collective bargaining (not least of which might be the 
economic factors affecting their particular industry). It is feasible, for example, that 
employees in a particular occupation in one sector may be enjoying an economic boom in 
which wages and conditions are improving whilst those in the same occupation in another 
sector may be experiencing job losses and worsening terms.
Private Sector White Collar and Clerical
Within private sector industries, MSF has dominated the mergers involving organisations 
representing white collar or clerical staff. The union itself arose firom a merger of two rather
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disparate partners in 1988. ASTMS, representing white collar workers in the health service, 
finance sector and manufacturing supervision, entered merger talks with TASS whose 
membership was concentrated at all levels throughout the manufacturing sector. The merger 
talks, starting in 1986 and initiated by ASTMS, led to the formation of a new and large 
union concentrated in manufacturing but with interests extending beyond this into the 
financial and professional services sector. In many ways the merger can be seen as a classic 
example of a consolidatory merger in which two unions, threatened by the decline in 
membership due to the contraction of the manufacturing sector in the mid to late 1980s, 
joined togetlier to secure their position. In addition to presenting the new organisation as the 
primary organisation for the representation of employees engaged in manufacturing, the 
partnership is also a springboard fi’om which the union could attempt to expand its 
membership beyond manufacturing in those areas where ASTMS had already established a 
membership base. The merger was undoubtedly led by the union hierarchy in both unions.
The respondents indicated that whilst the logic and rationale for the merger was largely 
accepted throughout both organisations, the General secretaries and NEC, with the support 
of union officers led the merger process; There was very little opposition to the merger and, 
respondents indicated, there was a large degree of unity within both organisations on the 
merger issue. The fall in membership subscription income was cited as the primary reason 
for merger. The decline in employment in manufacturing throughout the eighties had placed 
financial burdens on both parties and both were keen to consolidate their position in the 
sector. Falling income and increasing expenditure in both partners emphasised "industrial 
logic", as one respondent described it, of a merger.
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In the first phase of the merger process the new union set up a joint head office and merged 
union services to members. A joint NEC to lead the practicahties of the merger was also 
established. Within the first six months the unions had agreed a new interim rule book and 
constitution which was consohdated some 18 months later. Initially, the union chose not to 
tackle the duplicated branch structure. The integration of branches has been a lengthy and 
time consuming process and is still going on some nine years after the merger.
The merger had not succeeded in addressing the decline in membership. It was reported that 
both the union membership and the number o f  merged branches have continued to decline. 
Whilst this was partly explained by respondents in relation to the continued decline in 
manufacturing employment in the UK, it also suggests an inability of the new union to 
extend its membership growth outside the core sector. The continued decline in membership 
and the financial impact of this are evident in the range of services offered to members post 
merger. The survey indicated that the range of services currently offered by the union are 
significantly fewer than those available to members in the partner organisations. Car 
insurance benefits, insurance services and mortgages have all been discontinued by the 
MSF and the death benefits and benevolent fund available to members in the partners have 
been consolidated into a single Benevolent Fund without any guaranteed payments. In 
terms of the collective bargaining agenda there has been a significant narrowing of 
bargaining interests, despite the emergence of several key issues for this white collar 
workers in recent years in terms of flexible working, equal opportunities and training. The 
union reported that the financial environment in which it operated in manufacturing towards 
the end of the eighties mWe basic pay the primary consideration on the union’s bargaining
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agenda. Where the union has expanded its services to members post merger, it is seeking to 
widen its influence on the national pohtical environment, where it sponsors 16 Labour MPs 
compared with the 12 sponsored by the two partners. The new union has also responded to 
the growth in the European dimension in collective bargaining by seeking to extend its 
influence in the European Parliament.
Once estabhshed, the way in which MSF has sought to consolidate its position in the 
manufacturing sector can be illustrated by the way in which it has recruited a number of 
white collar staff associations into the union. The merger with the Imperial Group Staff 
Association, representing people working in the tobacco industry, is one such example. The 
General Secretary of the IGSA stated that the merger, which took place in 1990, was 
initiated and strongly favoured by the larger union whilst the Staff Association were 
suspicious of the move and wary of being taken over. Whilst MSF was largely able to 
convince officers and the NEC of the benefits of the move, the membership and officers 
based in the regions remained sceptical of the merger. The survey information indicates a 
great deal of division and debate on the merger amongst these two groups.
The main reasons for the Staff Association response to the merger overtures were financial. 
The decline in the tobacco industry had left the organisation facing declining income fi*om 
subscriptions and rising expenditure. The Association was also seeking increased expertise 
in the bargaining process in order to respond to a more complex bargaining agenda 
particularly given the developments in health and safety and the importance of equal 
opportunities initiatives to a predominantly female membership. Despite the reservations in
the membership, a major campaign amongst the members resulted in a conclusive 
endorsement of the merger and from that point the merger process moved very quickly. The 
union head office vyas sold within a month and the branch structure and union services were 
merged within three months.
The respondents reported that the merger move had helped stem some of the problems 
facing the organisation and, whilst membership had continued to decline, this reflected the 
continuing decline in demand for cigarettes as opposed to any employee relations issues. 
Once again the survey suggests the relatively insignificant impact of industrial relations 
structure when there is a strong sectoral trend. The bargaining structures have not been 
affected by the merger and there has been no move to simplify arrangements or facilitate 
single table bargaining.
In addition to the formation of the MSF the other significant merger involving organisations 
representing white collar private sector employees was the decision by Apex to join the 
large GMB general union. Apex representing managerial, administrative and clerical 
employees predominantly based in the private sector was unusual in that the merger, 
supported throughout the organisation was opposed at the top by the General Secretary 
ostensibly for "political reasons". Elsewhere in the union and within the GMB the rationale 
for the merger was accepted and the proposals broadly accepted. As a result of the support 
for the merger in the partner unions and the degree of unity on the merger question 
throughout the partners was such that the General Secretary was isolated and the merger 
went ahead in 1989.
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The main reason for the merger was, the survey suggested, the loss of influence suffered by 
the union, particularly internally within the labour movement and the TUC. Joining a large 
general union immediately addressed this providing renewed influence and increasing 
status. The merger also addressed Apex's other concerns such as a decline in members and a 
shrinking membership base by opening the opportunity for significant economy of scale 
savings.
Once decided, the merger process was relatively speedy. A joint NEC was estabhshed and 
union services merged almost immediately and the Apex head office was sold within three 
months. The branch structure has remained largely separate fi-om the branch structure of 
other elements of the GMB reflecting the desire by Apex to retain an element of 
independence within the GMB structure. This can be further illustrated by the retention of 
the Apex name.
The merger has not prevented Apex fi-om continuing to lose members (and branches) 
despite an increase in union membership within the GMB generally. Similarly, to the 
experience of the Imperial Group Staff Association, the merger with a larger union has had 
significant benefits for members in term of the range of individual services which have 
become available, but the merger has had far less impact on their collective representation. 
Apex reported that a range of financial services, car breakdown benefits and death benefits 
became available to members for the first time. However, in relation to collective 
bargaining with employers, there was httle impact of the merger on either the range of the 
bargaining agenda or the manner in which issues were pursued. The number of full-time
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officers dedicated to bargaining on the behalf of Apex members was reduced post merger. 
Summary
Trade union respondents representing white collar workers in the private sector, all had 
made an efficiency review process more or less integral to the union merger and, with the 
exception of one, all the reviews were to be ongoing. In the merger between the Imperial 
Group Staff Association and the MSF the terms of the review, which was aimed primarily 
at financial efficiency, was set by the MSF NEC and reported to the MSF Financial 
Secretary. Both parties were broadly supportive of the review process. The unions reported 
that the review had streamlined the communication process with the membership and fully 
integrated the negotiating function. There were no plans to make the review process 
ongoing and, given the scale of the merger and the number of members involved, to have 
made the review ongoing night have lacked credibihty with the members.
In all the other cases, the merger was to be used as an opportunity to introduce an ongoing 
review into the firamework of the merged organisation. The majority of the reviews were 
conducted 12 months after the merger had been approved in the ballot. In the case of the 
merger between Apex and the GMB, the review process was conducted a full two years 
after the merger when the new organisation might be held to be fully integrated. In every 
case, the entire organisation (and not the area directly affected by the merger) was to be 
included in the remit of the review. Whilst this degree of coverage may not be surprising 
where a new organisation has been formed, it is surprising that the integration of Apex into 
the GMB should have an impact outside the boundaries of the merger and across the larger
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organisation. The coverage indicates that the opportunity to review structure provided by 
the merger Avas readily utihsed by the GMB. In the GMB/Apex merger a series of working 
parties have been established since the merger in order to make sure the reforms initiated by 
the review are perpetuated and on-going. In general, the reviews tend to operate on terms 
established by the NEC and it is the NEC who evaluates the outcome. AU the unions 
indicated a strong degree of support for the merger proposals throughout the component 
organisations. One respondent reported that the membership of the organisation would 
probably not have been as supportive had they an inkling of what had been going on.
Respondents were asked to iUustrate the sort of outcomes which the review had dehvered. 
The GMB indicated that a number of union pubhcations had been suspended as a result of 
the review and the affiUations list had been rationalised. The integration of iinion services 
had been monitored carefully for efficiency. Another union suggested that the reviews had 
resulted in a series of cost-cutting initiatives including redundancies amongst the fuU-time 
staff. Each respondent confirmed that the review process established would extend beyond 
the period where the organisation was directly involved in the merger process and would 
become, in effect, a general efficiency review examining all aspects of the organisation. 
Where respondents indicated a specific timescale for an efficiency review, other than stating 
it was to be "ongoing", the favoured timescale was for a review every 6 months
It will be interesting to compare these findings with a group of white coUar workers who are 
represented in relation to the industry in which they are employed rather than by reference 
to their job or role. In the finance sector, employees are represented by a single industrial
165
union or, by virtue of historical development in industrial relations in the industry, a series 
of small company unions. Whilst merger activity amongst occupational unions representing 
white collar staff was characterised by a series of high profile consolidatory mergers 
designed to protect the union fi-om falling employment within industries in which they 
operated, mergers in the finance sector were more fi-equent and involved fewer employees. 
Although they shared the common feature of being a response to economic developments in 
the industry mergers in finance tended to reflect the trend in employer organisation m 
response to deregulation in the finance sector. As a result union merger activity was often a 
pragmatic response to merger activity amongst employers.
Finance
The significance of sectoral factors on the nature of merger activity and the impact they 
have on power relations is amply demonstrated by developments in the finance sector. 
During the eighties the sector grew consistently as the Government deregulated the 
provision of financial services and used fiscal pohcy to generate a growth in saving. At the 
same time privatisation was responsible for a surge in share ownership and stock market 
activity. With the growth in financial services that banks, insurance companies and building 
societies were authorised to provide came a growth of employment in the sector. This was 
reflected in a growth in union membership; both the larger trade unions like BEFU, the high 
street bank staff associations and the smaller employee organisations responsible for 
representation in a single building society or insurance company. As membership in these 
single employer staff associations increased they attracted interest firom larger general trade 
unions who were seeking opportunities to offset the membership decline suffered in their
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traditional sectors. The prevalence of merger activity in the sector in the first half of the 
period under investigation can be explained, in the main, by an aggressive policy designed 
to pull smaller finance sector staff associations into larger trade unions.
As competition within the sector intensified, employers looked to reduce cost bases and 
exploit technological developments to secure the optimum return for shareholders. 
Employers looked towards merger themselves as a means of protecting themselves from 
competition, securing additional fimds for investment and securing a recognised service 
provider in â related market as a platform for growth. Smaller employer's also looked to 
merge with other small employers in order to develop an organisation large and robust 
enough to withstand the increasingly competitive nature of the market and maintain a 
degree of independence. This increase in mergers amongst employers was mirrored in the 
growth of merger activity amongst their employee organisations. The incidence of union 
merger activity in the second half of the period is almost entirely attributable to 
reorganisation amongst employers.
The prevailing economic climate in the sector, expansionist or in decline, is an important 
factor in highlighting the effects of mergers as well as the motives for them. Where the 
merger has resulted fi-om predatory moves by larger unions to attract smaller organisations, 
one might expect the merger to liberate new sources of fimds or a firesh range of 
services/expertise. Alternatively, it may signal less activity within the primary employer as 
the larger union concentrated on maintaining overall levels of membership or pursuing a 
strategy for growth, as opposed to servicing the existing members. Where the merger of
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unions reflects moves by the employer one might expect the union position to be weaker 
since a reorganisation has been foisted on the employees and they are faced with a larger 
employer with more resources. However the merger may also herald a growth in the 
resources available to the union as a result of a one-off increase in membership.
Where smaller unions had been recruited to join a larger more generaUst trade union, the 
employers with which they negotiated reported little change in the organisation of collective 
bargaining post merger. There was, however, some discernible difference between those 
mergers in which a staff association with recognition in a single employer opted for merger 
with a large general union (for example, the merger between the North of England BS Staff 
Association and BIFU) and those mergers involving a unions with members working within 
two similarly sized, employer based staff associations. The first ex ^p le  falls broadly into 
Undy's definition of an aggressive merger (in which a smaller union is attracted by a larger 
one to transfer its engagements), The second can be defined as a consolidatory merger 
between two unions conscious of the need to merge in order to secure their position within 
the new employer.
The amalgamation of the Northern Rock Staff Association (NORSA) with BIFU was the 
first significant success of a conscious policy by the larger union to attract smaller 
organisations into a single employee organisation in the sector. The increase in the size of 
NORSA, which had close to 1,500 members on entry, meant that recruitment was 
economically rational. The number of new members recruited and the potential membership 
which became available, made it attractive for BIFU to direct resources and attention to
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staff associations in the sector. The transfer of engagements from a small staff association to 
a larger, TUC affihated union, was generally greeted with apprehension amongst 
employers. This was partly due to the increased resources available to a larger organisation 
but also reflected a fear that the merger would disrupt the culture of bargaining in the 
Company. When NORSA merged with BIFU, the employer expressed reservations about 
having to negotiate with a less informed and less specific staff body which would have less 
information about the Society and its performance. The Northern Rock also feared that the 
union would be less representative of its employees' views and that influence would shift 
away from locally based employee representatives and towards professional full-timers. 
When the North of England Building Society Staff Association opted to join BIFU the 
employer reacted by derecognising the union altogether, suggesting that it anticipated a 
major disruption to its collective bargaining.
These fears were less prevalent amongst the Prudential Assurance when ASTMS merged 
with TASS. The Company was less worried by the merger since ASTMS already negotiated 
with a variety of different employers. However, the Company still feared that ASTMS's 
knowledge of the sector may be diluted by a partnership with a union with roots in 
manufacturing. The Prudential feared that the merger (to form MSF) would mean that the 
culture and dynamics of the union would be more likely to reflect manufacturing interests 
that those of the finance sector. The Company's major fear, other than that of negotiating 
with a less representative union, was that the merger would lead to an upsurge in industrial 
action as the negotiating tactics prevalent in manufacturing were adopted in the finance 
sector.
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The merger of a small in-house union with a larger organisation might also have some 
advantages for an employer as the experience and range of services available to a large 
union act to stabilise collective bargaining. The Prudential did not specify whether or not it 
anticipated any benefits to arise from the merger. The Northern Rock indicated that it 
expected the merger to faciUtate a more professional union (with more moderate claims and 
a narrower bargaining agenda). It anticipated more stability in its industrial relations. Both 
employers claimed to be neither supportive nor opposed to the merger.
The effects of the merger on power relations in the sector were difficult to assess and there 
was no noticeable difference between the general level of pay increase and changes in terms 
and conditions in those organisations that has opted for a merger and those which remained 
independent. Both employers succeeded in introducing performance-related pay in their 
organisations in the face of union opposition. However, both unions negotiated the 
introduction of the scheme and succeeded in securing safeguards such as dual signatories, 
the provision of information on grading and an equahty audit. The level of competitiveness 
and interchange of staff in the sector meant that wage rates were very similar across 
organisations and trends designed to retain employees or attract new staff were quickly 
adopted across all employers. By 1985, for example, every major employer in the sector 
offered significantly enhanced maternity provisions (Incomes Data Services 1995), profit 
sharing and performance related pay. Jon Robinson, Head of Research at BEFU stated that 
given the rapid expansion of the sector, employers were compelled to compete for skilled 
and experienced staff, particularly in Sales and IT. The pay and benefits packages on offer
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to staff across the sector were very similar and the sector was continuously surveyed for 
developments. He confirmed that there was httle difference in the culture or pattern of 
bargaining were unions had been engaged in a merger and those where they had not.
The response of the Prudential suggested that employers too recognised that the merger had 
little impact on collective bargaining. In the survey, the Prudential reported that no changes 
in bargaining had resulted fi-om the merger and that union density and the climate of 
bargaining had remained unchanged. The Company also suggested that the scope and depth 
of bargaining remained largely unaffected by the merger. The Northern Rock stated that the 
range of issues negotiated collectively within the Company increased after the merger and 
union membership rose. Whilst this response may indicate that the union adopted a fi-esh 
bargaining stance post merger and attracted new recruits, the employer confirmed BIFU’s 
view that new developments in the bargaining agenda primarily reflected the 
competitiveness between employers and the requirement to recruit and retain skilled 
employees. The level of union membership growth reflected the growth in employment in 
the Society. Although there was an increase in the range of issues pursued during 
negotiations post merger, the Society reported that in relation to hours, holidays, managerial 
pay, violence at work and stress management, union claims were less ambitious than they 
had been under the Staff Association. This may indicate that the negotiating strategy of the 
union changed post merger but it may also indicate that the major improvements in these 
areas had been secured across the sector and that these issues had lost their currency. This 
latter interpretation is strengthened by the response that in a single area, equal opportunities, 
the claims of the merged union were more ambitious. Given the degree of competition for
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skilled staff at this time advance in equal opportunities issues, maternity provisions, flexible 
work patterns and childcare, was a common feature in the sector which was heavily reliant 
on female labour. In the early to mid eighties advances in equal opportunities provision 
across all main finance sector employers outstripped any other category of employer in the 
private sector. (Industrial Relations Services 1985)
The effect of mergers between small and larger unions on collective bargaining relations 
and structures may have been limited, however the effects on union power post merger in 
relation to individual members and on wider economic and political issues did increase. 
Large general unions like the MSF and BIFU were able to provide members with a far 
greater range of services and benefits including education, research, legal assistance and 
consumer benefits. Most smaller staff associations could offer their members little more 
than very basic representation and legal services. Similarly, whilst smaller associations were 
not affihated to wider representational bodies and did not sponsor domestic or European of 
domestic MPs, both BIFU and MSF were affihated to the TUC and FEET (the international 
body for finance sector trade unions) and both organisations sponsored MPs in both 
Westminster and Brussels. Although union power in these spheres may have increased 
notably with the range of services and resources available to a larger union, the net effect of 
the extended fachities must be considered in relation to the limited effect of union power 
within these spheres. When placed against the range of employee benefits available to 
workers in the finance sector including pensions, share options, preferential mortgages and 
insurance, the services provided to individual members by the union can look derisory.
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Moreover, union influence on developments in the finance sector, despite the resources 
available to it, is generally marginal given the proximity of the sectoral developments with 
topical political developments (like the debate around the single currency) and economic 
pohcy, given the extensive lobbying and pubhc relations strategies adopted by employers in 
the sector.
Intensive competitiveness within the sector combined with economic recession, resulted in 
merger activity within staff bodies reflecting tlie trend in mergers within employers in the 
second half of the period under consideration. These mergers concentrated within 
independent staff associations within sector again had httle discernible impact upon power 
relations in collective bargaining. Union density within the staff associations engaged in a 
reactive merger was relatively high ranging firom approximately 60% in the Nationwide 
Staff Association to over 85% in the Woolwich SA. All the staff associations represented 
employees up to the senior management level and in each case negotiations were conducted 
at the national company level. With the exception of the Alhance Building Society SA, fiih- 
timers led the negotiations with the employer.
Given that the union mergers were in response to company mergers, it is not surprising that 
all the employers were extremely supportive of the merger. Less complex bargaining 
arrangements resulting in more stabUity within industrial relations and conducted with a 
union which better rq)resented the views of the employees, were all major benefits of the 
merger reported by the employers. As Sarah Taylor, HR Director of the Nationwide
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Building Society stressed in the Society’s survey response, "The key was for the new 
merged society to deal with a single body representing all employees”. Few respondents 
concluded that non-structural benefits had resulted from the merger with the exception of 
the Woolwich who indicated that the merger of their staff bodies may result in more 
moderate pay claims. Where any disadvantages of the merger were anticipated by the 
employer these were generally in relation to the possibility that the merged body might be 
more powerful or that more professional staff were available to facihtate union side 
negotiation post merger. The Woolwich, for example, feared a growth in the influence of 
union full timers as a result of the merger. In contrast, the Nationwide did not anticipate any 
disadvantages from the union merger.
Given that the reorganisation of union organisations stemmed from a merger amongst 
employers, it might be expected that the merger was primarily aimed at facilitating 
continuity in bargaining and representation as opposed to demonstrating a change in the 
objectives and aims of the staff body. In contrast with the other mergers in the sector, in this 
instance unions were reacting to changes in the status of the employers with which they 
dealt, as opposed to seeking reorganisation for their own ends. Certainly, neither the unions 
or employers involved indicated that the mergers had had any significant impact on power 
relations within the company post merger. The Alliance and Leicester reported that the 
merger contributed to the increase in the range of issues that were determined in collective 
discussions but, as we have seen, the range of issues negotiated within the sector may also 
have resulted from strategies amongst other employers to tackle skill shortages and retain 
experienced staff. This may also go some way to explaining why, at the Woolwich, it was
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reported that the merged staff association pursued more ambitious claims in relation to pay, 
holidays, pensions and equal opportunities. The Society reported that a merged union was 
more forceful pursuing issues in relation to branch managers (including their pay) but there 
is no evidence that Society managers escaped the dominant trends in the employment of 
managers, individual pay and downsizing which managers experienced across the sector.
For employers who had themselves chosen to embark on mergers, the merger of their staff 
unions heralded business as usual. No changes, other than the organisational benefits of 
dealing with a union whieh reflected managerial reorganisation (and over which the union 
had no influence) were noted by the employers. All the societies agreed that the level of 
union membership had not changed as a result of the merger and that the merger had no 
perceptible impact on company aims, structure or performance.
For the unions there was a clear difference in the perception of the merger by the union 
representing staff in the organisation which had initiated the merger and the union where the 
employer had been taken over. In the case of the merger between the Gateway and 
Woolwich Societies and between the Nationwide and the Angha there was clear support for 
the merger from the larger staff associations. This might be explained by the influx of 
members in which their employers actions resulted and the fact that the smaller union was 
forced to reorganise along the model of the dominant union. From the smaller union there 
was at best ambivalence and at worse outright hostihty to the merger process in the survey 
responses. In a merger involving two societies of a similar size, between the Alliance and 
the Leicester for example, the two associations, (both anticipating a loss of influence), were
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generally opposed to the merger. .In each qase, the unions reported that employer pressure 
was the main reason for a merger and that the merger had been broadly supported by the 
membership. The merger process followed a similar pattern amongst all respondents with a 
rule book or joint NEC being the first move towards integration and merged services and an 
integrated branch structure following later. The branch structure usually reflected the 
regional structure of the merged society when this was in place. Establishing a joint head 
office for the union was usually one of the first stages in the process. All the unions reported 
a significant increase in membership post merger although this is unsubstantiated by the 
employers who claim that membership has remained broadly constant. This discrepancy 
may be explained by the fact that the unions referred to the membership increase fi"om the 
merger itself since, in every case, the level of employment was significantly less in both 
societies post merger. It does not seem reasonable to suggest that the merger of two building 
societies with the rationalisation and branch closures which followed could be reflected in a 
growth in union membership when trade union density was already very high.
There is no evidence that the power relations in collective bargaining post merger were any 
different than they had been in the dominant employer. Certainly the terms and conditions 
under which employers were taken on and the pay awards which employees secured, (as 
well as the extension of employee benefits), were not markedly different from those which 
prevailed across the sector generally. Moreover, unlike the mergers which dominated the 
first period of the study in the sector, these mergers had no impact on the scope of 
individual services on offer to members post merger or on the level of economic and 
political activity undertaken by their representatives. In most cases independent single
employer staff associations offered a limited range of membership services, some legal 
provision and membership discounts on specified products and the package available to 
members post merger was comparable with what had been there before.
Since none of the staff associations involved in these mergers were affiliated to any other 
organisations or had engaged in any pohtical sponsorship or lobbying, there was ho change 
in relation to this sphere of influence. With the exception of the Woolwich Staff 
Association, the other organisations claimed only minor improvements to their membership 
package. The Nationwide Staff Association, for example, improved its services by offering 
free legal advice and insurance services, whilst the Alliance and Leicester SA provided car 
insurance, travel discounts insurance services, car breakdown services and investment 
advice following the merger. In each merger the number of full-time officials, although it 
has increased, has remained proportionate to the levels employed by the two separate 
organisations before the merger.
Summaiy
In the finance sector, then, union merger activity fell into two distinct categories, those 
where the smaller union was attracted into merger with a larger, more generalist partner and 
those where the merger of unions reflected a merger by their employers. In each case, the 
category of merger had a distinct impact on the type and scope of the post merger efficiency 
review orchestrated by the union. Where the smaller union opted to join a larger partner the 
review process was negligible. Both BIFU and the MSF reported that the incoming union 
was slotted into a pre-arranged section within their organisation, the Building Societies or
177
Insurance Sections within BIFU and the Finance Section in the MSF. Usually a merger was 
not initiated and in effect the new partner maintained its organisation within the existing 
section. Any review within the new partner was aimed primarily at integrating it into the 
existing structure and not at efficiency. Jon Robinson, at BIFU, suggested that this process 
was usually straight forward and required tittle change in the existing structure of the new 
partner with the exception of a revision of financial arrangements. Certainly, he concluded, 
the exercise was not a covert opportunity to conduct an efficiency review on the partner, 
since in many cases the merger followed a carefully orchestrated attempt to persuade the 
union to merge with BIFU for the opportunities it offered for stability and growth. "To 
conduct that kind o f (efficiency) review on the proposals would not have been accepted (by 
the partner union) " he said, "and would have sent the wrong message to other staff 
associations that were thinking o f joining us. "
In contrast, where the merger of trade unions resulted from a decision by the employer to 
merge, all the staff bodies used the merger as an opportunity to introduce an efficiency 
review into the new organisations. Both the Alliance and Leicester Staff Association and the 
Nationwide Anglia SA introduced ongoing efficiency reviews during the re-organisation 
associated with the merger. Tim Pail, Nationwide SA's General Secretary, told us that in his 
organisation he conducted the review in tine with terms of reference set down by the new 
NEC and which was strongly supported throughout the union. Whilst an initial report on the 
efficiency review was made six months after the merger of the two societies there were 
provisions in the terms of reference for the review to be ongoing. In the Alliance and 
Leicester SA, the review process was set up by an external consultant and conducted to
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terms of reference set down by the NEC. Whilst the degree of support within the union for 
the review was strong amongst the General Secretary, NEC and officials, the members were 
ambivalent and some activists were actively opposed to what they saw as an attempt to 
prune union services. In contrast to the arrangement for an ongoing review at the 
Nationwide SA, in which no timescale was specified, the review process at the Alliance and 
Leicester SA contained provisions for the review to be conducted every six months. The SA 
claimed that although the review process had been conducted regularly it had not as yet 
resulted in any major change initiative or restructure. Only in the Woolwich SA was the 
merger process conducted without an accompanying formal efficiency review. This was 
because the two organisations involved in the merger, with 2800 and 950 members 
respectively were too small make a review meaningful. In addition the Association did not 
appoint its first full-time official until after the merger so there was no-one to conduct a 
review during the process.
Given that the decision to engage in a merger was imposed on these unions, it appears that 
they reacted positively and with a degree of aptitude to use the resultant upheaval of their 
organisational structure to ensure that they became an efficient organisation post merger and 
in building an ongoing dimension to the review process ensuring that the organisational 
benefits arising from the merger are reinforced in the long-term.
Of all economic sectors, particularly in the light of deregulation, the finance sector is 
perhaps the most purely “private” sector and fi-ee from government intervention. In contrast 
other areas of the private sector have only recently emerged from a lengthy period in which
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they were wholly or mainly owed by the state and therefore more subject to the impact of 
political policy than economic trends. The transport industry will be considered first, 
followed with the communications and broadcasting industries. Although the latter still 
cross the divide between private and public sector and has employees operating within both, 
a decision was taken to include them in this section on the grounds that overall the majority 
of employees working in the industry were employed in the private sector. Where sections 
of the both industries operate in the public sector they compete with private sector firms in a 
deregulated market. As a result, bargaining practice tended to reflect the pressures that arose 
within the market in which they operated.
Transport
Consolidating employee representation in the transport sector was the primary determinant 
of the merger which formed the Rail, Maritime and Transport (RMT) union from the 
National Union of RaQwaymen (NUR) and National Union of Seamen (NUS) in 1990. The 
talks preceding this merger were very lengthy and incorporated many financial targets for 
the NUS, who had initiated the merger. The NUR reported that it did not intend to proceed 
with a merger to a financially unstable partner. (The NUS had suffered a lengthy and 
financially damaging dispute with the P and O Company the previous year.) Along with the 
core groups of railway and shipping workers, from the outset the new union sought to 
widen its appeal with special and separate sections for road transport members (NURTO) 
and service catering staff (NUHSE). The new merger predicted a growth in industrial, 
financial and political strength. Some evidence of the latter was apparent in the retention of 
a greater number of sponsored MPs and more activity focused on representation in the
180
European Community. Individual members were given an extended range of personal 
services post-merger including improved accident, retirement and demotion compensation. 
It is not clear whether the strategy for the consolidation of union membership in the sector 
was successful and whether the union was able to extend its appeal sufficiently beyond the 
confines of its core membership, to compensate for the decline in employment in these 
sectors. Whilst union density has been relatively stable since the merger, membership levels 
have continued to decline reflecting employment within the sector.
Overall, the effect of the merger on collective bargaining relations in the rail sector reflects 
the degree of influence that the new union has in different dimensions of power. For 
example, the union ran a lengthy and popular campaign against privatisation of rail services 
but 'was unable to prevent the legislation going ahead to bring about the sale of the rail 
network and the finnchise of the rail regions (or indeed to secure commitment fi'om the 
opposition to re-nationalise die network upon attaining power), However the union's direct 
negotiations with the employer have been punctuated by lengthy and well sustained 
industrial action which may suggest that power relations in the sector are yet to be clarified. 
A long signalmens’ dispute in 1995 against Railtrack has been followed in 1996 with action 
fi-orn the guards and drivers on seven regional networks and the drivers on London 
Underground. It is difficult to say whether the union is in a more powerful position in the 
privatised rail network or is simply placing a stake in the ground to establish a finmework 
for bargaining with the private rail companies. Given that most of the regional networks • 
have already signalled their willingness to cut staJff and increase productivity (moving away 
fi-om guards on trains altogether in some instances) this suggests that employers intend to
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continue the job losses initiated by Railtrack in the initial period of rail network 
privatisation. The pattern of job losses and the unions inability to protect employees 
suggests that, if anything, the current bargaining environment has increased the ability of 
the union to improve pay and benefits for. existing employees and weakened its ability to 
protect members’ jobs or, given the number of accidents on the network since privatisation, 
their safety. The effects of the merger are impossible to disassociate from the effects of 
privatisation and it may be that a larger union has acted to temper the initial effects of 
privatisation and that without the RMT the move to private ownership would have been 
accompanied by even more job losses and poorer terms and conditions.
The merger between the NUR and the NUS to form the RMT focused on organisational 
efficiency in the area of the union which would be most affected directly by the merger, in 
this instance the former NUS. Prior to the merger and as a formal requirement in the merger 
process, the NUS had to take steps to reduce their payroll costs and the deficit in their 
working fimd. In 1987 at the very start of the merger process 14 members of staff took 
redundancy and six retirements were met with the recruitment of just two new staff. Further 
retirements in 1988 meant that the NUS payroll costs had been reduced by £800,000 by the 
end of the year. In addition to specific financial targets aimed at improving the efficiency of 
the partner union, the RMT also utilised the opportunity for change by the formation of a 
new organisation. A study of the reorganisation and constitution of the organisation was set 
up and conducted by the Industrial Relations Unit at Warwick University. The remit of the 
study was across the entire organisation and was designed to ensure that organisational 
efficiency was built into the new union from the outset. The project recommended adoption
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of a particular structure and was disbanded and there were no provisions for an ongoing 
review. Nevertheless, the union did utilise the merger process to extend organisational 
change beyond those sections directly affected by the merger. The merger process, 
therefore, became a vehicle for wider organisational change.
The impact on collective bargaining at sea, following the creation of the RMT is extremely 
difficult to quantify. The differential between NUMAST rates and those negotiated by the 
RMT have narrowed shghtly and this may suggest a relative increase in bargaining power. 
Nevertheless, the unions have failed to prevent the growth in job losses continuing into the 
1990s and the continued casualisation of shipping employment. An argument can be made 
to suggest that both RMT members and those belonging to NUMAST have benefited fi-om 
the merger because it has helped to slow the decline of British shipping. However, neither 
union claimed in their evidence to a Parliamentary Committee (1995) anything other than 
the continued decline of the UK industry ^ f^iich could not compete globally with flags of 
convenience and unfair competition.
Communications
Two industries which employ workers in both the public and the private sector are now 
considered, the Communications industry and broadcasting. Whilst major employers 
operating in the public sector remain, they are increasingly subject to private sector 
competitive pressure in key areas of their service provision. As a result, and in order to 
protect their competitive pressure public sector employers in these industries have been 
obliged to adopt the prevalent practices and initiatives that their competitors have chosen
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particularly in relating to managing people and employee relations. The influx of private 
sector practices means that the majority of employees within the industry are either 
employed directly to a private sector employer or contracted to work for a public sector 
provider under a contract for services. A minority of employees in each industry are 
employed directly by the state or agencies of the state and even then there are many 
similarities with their counterparts in the private sector in terms of the terms and practices 
under which they are employed.
The communications industry has been affected by two major trade union mergers in recent 
years. The merger between the Union of Communication Workers (UCW) and the National 
Communication Union (NCU) to form the Communication Workers Union (CWU) in 1995 
involved all non-management grades in the British Telecom and the Post Office (clerical, 
engineering and operating staff). The Society of Telecom Executives, representing 
managerial grades in British Telecom entered a federated structure with the IPMS, CMA 
and Halifax Building Society Staff Association which was formally endorsed by the union’s 
1996 Conference. Later that year, managerial grades in the Post Office, represented by the 
Communication Managers' Association also opted to join this federated structure.
These mergers, involving both the employees and the managers, have the hallmarks of 
consolidatory action aimed at preserving the union's influence when faced with a hostile 
operating environment. Both Telecom and the Post Office had seen huge job losses in the 
industry in the late 1980s as British Telecom faced the rigours of the market as a private 
company and as the Post Office faced impending privatisation. The combined membership
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had fallen by almost 30% between 1985 and 1995 almost entirely as a consequence of job 
losses Lq the sector (this figure takes no account of the unions' efforts to increase 
membership amongst other suppliers in the industry).
The main reasons for the merger between the UCW and NCU were identified in a report 
compiled by Lord McCarthy on behalf of the unions. The changes to the 
telecommunications industry both in terms increased competition and the introduction of 
new technology, were identified as heralding a hostile business environment placing jobs 
under Ihrcal. MeCarlhy euneludcd thal inany new Tclccum businesses would emerge, 
recruiting ex-BT employees but without union recognition rights. Membership levels would 
therefore decline. Project Sovereign at British Telecom alone identified 30,000 jobs to go 
between 1990 and 1993 (during the time of the merger discussions). McCarthy identified a 
merger as one way for the unions to consolidate their position before membership decline 
eroded union influence.
All the unions anticipated greater market pressures in the near future. In 
telecommunications, the deregulation of the market allowing a range of other providers 
access to the BT network and the growth in the mobile phone business, combined with the 
Company's exclusion by Government from the cable entertainment sector, all posed a threat 
to members' jobs. In the Post Office the lingering threat of privatisation was still in the 
background and management were forced to import organisational features such as team 
working and flexibility in order to preserve the monopoly in a standard nation wide postage 
delivery service. (This lay at the root of the long running dispute in Autumn 1995.) Faced
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with these pressures combined with major innovations in technology which destroyed jobs 
in both industries the unions opted for a strategic merger to consolidate their position within 
the sector. Whilst the employees opted for the security of cross-sector representation, 
managers looked to consolidate their position and preserve occupational representation by 
opting for a federated structure with other managerial unions.
The survey suggested that the formation of the CWU had a major impact on both BT and 
the Post Office. Seventy five per cent of eligible staff were union members and both 
companies had a strong history of working with the trade unions. Both were generally 
supportive of the merger and anticipated a more professional union, more representative of 
its members and with more appropriate (less diverse and flatter) bargaining structures. 
Minor reservations were expressed by the Post Office management that the merger might 
result in a more powerful and effective union presence, in which the influence of full-time 
officials was less ^ d  there was more power resting witii local shop stewards.
The effect of the merger on power relations is complicated by the fact that there were huge 
job losses and deregulation in the sector and the threat of privatisation in the post office. 
Within this environment maintaining the status quo in management/union relations may 
demonstrate increased union power resulting from the merger. Managers claimed that the 
mergers had had no notable effect on industrial relations in the sector other than the move to 
a more simphfied bargaining structure in BT was conducted in conjunction with union 
moves to merge. In terms of pay in the sector however, Iain Vallence, of BT, told the Trade 
and Industry Committee in September 1995, that the union had succeeded in securing rates
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far higher than those paid in the public sector (but this is probably more a feature of 
privatisation and huge profits than union strength). Both employers commented that union 
density post merger remained constant indicating that the union had succeeded in retaining 
membership other than those resulting fi'om job losses. Although the unions did not manage 
to oppose the anticipated job losses effectively and neither employer reported any difficulty 
in reducing the size of the workforce, the prevalence of voluntary redundancy, the age 
profile of redundant employees and the severance terms negotiated indicate that, arguably, 
the union retained sizeable influence during the job losses programme.
The relative stability in employee relations and density post merger in BT suggests a 
consolidatory merger may have been successful in shoring up existiug levels of membership 
in BT. Moreover, BT reported some extension of scope in the bargaining agenda post 
merger. Equal opportunities, stress management and pensions were all identified as 
prominent areas of union interest and activity and improvement to these terms became a 
prominent feature of union pay claims for the first time during the merger discussions. This 
may, of course, reflect additional resources being directed to these areas by the union, legal 
decisions relating to pension rights, part-time working and erriployer's liability for stress 
amongst the workforce may have had an impact on bargaining policies in these areas. There 
can be little doubt, however, given the phenomenal level of change within the Company 
that the union is in a less influential position than when the BT was a public sector 
employer. The Board's willingness to satisfy shareholders and customers has effectively 
limited union influence to employee relations and the management of change within the 
Company. Nevertheless, the preservation of membership levels and influence over pay and
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bargaining, indicates that the union has managed to protect a positive role for itself despite 
major job losses, private sector disciplines and rapid change in work practices. If the merger 
may have helped to consolidate the union's position in BT, it has been less successful (at 
least so far) in providing a springboard for growth in the other emerging 
telecommunications companies. Recognition in the two largest companies (although small 
in comparison with BT) Mercury and Orange Communications have not been secured and 
over 95% of the NCLTs membership in telecommunications is still employed by BT.
Whilst the stability of employee relations in the Post Office post merger also may suggest 
that power relations are stable (and may indicate an increase in union power) the rapid 
change in working practices post merger may indicate that management have increased their 
influence. The outbreak of industrial action in the summer of 1996 revealed that the power 
relations issue was still largely unresolved as the union and management clashed on team 
working, flexibility and pay, and the union executive felt confident enough to reject an 
agreement recommended by Alan Johnson, the General Secretary. This may be indicative of 
a more confident union able to draw on resources fix)m outside the sector to support 
industrial action for the first time. The impact of the merger and the effect on power 
relations in the Post Office were illustrated by the struggle with the Major Government over 
privatisation in the Spring of 1995. A well-orchestrated campaign focused on customers and 
businesses was instrumental in preventing the privatisation of the Post Office later that year. 
The campaign demonstrated that outside the bargaining arena the increase in resources and 
support following the merger can enable the union to make a bigger impact with the media.
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The 1993/4 campaign against privatisation run by the union pre-merger, for example, was 
much lower key and not as well resourced and, therefore had little impact outside the union.
The union reported that the impact of the merger outside bargaining was significant. More 
MPs at home and in Europe had been sponsored and the union had a greater level of 
representation on iudustry wide bodies and at the TUC. The merger also had a positive 
impact on the level of services provided after the merger in areas such as education, 
publicity and research and in the range of personal services such as credit cards and car 
insurance w hich becam e available to members.
Decisions by the two managerial unions, STE and CMA, to join a federated structure with 
the IPMS stemmed, they reported, fi'om a desire to maintain independence whilst realising 
some of the benefits of economies of scale available to a larger organisation. Under the 
terms of the Federation, merged centralised services in areas such as research, pensions, and 
membership benefits are pooled and the unions retain separate identities, executives and 
conference arrangements. Both British Telecom and the Post Office told us that they have 
continued to negotiate with their managerial unions in the structure and over the same issues 
as they did following the re-organisation. The net effects of involvement in the federation 
are once again difficult to gauge, as the years preceding the re-orgnisation were ones in 
which the managerial grades in both organisations were placed under enormous pressure. 
Over 12,000 middle managers in British Telecom were removed fi'om the business 
following privatisation and a new system of appraisal and performance-related pay (on 
which the union balloted for industrial action in 1994) were both introduced. In the Post
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Office, although not as dramatic, the managerial structure has been reformed. Lower 
managerial tasks were devolved to operators and, as a result, layers of management have 
been stripped away. The Post Office estimate that over 1,000 management grade positions 
have been cut since 1995.
The net effect of involvement in the Federation is, therefore, difficult to assess. Unlike a 
formal merger the Federation will have no impact on the bargaining structures of the 
organisation and will not lead to an influx of resources (other than from money saved by 
pooling central resources). Nevertheless the employers reported that there had been little 
change in the scope of collective bargaining, the issues on which the union were asked to 
contribute and the level of union density. All of these suggest that whilst unable or 
unwilling to tackle job losses from its area of recognition, the union has been able to secure 
a degree of influence in the employee relations forum. Whether the union has managed to 
demonstrate success in tiie forum is questionable, given that British Telecom have 
introduced post privatisation, a range of reforms which the WIRS survey suggests unions 
have generally opposed. A new appraisal system, multi-functional managers, single table 
bargaining, and downsizing have all been introduced successfiilly. Performance-related pay, 
which effectively distanced the union's role in bargaining brought the union to the edge of 
collective action from which it subsequently backed away. Again the degree to which this 
bullish style was determined by operating as a private sector employer is impossible to 
determine. The scenario may simply reflect a position where the preservation of a role in a 
private sector environment illustrates that the union's power has increased, but the freedoms 
offered to a private sector operation has meant that managerial power has increased to a
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greater degree.
The decision by the managerial unions to enter a federated structure was led 
overwhelmingly by the general secretary. The NEC was divided on the issue of whether to 
pursue the initiative. Members, activists and officials were largely uninvolved in the 
decision. As we have identified the motive to merge stemmed from market pressures. The 
unions indicated that they aimed to economise in the face of falling membership and rising 
expenditure by pooling their resources for the provision of common services. Through 
merging union services, it was hoped friat die union woiüd realise economies of scale whilst 
retaining its identity and independence. As a result joining the federation has had no 
discernible effect on extending union power in negotiations other than contributing 
positively to the union's financial position. Nevertheless, both unions reported that the range 
and scope of influence had survived in a period of rapid change in both 
Telecommunications and at the Post Office, and the structure of the trade unions may be a 
contributing factor to this. Moreover, the merger has had a demonstrable impact on 
extending the provision of services to individual members and a much wider body of car 
and home insurance, preferential loans, hohdays and mortgages are now available to 
managers. The unions have also secured access to sponsored MPs, that prior to involvement 
in the Federation, they did not have. At first both unions simply inherited the political team 
sponsored by the IPMS, but last year this was expanded to represent the greater range of 
members and occupations included in the Federation. The federated structure has also set up 
some mechanism for co-ordinated action within Brussels. During the campaign over post 
office privatisation, it was reported that the CMA was able to use these channels to support
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the more vocal campaign being launched by the larger union.
The creation of the Communication Workers Union followed a pre-merger review of 
structures, services and economic environment prepared by Lord McCarthy. The merger 
was initiated by the General Secretaries in both unions together with senior officials and 
executive members. In his report in 1994 McCarthy recommended the formation of 
working groups to involve activists in the merger process. Each working group was to 
review a range of specialist tasks including structure, services, names, membership services 
etc. During the merger process, when both unions had given authority for a merger to be 
explored, a new joint NEC met on a bi-monthly basis. It consisted of the two General 
Secretaries and eight EC members from each partner. Bill McCarthy acted as a facilitator 
for the Committee. Initially the working group, as it became, looked at establishing co­
operation in education, pensions, research, childcare, legal aid, union services, EU 
representation, activities within the Labour Party and the TUC mid the Postal Telegraph and 
Telephone International. This was followed by estabhshing separate sub-groups to examine 
co-operation between the parties in each specified area. These were called efficiency review 
groups. Fourteen efficiency review groups were set up consisting of activists. At the second 
stage of the process more activist review groups were formed to consider the structure of the 
new union, the EC, union officials, structure below HQ and above branches, conference, the 
union name, the rule book, legal services, membership services, finances, the political fimd 
and constitutional safeguards. The integration of the branch structure was identified as an 
area to be dealt with on a local basis and then to be reviewed at a later date. No integration 
of branches was proposed in the short term. It was hoped that by pursuing a series of joint
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initiatives at a local level the integration ivould be facilitated and emerge naturally to some 
extent.
The NCU efficiency review process was very structured and well organised. The role of an 
independent facilitator should have ensured that the groups were not constrained by their 
proposals by the way things had been organised previously. The process was aimed at 
reviewing all aspects of union services and structures to secure the maximum range of 
benefits for the new membership. However, the review process conducted by activists was 
not an ongoing process and as soon as groups had reported they ceased to meet. 1 he groups 
were not used by the new union as a means of ensuring a regular efficiency review but 
simply to integrate the two separate structures.
If the process had a weakness, it was that the structural organisation of the regions and 
branches was delegated to local officers and members who, as we have seen, may be likely 
to feel threatened by the union and preserve the regional management and branch structure. 
It may be that opportunities for rationalisation have not been realised. The new body shied 
away from regular reviews of the branches and regions and instead left it up to local areas to 
complete the merger at a local level. Not unsurprisingly, two years after the merger the 
progress of integration outside the centre was limited.
The review process was a genuine structured and well-organised attempt to integrate two 
partners efficiently, to realise economies of scale and ensure that the services and structures 
were not duplicated. The review was well orchestrated and the fact that it was conducted by
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an eminent outsider attached a degree of importance to its findings. Nevertheless, in 
effectively opting out of the review of the regions and branches it may be that vital areas of 
efficiency savings were missed. The decision not to have a provision for regular reviews 
may also constitute a missed opportunity because it may facilitate slippage firom the 
recommendations of a wide-ranging review which could have been legitimised by both 
timing and the appointment of an independent person to oversee the project..
Summary
Efficiency reviews have not been a feature of developments in die Federation. Where 
services have been merged this has been left up to individual departments to arrange 
without any membership involvement. So far the amalgamation of services has 
concentrated on administrative measures such as sharing premises and facilities or 
reviewing processes to avoid the duplication of work. There are no structures in place for an 
ongoing efficiency review though the functions would probably benefit from one given that 
the review of services conducted when a member joins is simply a pragmatic response to 
share facilities and avoid duplication. In essence, it will only address properly the more 
obvious of the efficiencies available. This may of course stem from the fact that the project 
team seeking opportunities for rationalisation are likely to be those with the most to lose 
from the exercise.
Television and Broadcasting
Like the communications industry broadcasting and television stretches across the 
public/private sector divide so that although the majority of the employers operate firmly
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within the private sector, publicly funded broadcasting is still a major component of the 
industry though one that is increasingly adopting the commercial practices prevalent 
amongst it main competitors. Trade union mergers within the industry during the period 
were limited to the integration of the merger of ACTT and BETA a classic consohdatory 
merger in which the two occupationally based unions sought to rationalise their 
organisational structures in the face of major change in the industry. The deregulation of the 
sector in the mid to late eighties, under which the dominance of the traditional ITV 
companies was broken and under which an entire range of new, independent production 
companies could develop, posed new threats for the unions. Even in the areas with a history 
of strong union representation like the BBC, the creation of internal markets and a wave of 
contracting out in production work led to the rapid expansion of contract working and 
flexible contracts. Staff traditionally employed on a retained basis by a Company or 
organisation which would retain their services and use them on a variety of productions 
were taken on under short term, project based contracts, without the guarantee of future 
work. The wave of insecurity in employment was of major concern to the employees and to 
the union, who sought to retain members as they switched between contracts.
Within the context of deregulation the trade unions also sought to appeal to the employers 
in the sector by offering them a forum for recruiting their flexible project based staff and a 
straight forward structure for negotiating with the core workforce who remained as 
permanent employees. The primary advantage of the merger cited by the union in the 
survey was that all grades and occupations could be represented by a single body and the 
union could offer any employer "clear and sensible negotiating arrangements with a single
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union". Thus, the union sought to preserve its position within the sector by responding to 
the imposition of flexible working by developing a more flexible structure through which to 
negotiate with employees retained by the company and those working under contract. As 
well as developing simplified bargaining structures to replace the complex and separate 
arrangements which previously covered different occupations, the union also sought to 
negotiate "going rates" for staff under contract to simplify and standardise negotiations 
when staff were being selected for a new production.
There were undoubtedly benefits in terms of economies of scale for the unions from the 
merger. The two merger partners were separately strong in very different areas of the 
industry. BETA was the primary union at the BBC and for fi'eelance workers in independent 
film and tape productions (under the PACT/AFVPA agreement). ACTT, on the other hand 
had important agreements in film laboratories, ITV companies and the Society of West End 
Theatres. The merger, in consolidating two distinct spheres of influence within the industry, 
sought to consolidate the influence of unions in the sector but not to expand outside the 
primary, industrial sphere of influence.
The 1980s was a period of rapid structural change in the sector as a consequence of 
deregulation. Major employers in the industry moved away from a core workforce 
producing programmes as a wave of cheaper independent production companies flooded the 
market. In a desire to remain competitive all the companies reduced their workforces and 
replaced stable permanent employees with contract workers on flexible contracts.
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The effect on traditional bargaining structures was to limit their application to fewer 
employees and to place traditionally unionised technical occupations outside the scope of 
collective bargaining. Where companies did continue to produce their own programmes, 
staff were employed on contract for a specific project and then laid off at the end of it. In 
many ways, the employment patterns which had traditionally been apparent in the acting 
profession were extended to technical and production staff in television who had always 
enjoyed more permanent employment. By 1993, the majority of the membership of the 
broadcast unions was self-employed and the union set up a whole range of services, 
including comprehensive tax and legal advice and an employment agency, in response. As 
well as changing the traditional patterns of employment in the sector, the intense 
competitive pressure also encouraged employers to tackle the removal of stable 
employment and employment protection head on. During the late 1980s a wave of 
derecognition and confrontation with the trade unions spread across the sector, the most 
visible example of which was a lengthy strike by technicians at TV-AM in 1988. In 
common with the other sectors where the structural change in employment policies was 
dramatic and hostile to collective bargaining, it is difficult to ascertain the effect of the 
merger in constraining the move to flexible working and in ensuring that a degree of 
employee protection was retained. Employees in the large unionised companies have 
retained pay rates and conditions in advance of the contract staff and the move towards very 
flexible working has been less severe, however, it is also true that union influence in its 
traditional areas of support has lessened because these areas employ fewer staff. The fact 
that the massive casuahsation of the sector has resulted in over half the union’s members 
being self-employed contract workers, is no testament to the merged union's abflity to halt
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the move to contract working. However, the fact that these employees have by and large 
retained their membership indicates that the union still plays an important role in bargaining 
by creating a framework and providing information for members to bargain their own 
contracts.
Given the development of flexible, contract working and the loss of jobs and membership 
from the traditional employers the merger was, at least as important as a response to sectoral 
developments as an attempt to extend influence. During 1989-91 core, full-time and 
permanent employment at the BBC declined by almost two thirds as flexible working 
expanded. Similarly, whilst the industry in the late seventies was dominated by the major 
ITV channels and the BBC by the late 1990s, it was estimated that there were over twelve 
thousand, different production companies that had made programmes for either the BBC, 
the ITV companies or Channel 4.
The traditional employers in television and broadcasting reported that the union merger did 
not make any difference to power relations in the sector. Peter Graham, Personnel 
Controller at the BBC, told us that there was "no discernible difference" in collective 
bargaining as a result of the merger. Since each union had a readily definable sphere of 
influence within the industry and continued to represent the same crafts and professions, 
this may have supported the view that the merger did not have any effect. Historically 
BETA represented employees at the BBC and ACTT represented those working at ITV. 
This arrangement did not change post-merger. The survey confirmed that neither the BBC 
or ITV anticipated any change arising from the merger and therefore expressed neither
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support nor opposition to the development. However, these responses may disguise the fact 
that the merger had a significant impact on trade union power particularly in the BBC and 
ITV companies. Immediately prior to merger was the major wave of deregulation in the 
sector that posed a major threat to both unions in terms of recognition and influence. The 
union has managed to retain a significant level of membership amongst the self employed. 
(Self employed membership currently stands at around a third and has risen dramatically 
since the 1980s.) In the BBC, where 35% of technical, professional, administrative and 
clerical grades were represented, there was no change in membership density post merger 
despite the significant fall in both employees and members and despite the impact of the 
internal market reforms under which much of the production was contracted out to external 
producers. Following the merger, the BBC reported that the proportion of union members in 
the workforce remained constant and the scope of collective bargaining remained the same, 
albeit that the structure was simplified and negotiations covered different occupations 
together instead of separately.
Given the labour market developments, casualisation, contracting out, the growth of non­
union employers in the sector and the loss of jobs fi"om traditional areas of strength, the 
union has done well to retain its membership density amongst the traditional employers and 
to develop a membership amongst the new employer and within the self employed. The 
union has managed to retain its level of influence and bolster its membership despite a 
hostile environment. This it has done by seeking to develop services to appeal to the casual 
employee (set rates for projects, a job shop, tax advice etc) and structures to appeal to the 
employer (cross-occupation, simplified bargaining). Despite major changes in the sector, all
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of which should have led to an increase in the ability of employers to drive down wages and 
curtail collective bargaining if they had so wished, the BBC reported in the survey that the 
merger had had no impact on industrial relations scope, on the climate of collective 
bargaining, or on its own pay rates. Of course, there is a strong possibility that the employer 
did not choose to exploit the opportunities offered by deregulation as much as they might 
have, nevertheless the union must take some credit in reforming its structures to meet the 
needs of the business and facilitating a role for itself.
Like the BBC, ITN reported little change in their industrial relations, although the company 
reported that the merger had supported stability in industrial relations and a less complex 
bargaining structure had been implemented post merger. ITN negotiated a single table
i
bargaining arrangement within the company prior to the merger but the employer indicated 
that the proposed merger had been a positive factor in this development. Also like the BBC, 
ITN did not identify any changes in terms of the depth or scope of the bargaining structure 
post merger. The merger had no direct impact on industrial relations in the organisation or 
the aims, or structure of the Company.
Whilst an increase in union power following the merger may be supported by preserving 
union influence and offering the employer a workable system of collective bargaining, there 
is more persuasive evidence that the union tried to expand its influence outside the 
bargaining process. The union reported that it had sought to extend union power across the 
primary and tertiary spheres of influence. Political activity, at home and in Europe was 
given a new prominence and extra resources were allocated and the range of personal
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services (mortgages, loans and employment advice for instance) was also extended. The 
merger allowed the union to exercise greater influence on the pohtical bodies within the 
industry. The merger led to single union representation on the Broadcast Films and Video 
Training Organisation and Skillset. This external activity on industry-wide bodies 
demonstrates the union's involvement in training and standards through which it may appeal 
to the self employed in the sector by offering them a way of maintaining their employability 
and of retaining their membership. As well as huge labour market change, the sector has 
been vulnerable to important technological advances notably the development of simplified 
cameras which remove many of the traditional skills associated with camerawork. By active 
participation in the industry skill and training programme the union may be seeking to 
preserve its influence with those members seeking to up-date or transfer their skills.
This brings the analysis of the broad impact of private sector industry on the outcome and 
impact of trade union merger activity to a close. As has been noted there are some common 
themes arising fi’om our survey responses as well as some outcomes to particular economic 
or political developments across the industry in which the merger occurred. Some of the 
common threads will be drawn together in the conclusions when the central themes arising 
fi"om responses on mergers in the private and public sectors will be outlined. To facilitate 
this exercise Jiowever, some analysis of merger activity during the public sector in the 
period of the investigation is required.
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CHAPTER 7 - UNION MERGERS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The study of union mergers in the private sector ended with some analysis of companies 
which, during the last fifteen years, have shifted from being wholly or mainly public 
enterprises to (for the purposes of this analysis) fully-fledged private sector operations. This 
alone illustrates the dramatic shifts in organisation and employee relations that the public 
sector has seen in recent times. This final chapter analysing responses to the questionnaire 
survey examines merger activity in the public sector. Here there have been significant 
changes in collective bargaining as a result of trade union relations moving to centre stage 
in government poHcy during the period of the study.
Due to the decline in union membership in private sector companies, union membership in 
the public sector now accounts for the majority of trade union membership in the UK. The 
scale and range of union mergers in this sector is an indication of the financial pressures on 
trade unions arising from contracting public ownership and increased privatisation, very 
tight public spending limits during the period of our study and a Government generally 
hostile to the practice of collective bargaining and trade unions. As the Government has 
sought to make reform of the public sector (through privatisation, the move to Agency 
status for some Government functions outlined in the Next Steps initiative, revised funding 
arrangements and a huge contracting out initiative in local government), a flagship policy 
this has had important ramifications for trade unions operating in the sector.
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Union mergers in the public sector have generally fallen into one of two types. Small, 
independent staff unions facing a decline in membership (and unable to respond to the more 
sophisticated range of services demanded by their members) have sought to secure their 
position by joining larger unions offering a greater level of financial security and a more 
complex range of services. As public sector job losses and the threat fi*om privatisation 
/contracting out has grown across the sector some larger unions, most notably NALGO, 
NUPE and COHSE, have merged in order to preserve their dominance in the sector against 
the encrouchment of private sector unions increasingly developing a significant foothold in 
the sector as a result of some of the initiatives. Moreover they have sought to extend their 
influence by identifying themselves as the key organisation for the representation of NHS 
and local Government employees.
The late 1980s was a transitional phase of industrial relations in the public sector, not least 
because unions were increasingly representing members who had transferred into the 
private sector through privatisation initiatives. This, combined with the financial pressures 
meant that industrial relations in the sector changed rapidly. Developing mergers and 
increasing inter-union competition were just two of the ways in which unions responded to 
the major changes in the public sector policy and a general hostility to unions within 
Government. The structures of employee representation in the sector, union bargaining 
techniques and strategy may have been affected in a number of ways as public sector 
employers have had to implement privatisation and market testing employees have had to 
face the rigours of open competition. For example, WIRS (1992) shows that the privatised 
utility unions placed increasing importance on job security agreements and enhanced
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severance as employers cut back on the number of directly employed workers in the 
organisation. The survey also reveals that unions were increasingly interested in bargaining 
on basic and enhanced pay issues, since for the first time unions were able to link pay 
claims to profits in the newly privatised firms.
This section of the study considers union mergers and their effect on trade union power in 
all the major elements of the public sector including central government, education and the 
health service. At the close of the section there is a brief overview of the internal union 
efficiency reviews that have arisen from merger activity in the sector and the anticipated 
outcome of these. However, I begin with an assessment of the impact of mergers on 
collective bargaining in local government where the major initiative affecting employee 
relations during this period was the legislative obhgafion on councils to put key services out 
to tender.
Local Government
The most important and influential union merger of recent times is the merger between the 
three major public sector unions, COHSE, NUPE and NALGO, in July 1993. NALGO, the 
trade union representing white collar staff in local Government and the health service and 
COHSE and NUPE which represented blue collar workers in similar areas, all initiated 
merger talks in 1992. The survey conducted for this study showed that support for the 
merger was widespread, concentrated in the General Secretaries, NECs and union officials 
centrally in the three unions with some scepticism of the move amongst regional officials 
and activists. The merger was essentially an exercise in consolidation of the unions' position
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in an increasingly hostile environment for trade unions in the public sector. Privatisation 
and compulsory competitive tendering of pubhc services had placed financial pressures on 
the unions. These pressures were more acute in COHSE and NUPE which were relatively 
smaller and where the decline in membership was more pronounced, but NALGO too had 
suffered a significant fall in membership. In our survey the respondents reported that the 
other major reason for the merger was the desire to secure an improved bargaining structure 
in the face of a co-ordinated move to local bargaining in the sector. The merger was 
intended to unfreeze resources so that the union would be better placed to devolve the skills 
and experience necessary to conduct collective bargaining locally.
The merger process to create such a large trade union was lengthy and complex. A joint 
NEC was elected and a new rule book and constitution drafted before the merger was 
confirmed formally. The integration of a branch structure has made very little progress since 
the merger and, alfiiough, some progress on the merger of union services has been made, 
services are still organised separately for the components of the merger. A single head 
office has yet to be designated and, at present, the union has retained the ex-COHSE and ex- 
NUPE offices in addition to the main Unison offices. The ex-NALGO HQ has become the 
union's South-East regional office and in the South East and elseviiere the office structures 
have been rationahsed and several offices have been placed on the market.
Membership in UNISON has stabilised at approximately the level of the three component 
unions at the point of merger. The integration of the branch structure is ongoing but the 
network has already been reduced. The number of full-time officers in the union has
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decreased as a result of a 20% reduction in union staff immediately following the merger. 
The level of services offered to original members has remained largely static but the quality 
of financial services available was improved as a result of the merged union developing its 
own insurance company with the Britannia Building Society. UNISON has expanded its 
political activity post merger and isponsored between 60-70 MPs through a separate 
affiliated political structure. The union retains a European officer and is active in lobbying 
the European Parliament.
The effect of the formation of Britain's largest trade union on bargaining and on employers 
is difficult to quantify. The range of influences upon bargaining in the sector, the response 
of union's to revised funding arrangements, tendering and privatisation make it difficult to 
isolate the determinants of any one influence. Prior to the merger NUPE was responsible for 
representing manual grades in local government including home-helps, cleaning staff and 
care workers, whilst NALGO represented the APT and C monthly paid grades in local 
Government. Traditionally union membership and density have been high and, in contrast 
to the decline in union membership in the private sector, in the public sector union density 
tended to be stable in the eighties. The responses fix)m employers indicated that density was 
roughly half the workforce (40% density was quoted by Liverpool City Council whilst 
Hammersmith and Fulham Council quoted a density level of 50%).
Negotiations were generally conducted at a national, Whitley level and led by national 
officers of the union. The facilities afforded to the unions by employers were 
comprehensive. Liverpool City Council, for example, provided stewards with time-off
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facilities, offices and check off NUPE were allowed a full-time convenor and three part- • 
time staff to service 3,000 members. NALGO had five full-time stewards for 6,200 
members. In other cases lay representatives were allowed three hours a week facility time. 
At Hammersmith and Fulham, union representation was resourced by four full-time 
convenors, one full-time senior steward and two senior representatives, one based on 80% 
facility time and the other on 50% to serve a combined NUPE/NALGO committee for 
integration of representation structures.
Reaction to the proposed merger produced a fairly common set of concerns on the part of 
local Government employers. All the respondents feared that the new organisation would be 
more powerful and pursue a more diverse bargaining agenda. That this would lead to more 
industrial action by a union less representative of the workforce was a common concern. In 
addition, one council indicated that the merged union would lead to an upsurge in power for 
local stewards as the influence of union officers decline. Another council mentioned that 
factionalism based upon old union loyalties was likely to be a problem in the short-term.
Stability in industrial relations, and a move towards less complex and more appropriate 
bargaining structures were the most popular anticipated benefits of the merger. This is 
demonstrated by the decision by Hammersmith and Fulham Council to review union 
facilities with a view to supporting the new union structure. One Council specifically 
mentioned that the merger would be accompanied with a move towards single table 
bargaining, single status employment and a move to integrate the terms and conditions of 
the manual and clerical groups. Another council mentioned that integrated representation of
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employees in one body meant that there would be less need for the provision of facilities 
such as time off. The responses of these employers suggest that the merger facilitated a 
trend towards structural reform of bargaining in local Government. The WIRS survey 
conducted in 1992 showed that the move to single table bargaining and single status was 
well advanced in the sector despite union opposition by 1995. When 1RS surveyed 
bargaining arrangements in the sector, they recorded widespread structural change in 
representation (1RS 1995). Employers reported that post merger the unions were more 
realistic in relation to CCT, that pay bargaining had successfully been devolved to DSC 
level and ^ t  formal appraisal systems for both manual and white collar staff were almost 
universal. Such evidence suggests that the concerns expressed by employers that the merger 
would facilitate an upsurge in union power did not impede (indeed it may have assisted) 
structural change in bargaining. However, it may be that the range of expertise and the 
flexibility in union structures afforded by the merger may have assisted the union in 
maintaining wages and securing enhanced severance payments for its members. The 1RS 
survey (1995) reported that the majority of redundancies highlighted by the survey were 
voluntary and that only eight authorities in the UK had a policy of compulsory 
redundancies. Authorities reported real improvements in pay over the last 12 months and 
greater flexibility in non-pay benefits. However, the largest employer in local government 
in the UK, Strathclyde Regional Council, did not report any change in employee relations 
arising from the merger in thé survey conducted for this thesis. It reported that since 
NALGO and NUPE members in the Council would be represented by separate branches 
there would be no discernible differences arising from the merger.
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Following the merger, all the respondents reported that union membership had remained 
constant indicating that the unions had managed to consolidate their position within the 
sector. The employers suggested that the structural change highlighted by the 1RS survey 
was linked to the merger. Liverpool Council reported that bargaining arrangements had 
been affected by the merger. It reported that the harmonisation of terms and conditions and 
the move towards single status had been a direct response. The Council reported that the 
move had had a positive effect on the climate in which bargaining was conducted.
Similarly, Hammersmith and Fulham reported that they expected benefits to arise from the 
harmonisation that they were hoping to introduce in response to the merger in the near 
future.
Just as the formation of UNISON had a cultural dimension in local government where blue 
and white collar workers had enjoyed very separate representation and bargaining 
^rangements prior to the merger, this was also reflected in the impact of the merger on 
bargaining in the NHS. Here although the merger formahsed the joint working 
arrangements already in place between NUPE and COHSE members there was greater 
cultural opposition to integrating members formally represented by NALGO. As a result the 
NHS bargaining arrangements shifted little in contrast to the move to single table 
b^gaining that characterised the effect of the merger in local Government.
Health Service
Similar to local Government the creation of UNISON in the Health Service occurred at a 
time of major change in Government policy in the sector. The Government NHS reforms,
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which effectively devolved pay bargaining for most employees to the level of individual 
hospital or workplace, had a huge impact on the bargaining framework which has contused 
the overall impact of the UNISON merger on collective bargaining. The creation of Health 
Authority Trusts, charged with providing healthcare across a range of newly, established 
and competitive markets, combined with the attempt to devolve the determination of terms 
and conditions to the local level meant that there was a move to reform bargaining 
arrangements in the health sector independent of the union merger. A policy aimed at 
promoting separate initiatives on employment resulted in a wave of casualisation and 
flexible working in the healthcare sector and greater reliance on contract staff operating 
under service agreements. Devolved bargaining on terms and conditions (a logical extension 
of the structural re-organisation) was successfully introduced for most support staff in the 
Trusts (although at the time of writing, still partially resisted by the nurses). The radical 
move to detach NHS employees from nationally determined policies, procedures and terms 
and conditions effectively led to a huge degree of change in NHS employment. Trusts 
initiated local bargaining across the full range of terms and effectively destroyed the 
national pay structures and guarantees of job security. Whilst the impact of the union 
merger is unclear, it is nevertheless apparent that huge advances were made by the 
employers in relation to the introduction of casual and flexible working, reducing the 
workforce numbers and devolving bargaining arrangements. That said, the move towards 
devolved bargaining and flexibihty in this sector was not accompanied any attempt to 
derecognise the union or indeed limit or curtail its role in the representation of staff. No 
alternative forums for consultation or representation were investigated and collective 
bargaining remained at the heart of industrial relations in the sector.
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It may be that the formation of such a large trade union with cross sector representation 
could have deterred derecognition, but employers generally reported that the merger had 
little impact on bargaining arrangements or agendas. Employers claimed that they could not 
identify the impact of the merger when the pace of structural change was so great. That said, 
one indication that the union had some success in preserving an important role within the 
structures is apparent from the evidence on union mergers and trade union facilities. The 
move to local bargaining was not accompanied by a reduction in union membership or a 
curtailment of facilities. Union density was reported to be reasonably high (at about 50%) 
and most authorities/trusts provided time-off and office facilities to union representatives. 
Where employers did identify a disadvantage arising from the merger this was largely to 
due to the maintenance of complex bargaining arrangements post-merger. Union 
representatives formerly from NALGO sought to preserve separate bargaining arrangements 
from colleagues from COHSE and NUPE after the merger. Employers also expressed 
concern at the access to professional support and resources that the new merged 
organisation could now afford in contrast at their own resources which had been limited 
with the move to localised bargaining.
The WIRS survey showed that the move to single status employment and single table 
bargaining had been far slower across the sector than in local Government and in the survey 
employers reported that there had been no change in the bargaining structure since the 
formation of UNISON. Whilst COHSE and NUPE had traditionally worked closely 
together in co-ordinating bargaining separate, arrangements had by and large been 
maintained. There may be several reasons why developments in the NHS are not as
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advanced as those in Local Government. The survey indicates that structural change in 
Local Government was underway prior to the merger between the three unions. There were 
strong legislative pressure on unions in the sector and the unions had traditionally had 
entirely separate bargaining arrangements. In contrast, COHSE and NUPE represented the 
same categories of staff and had a history of co-ordinating and co-operating without the 
same bargaining arrangements. Many of the flexibilities available through structural 
reforms may have been in place already as a result of informal arrangement.
The otiier merger which occurred in the healtii sector was that between the Health Visitors 
Association and the MSP. A move through which the smaller union aimed to preserve its 
influence and maintain membership. Following the merger, membership in the Association 
remained broadly constant. There was no report of any structural change in bargaining as a 
result of the merger and, although the union reported that it negotiated across a wider range 
of issues fo llo w g  die merger, dûs was not confiimed by employers, For members of die 
Health Visitors' Association whilst the services available remained broadly the same there 
was some improvement in quality post merger. The Association reported an increase in 
their pohtical involvement, both domesdcaUy and within the EU. It had not sponsored any 
MPs or participated in lobbying at ah prior to the merger.
The moves towards devolved bargaining and contracting out of support services, which 
were a feature of collective bargaining in the health service and local Government, were 
also a feature of the civil service. Here the Government pursued a move to smaUer 
bargaining forums through creating government agencies separated from host Departments.
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In addition, a programme of market testing was conducted under which managers were 
encouraged to contract out a specified value of support services. In contrast to the unions in 
the health service and local government who were able to conduct a merger across all their 
organisations in the civil service merger activity excluded the largest trade union, the 
CPSA. Until very recently the CPSA chose to preserve their independence fi-om the 
initiative launched by their colleagues in middle management grade (NUCPS) and the 
Inland Revenue (IRSF).
Civil Service
I
The merger between the Inland Revenue Staff Federation and National Union of Civil and 
Public Servants (NUCPS) in 1995 created the largest union in the civil service in response 
to the creeping fragmentation of the Government Departments within which they org^sed. 
The new union resulting from the merger, the Public Services, Tax and Commerce Union 
(PTC), has 150,00 members and became the tenth largest union in the TUC. Merger talks 
between the two partner organisation started in 1993. The two merger partners refiected 
very different traditions. The IRSF was a “departmental” union organised solely within the 
Inland Revenue. In contrast, NUCPS, itself the product of a merger in the 1980s wa^ a 
general union representing junior and middle managers. The merger process was initiated 
by the NUCPS and the IRSF were initially sceptical of the move (particularly union 
members who were concerned about protecting the stronger financial position of the IRSF).
Both unions reported that the General Secretary of NUCPS was of primary importance in 
the merger process and that he was closely supported by the General Secretary of the IRSF
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and NECs and officers in both unions. The union activists and membership were, according 
to the unions relatively unimportant in the merger process. The reasons underpinning the 
decision to merge were noticeably different between the partners. Although there was a 
financial dimension to the decision in both instances, the decision of the IRSF was focused 
far more on consolidating a position and developing new areas of recruitment, whilst 
NUCPS highlighted the importance of responding to devolved pay bargaining and 
organisational fi-agmentation by tapping sources of greater expertise.
For a merger involving a large number of members the merger process has been relatively 
straight forward. Informal discussions on a merger resulted in a discussion document 
“Working Together” which was endorsed by the Executive Committees of both unions in 
March 1993. The paper proposed working jointly in relation to three distinct areas: services 
to members (pooling resources in the advisory functions, research and health and safety), 
campaigning (a joint campaign against the extension of privatisation and market testing 
was organised) and relations with external bodies (such as the Pubhc Services International 
and the TUC). The IRSF and NUCPS also built up a joint understanding of how they 
managed internal bureaucracies and democratic processes. “The moves eventually 
highlighted the benefits o f a potential merger” John Sheldon, joint General Secretary of the 
PTC, told Employment Trends in May 1997.
An "Instrument of Amalgamation" setting the precise steps to create the new union was 
formally approved by members during the 1994 Conference and a rule book for the new 
union was agreed prior to the merger. Shortly after the merger was approved the new union
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set up a joint 32-strong NEC and set about merging union services. The discussion on the 
structure of the new union proved to be one of the most controversial aspects of the merger 
for the IRSF Executive. There was concern that the IRSF had been rooted in a single 
Department whilst NUCPS had cross-Departmental representation. There was also concern 
over the fact that NUCPS had been running at a deficit for several years whilst IRSF had 
substantial financial reserves. These concerns were to be addressed through the adoption of 
a sectional structure for IRSF members within the new organisation. The Inland Revenue 
Group was to have its own Executive Council, rule book and conference and it would 
contribute 14 representatives to the 30 strong Executive of the PTC. The IRSF structure of 
offices, branches and regions would be retained. To address concerns over union finances, it 
was agreed that key IRSF personnel would be appointed to financial positions in the new 
structure and that no former IRSF funds would be used to pay debts incurred by the 
NUCPS. A substantial proportion of IRSF assets were ring-fenced to ensure that they could 
only be used by the new Inland Revenue body. It was agreed that there would be no 
increase in membership subscriptions as a result of the merger until it was proposed and 
agreed by the joint PTC Conference.
NUCPS also instigated some key changes in advance of the merger. The union examined 
the number of full-time officials it employed and made the decision to replace some senior 
personnel with negotiating staff to reflect the devolution of bargaining within the Civil 
Service from a national level to an Agency or Departmental level. The union also undertook 
some financial reforms and managed to record a surplus in 1995.
215
In the summer of 1994 IRSF officers and Executive Committee members ran a series of 
regional workshops to promote the merger proposals. A Special Delegate Conference was 
held in February 1995 and the merger was approved at the union’s annual conference later 
in the year. Academics from Templeton College in Oxford were asked to design and deliver 
training to assist the new union officer’s plan for the new organisation in June 1995. The 
training established key responsibilities within the proposed structure, established financial 
systems and budget controls, investigated potential savings from economies of scale and put 
in place a recruitment strategy for new members.
The training also considered the reconciliation of cultural differences between the two 
partners, the identification of key union objectives and the setting of bargaining aims. A 
mission statement was drafted for the new organisation. Members were balloted on and 
approved the proposals in the autumn and the new union came into existence on 1 January 
1996. Arrangements for a single headquarters are, at present, ongoing. The integration of 
the branch structure has not yet been implemented although the first stage, that of bringing 
all branches into a single geographical area, has been completed.
It is too early to consider how the merger has affected the bargaining agenda for 
negotiations or the levels of membership in the union. The merger has only recently been 
finahsed and to all intents and purposes the component unions have continued to negotiate 
as separate entities. Given that the unions represent employees in very different 
environments, the scope for the merger to have any impact on the structural fi-amework for 
bargaining appear limited. At this early stage, it is difficult to quantify any changes in the
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number of full-time officials, political influence and the integrated range of individual union 
services arising as jfiom the merger the merger. What is apparent however is that some 
voluntary redundancies have already resulted fi'om the merger and the new union is 
negotiating an extension in membership services.
Although not strictly a union merger the move to a federated structure by several 
managerial trade unions has been included for reasons that we have outlined previously.
The fact that an amalgamation involves members in a degree of common funding of 
services, cross financing and joint political lobbying activity combined with the fact that the 
amalgamation also offers the opportunity for federation members to orchestrate an 
efficiency review means that the federated structure has much in common with a formal 
merger for the purposes of studying the impact on trade union power. The civil service 
union representing professionals and specialists, EPMS, was instrumental in establishing the 
federated structure under which small specialist trade unions have attempted to presave 
their independence whilst benefiting from economies of scale through merging their . 
services. Talks to establish the Federation began in 1992 and so far five unions are currently 
involved in the initiative (TPMS, STE, CMA, FDA, EMA and the Independent Association 
of Halifax Building Society Staff).
The impetus for the initiative came from the General Secretary of the EPMS supported by 
the full time officers of the union and the NEC. Whilst the union's regional officers and 
membership were largely ambivalent to the initiative there was some opposition from 
activists in the union. The pattern of support amongst the partner organisations broadly
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reflects the EPMS position. In essence the initiative was driven from the top down and the 
personal relationship between the General Secretaries of the initial partners cannot be 
understated. All three of the initial partners reported that the single most influential section 
of the union responsible for the federated development was the General Secretary. The main 
reasons for moving to a federated structure have much in common with the reasons why 
other public sector organisations moved to a merger. The IPMS was faced with a declining 
membership (primarily resulting from privatisation and market testing initiatives) and the 
Federation was a structure which offered a means of consolidating the union's position and 
appealing to new areas of potential recruitment. The federated structure also offered a way 
of releasing more resources to be concentrated on the demands of devolved pay bargaining 
whilst avoiding the need for subscription increases.
The process by which the Federation will be formally established is ongoing and the unions 
involved plan to put proposals for a common rule book to their respective conferences in 
1996, with a view to formally endorsing the Federation in January 1997. Some integration, 
particularly in merging services, has been developed in advance of the formal decision to 
proceed. Common arrangements in research, education, computer systems, legal services 
and Parliamentary advisers have been developed. The Federation has also rationalised its 
properties setting up a single headquarters and utilising the head offices, previously used by 
component unions, to develop a more comprehensive regional structure for the Federation. 
The CMA told us that the level of integration had not yet facilitated a decline in full-timers 
employed but it had had a noticeable impact in allowing support staff to be re-directed into 
negotiation and serving members directly.
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The overt impact of the Federation on bargaining power or structures will be limited. Under 
the federated umbrella unions préserve their independence and determine their bargaining 
priorities and structures directly with employers. Given the different industries in which 
they operate, there is no scope for integrated or co-ordinated bargaining. However, the 
structure should facilitate better and more economical support services such as membership 
records, research and legal advice and the range of membership benefits should be 
improved by the organisation's bigger purchasing power. The organisation might 
realistically expect to have more impact in the third power dimension aimed at the control 
of political and economical factors by pooling its lobbying and campaigning resources.
As we have seen, mergers in local and central government and the health service have all 
been linked by common threads. This is not surprising given that in relation to local 
bargaining and contracting out in particular, unions in these sectors were faced with 
common issues. The education sector, in contrast, faced a different series of policy 
initiatives and, not surprisingly, merger activity in the sector during this period looks very 
different.
Education
In the education sector the main strands of national pay bargaining have been retained and 
there were no moves during this period to introduce private sector initiatives tendering or 
market testing, either directly or indirectly, into the sector. In contrast to the other areas of 
the public sector, there have been no moves towards merger amongst the large teaching 
unions during this period. Where mergers have occurred they have been tended to be on the
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fringes of the teaching profession affecting relatively few members. A consohdatory merger 
between the Association of Lecturers in Colleges in Scotland and the Educational Institute 
of Scotland was designed to consolidate the position of the two bodies representing teaching 
staff in higher education in Scotland. The Greater London Staff Association, ^yhich was a 
small non-affiliate union representing some staff in educational administration in local 
Government, sought out a defensive merger with the GMB.
Employers reported that the lecturers' union had a significant level of density amongst all 
grades of teaching staff, between 50-80%. The employers provided a wide range of facilities 
including offices and time-off. Strathclyde reported that, on average, the union 
representatives received 20 days a year time-off for union duties. Negotiations were 
conducted within a national framework covering conditions of service, structure and final 
salaries. Guidelines were implemented locally and the discretion which councils could 
afford in relation to grading structures meant that there was some flexibility in the 
implementation of agreements.
The employers were generally neutral in their reaction to the merger. No significant impacts 
oh bargaining in the sector, however one council indicated that there was concern that the 
more generalist nature of the new organisation resulted in less specific knowledge of the 
local issues and that this might be a disadvantage. In the survey, the employers reported that 
the merger had had no discernible impact on the bargaining arrangements within Councils. 
Strathclyde reported that this was primarily because both merger partners maintained 
separate bargaining arrangements post-merger and, given the number of employees covered
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and the ease within which negotiations were conducted, the Councils had maintained 
separate negotiations after the merger.
Whilst noting that the merger had no impact on collective bargaining generally, the LRC 
Education reported that it detected a shght hardening of the union’s position in relation to 
pay following the merger and a shght worsening in the climate of industrial relations. The 
employers who dealt with the Greater London Staff Association reported that the 
organisation was of httle significance and that its integration into the GMB had had no real 
impact on collective bargaining. Given that the number of employees affected by these 
mergers was relatively small, it is not possible to isolate the impact of the mergers fi-om the 
range of other factors influencing bargaining during the period. Nevertheless, it does not 
appear that there was much change in bargaining structures over the period and it may be 
that the mergers had httle impact overaU.
Finally, in the Higher Education sector, the merger between NATFHE and the AAES in 
1990 had very little effect on collective bargaining within the profession. The merger was 
effectively the formal recognition of a joint membership agreement that had operated for 
many years. In return for 50% of their subscriptions AAES members, who are lecturers in 
post-school education (differentiated fi-om other NATFHE members only by what they 
teach), were afforded full rights of NATFHE membership. The merger completed the 
introduction of the small AAES structure into the NATFHE structure.
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Similarly, in the education sector there was no major merger activity in the probation or 
prison services. Those mergers that did take place were on the periphery of both services, 
politically at least. It is to these mergers attention is now turned.
Probation Service and Prisons
Ironically, given its strong occupational and private sector focus, an aggressive recruitment 
strategy amongst staff associations by the white collar section of the EEPTU seems to have 
led to a variety of white collar and professional staff bodies integrating with the engineers 
prior to their merger with the AÊU. The EEPTU made successful approaches to the 
associations of probation workers, prison officers and staff in bail hostels run by local 
government when, due to its exclusion from the TUC for poaching members, it attempted to 
become a focus for non-affiliated trade union and staff association activity. (The strategy 
was shortlived and abandoning its relationship with non-affiliates became a condition of the 
EEPTU’s reentry to the TUC ^ d  subsequent merger with the AEU. In each of these 
mergers the influence of the General Secretaries in both the EEPTU and the smaller unions 
was essential to progressing the merger, but there was no substantial opposition to the 
merger from the membership of either union. In each case the merger was initiated by the 
EEPTU, through the General Secretary, or the Chair of the smaller union and the proposals 
were put to the NEC. In each case the NEC authorised the General Secretary to investigate 
and then pursue the merger.
The reasons given by respondents for embarking on a merger were different for each of the 
smaller unions. The Prison Service Union, a breakaway from the Prison Officers'
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Association, sought to maintain its independence from this group. It endorsed the merger as 
a means of improving its collective bargaining services to members and as a way of 
consolidating its position. It was also strongly attracted to the EEPTU by the wide range of 
membership services on offer and by the absence, at the time, of the affiliation with the 
AEU. The Association of Senior Probation Officers responded positively to the merger 
approach when faced with rising expenditure and a declining membership as a means of 
consolidating their position within the sector. The union feared that lay membership 
involvement was declining to such an extent that the union would not be able to maintain its 
level of service to members without the support of a larger organisation. 1 he retirement of 
the incumbent General Secretary created an appropriate time for the union to address a 
range of its problems through merger. The Association representing staff in bail hostels 
merged primarily to secure its existence. It was simply too small to sustain an independent 
organisation. The merger with the EEPTU was primarily an attempt to preserve the 
organisation as well as secure a base from which the union might seek to grow by appealing 
to new members.
Given the size of the partners with which the EEPTU was merging and the federated 
structure which the union had adopted in relation to the mergers, the process was completed 
very quickly. The smaller unions were simply amalgamated into the Federation of 
Professional Associations which was effectively a trade group of the EEPTU. In each case 
the merger process followed a similar pattern. A jointly negotiated rule book and 
constitution was negotiated prior to the merger and union services were merged shortly after 
the merger had been ratified. In most cases the smaller union had few staff, services and
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offices to integrate with the larger partner. Under the terms of the merger the smaller union 
maintained its own branch structure and was responsible for its internal organisation.
In the case of each organisation the number of members has increased since joining the 
federated structure. In relation to the Prison Service Union and the staff at bail hostels, the 
increases were modest, but the Association of Senior Probation Officers enjoyed a marked 
increase in membership resulting in the formation of several new union branches. Neither 
the Probation Officers nor the Staff at Bail Hostels offered members any individual union 
services before the merger and the Prison Service Union only offered legal advice and death 
benefits. All the unions have seen a significant improvement in the range of services they 
can now offer to the membership including financial services, discounts, education and 
research. Similarly, none of the smaller unions was able to exert any pohtical influence 
prior to the merger but under the terms of the merger agreement they secured access to the 
EEPTU/AEEUs sponsored MPs.
Given that the influence of most of these staff bodies was marginal when they were 
independent (some were not even recognised for bargaining by their employer), the affect of 
the merger on collective bargaining is likely to have been marginal. In most cases, the staff 
union was formed in protest after a dispute with the TUC union representing staff in a 
particular area, hence the common ground with the non-TUC affiliated EEPTU. In most 
cases, the employer chose not to recognise the splinter union for fear of disrupting 
arrangements with the larger organisation. The Probation Service reported that the 
Association of Senior Probation Officers which joined the EEPTU in 1988 was a
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professional body and did not have any negotiating rights in the Service. Similarly, the 
Prison Service Union, which joined the EEPTU in 1990, is not recognised by the employer 
and the employers do not provide any facilities to the union. The union’s sole rights are to 
represent members in disciplinary hearings or where members are under investigation for 
alleged misconduct. In 1994, each of the smaller unions was obliged to disassociated itself 
from the EEPTU (in most cases the employers were not informed) when the electricians 
formally rejoined the TUC.
The information on the nature and consequences of trade union mergers in the public sector 
gleaned from the questionnaire survey has now been presented. Some analysis of the 
material will be attempted in the next Section where the main themes arising from the 
survey in relation to the pubhc sector will be investigated and compared with the finding on 
mergers in private industry. Before an overview of findings is presented, however, it is 
necessary to consider some of the material detailed in trade union responses on the effect of 
mergers in the public sector on trade union internal organisation and, in particular, the 
hosting of formal efficiency reviews. In the interests of clarity and comparability the 
information on efficiency reviews arising from mergers in the public sector has been 
collated separately and is presented below.
Efficiency Reviews
There is a great diversity in the type and scope of efficiency reviews \ ^ c h  follow mergers 
between unions concentrated in the public sector. It is not surprising, given the logistics 
involved in a merger involving three unions of the size of COHSE, NUPE and NALGO,
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that UNISON opted for a relatively minimalist efficiency review on its formation. The 
merger process generated a short term cash flow problem in the period immediately 
following the merger and a review was formulated specifically to tackle the issue. The 
exercise undertaken resulted in a voluntary severance programme that resulted in thirty staff 
leaving. The recommendations following the review were implemented quickly to tackle 
the temporary and immediate difficulty. There are no plans for an ongoing policy for 
efficiency reviews.
In mergprs where a small trade union was effectively transferred to larger union, such as in 
the education or prison and probation sectors, respondents indicated that the size of the 
partner and the small degree of organisational change afforded by the merger, did not 
generally warrant any efficiency review. The Educational Institute in Scotland, for example, 
took the view that the merger with the Association of Lecturers in Scotland did not warrant 
any organisational review. Similarly, the mergers between the MSF and tiie Health Visitors 
Association did not facilitate any efficiency review. The HVA was effectively slipped into 
an established area of the MSF where they remained responsible for running their own 
affairs with a degree of autonomy.
The concept of a post merger efficiency review is alien to the notion of a federated structure 
developed by the EPMS. Part of the attraction of the organisational structure is that it offers 
unions a means of preserving an independent organisation whilst benefiting from shared 
services and economies of scale. It is not surprising that reviews do not transcend 
independent structures. There are, at present, no plans for a formal efficiency of shared
226
services to be conducted. At the moment services have been integrated through the 
negotiation between service providers and it would be fair to say that the need to keep the 
federated structure on course has proved to be the primary objective of the structure and one 
to which efficiency has played a secondary role. The participants suggest that this is likely 
to remain the case because they indicated that there are no plans to introduce any kind of 
formal efficiency revie’ws.
In contrast to the relatively low key link between mergers and efficiency reviews elsewhere 
in the sector, the IRSF/NUCPS merger illustrated how the merger process can be alUed to a 
programme of efficiency review to ensure that the merger has a n impact on the organisation 
outside the confines of merger activity. Arrangements during the merger process sought to 
ensure that all the areas where the merger had a direct impact were reviewed for efficiency. 
The original merger document specified that the 1995 Conference would make a provision 
for a review of the IRSF structure to accommodate developments such as the growing role 
of Regions and Executive Offices in the Inland Revenue; and the importance of 
representing all members faced with contracting out and privatisation however, the model 
eventually adopted did not limit the review process to those areas. The new union went 
further and created a dynamo for an efficiency by advocating an ongoing review every six 
months. The review could focus on any aspect of union organisation and it was conducted 
by a personnel expert who reported to a joint steering group after a period of investigation.
The General Secretary of the IRSF was the person who promoted the initiative and he set 
the terms of reference for the review. In addition to this process for union reviews, the
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merger agreement specified that there was to be a general all embracing review of efficiency 
in the organisation every two years. The NEC were charged with setting the terms for and 
conducting the review. The aim was to see whether the organisation was functioning 
properly and in the best interests of all members. All branches and other sections of the 
union were to be involved in the review and any changes proposed as a result of the review 
were to be put to the annual conference of the union for endorsement.
To assist the new union in its reviews and in particular its staff reorganisation, bargaining, 
senior management roles and regional links with head office, following the merger, the 
union called in Alan Fowler, a firee-lance personnel consultant. Fowler told People 
Management magazine (Steven Overell, Unions Tackle Their Own Management, People 
Management, September1996 p25):
"I was given free rein to advise - to the point o f doing away with certain jobs - andfound 
the union open to work with. It did not accept all my advice, but it did feel that outside 
professional opinion was helpful "
Fowler claimed that his status as a fi^lance consultant with prior knowledge of the 
vocabulary and systems of trade unionism aided his credibility. In the same article, CUve 
Brooke, the PTC's joint General Secretary stated that bringing together the remuneration, 
grading and operational responsibihties of two major unions was a major process. He 
reported that change management consultants had been contracted to implement the new 
structure and that, "To my mind, they have been excellent value for money ".{op. cit. p26) 
Brooke also took his top managers in the new union to participate in training at Templeton 
College where Roger Undy and Lord McCarthy trained them to handle the management
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issues inherent in a union merger. Undy, stated that unions were now much more aware of 
the need to be seen to offer a professional service.
"A lot o f this is driven by the loss o f members and the associatedfinancial difficulties. It 
has brought quite sharply home (sic) to a number o f people that these things have to be 
addressed in a more professional manner", he said (Op. cit. p26).
In seeking a structured approach supported by external consultants, the PTC demonstrates 
that the impact of a merger may stretch beyond those areas of the partner organisations 
directly affected by the merger in purely organisational terms. The structure facilitates a 
series of ongoing short term reviews of specific areas of the union and a general efficiency 
review every two years. The new union has utilised the process of change arising fi-om the 
merger process and formation of the union to promote ongoing organisational change and 
efficiency.
WMlst the merger process adopted by MSF effectively precluded the initiation of efficiency 
reviews in the smaller unions with v ^ ch  they had merged, the EEPTU's reported that it 
encouraged reviews amongst its federation of professional associations. The union took 
examined the organisational efficiency of the incoming union in each merger and, in cases 
where it was apparent that a review was warranted, this was negotiated as a part of the 
merger process. As a result efficiency reviews were conducted in both the Probation 
Officers' Union and the union representing staff in bail hostels prior to their formal 
acceptance into the union. The reasonably robust structure adopted by the Prison Service 
Union meant that no efficiency review was warranted in this merger nor, incidentally, in the
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vast majority of private sector staff bodies who joined the federation at other times. The 
reviews were conducted by officials of the EEPTU and the smaller union. The review terms 
were agreed in advance with the NEC of the smaller union. The review team reported to 
bo& the NEC in the smaller union and the NEC of the union. The union stated that the 
review process was initiated within the first six months of the merger and reported after 
either 12 months (as in the case of the Probation Officers) or after 18 months (as with staff 
at bail hostels). In each case provisions were made for the review process to be ongoing 
and conducted at regular intervals. During the survey, the unions were able to point to 
specific examples of improved organisational efficiency as a result of the review process. 
The Association of Senior Probation Officers was able to restructure its regional coverage 
which meant the organisation was able to operate more economically and closer to its 
members. The Association of Staff and Bail Hostel Workers was able to rationalise its 
recruitment process which led to a steady increase in membership.
The relationship between union mergers in the public sector and efficiency reviews suggests 
that there is no set pattern amongst union mergers and that the decision over whether to 
utilise the merger process to instigate some ongoing mechanism for organisational change, 
is essentially one of policy. Some unions are more interested in utilising the change process 
than others. For example, the process of merger adopted by the PTC and the EEPTU, 
demonstrates the real organisational efficiencies that can be achieved on a continuing basis 
by a review process legitimised by the constitution of a new organisation. This approach 
contrasts however with the majority of respondents in the sector who indicated that they 
stopped short of integrating any ongoing review process within the merger activity. Some
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unions seem to focus exclusively on a merger which delivers additional members to the 
union and offers the opportunity to attack and develop new areas of membership, whilst 
failing to realise that a relationship with an inefficient organisation may place financial and 
organisational burdens on the union and may indeed intensify those pressures which the 
merger was designed to resolve.
The information on mergers, and their consequences in relation to both collective 
bargaining and internal union organisation, has been presented in the context of both the 
sector and industry in which it occurred. The central findings of the research will be 
presented with a view to enhancing an understanding of the consequences of union mergers 
for bargaining and union power. In the concluding chapter in this study the main findings of 
the investigation shall be summarised and the responses from each sector examined and 
compared. A questionnaire survey, however, is constrained in the type of information it 
will solicit by the fact that responses are an historic assessment of a developing process 
and dependent on the perceptions of the individuals completing the response. For these 
reasons it was decided to supplement the survey findings with case study approach.
The case study metiiodology allows the resiearcher to study developments within the 
context of a timescale. A union merger and the impact on power relations can be studied 
as a developing process rather than relying on a single snapshot. It also allows the 
researcher to conduct a more detailed examination of the evidence at first hand away from 
any subjectivity or “spin”. This is particularly important given the nature of a collective 
bargaining and the requirement by parties to present outcomes in a favourable light to
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members of management. A case study approach will never facilitate the range or breadth 
of information solicited through a questionnaire survey but it will an important dimension 
to this study of mergers and union power as shall be seen in the next chapter.
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8. CASE STUDIES
To complement the research conducted by the questionnaire survey and fbllovy up 
interviews two case studies into the consequences of two different types of union merger in 
two different sectors were undertaken. The aim was to use different research techniques to 
address some of the limitations in both methods as they are applied in this study. There are 
several ways in which the findings of the questionnaire survey are limited. Firstly, the 
methodology relies on an individual perception of the consequences of mergers and will not 
reflect the view of the organisation as a whole. The views expressed are those of the 
respondent alone and as such vulnerable to any subjectivity or gloss that they wish to put on 
their response. The questionnaire also suffers from being a snapshot of what is essentially a 
moving process which develops over time. These limitations are not a problem for the 
researcher providing they are recognised and, where possible, steps are taken to address any 
potentially misleading findings.
Given the limitations of a questionnaire survey, the case study approach, a detailed study 
over a longer period, was thought to be an ideal complement to the survey. Case studies 
facilitate a study of mergers over time and may provide some insight to the developing 
relationship between merger partners. The approach also facihtates a relatively more 
independent viewpoint from which the consequences of merger can be assessed without the 
need to rely on the potentially partisan responses from practitioners.
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The survey data will also complement the findings of the case studies where the latter has 
some limitations. The problems associated with generalising from the specific to the 
general, usually perceived to be the main drawback of the case study approach, can be 
addressed by comparing the findings with those identified in the survey. Similarly the 
survey is likely to compensate for the narrow focus which is necessary in a case study and 
to provide some guidance as to the areas in which deeper research may be useful.
The case study approach has a series of advantages which recommend it to the researcher. 
Case studies are useful in providing an insight and understanding of organisational 
functions that are not well documented or not amenable to fleeting contact with an 
organisation (such changes in power relations over time). Moreover, where more than one 
study is conducted there is also the facility for comparison the findings of studies internally. 
Interestingly, Martin (1986) who constmcted a complex quantitative model for researching 
changes in union power, chose not to apply his model statistically or through a 
questionnaire survey. Instead he chose to focus on a series of case studies. Only in a forum 
in vWnch the researcher could conduct a detailed analysis of power determinants over time , 
he argued, could a complex model be applied in practice.
An investigation of the processes by which a merger is completed and the effect that the 
merger has on union power necessarily involves a degree of complexity and, in turn, 
compromise. The merger processes are not readüy available to investigation and when the 
study focuses on organisational change and stmctural reviews, there is a degree of 
sensitivity attached to the evidence that is not easily discernible fi’om outside the
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organisation.. Any study of this type is then open to the criticism that it is incomplete and 
that it has not taken a sufficiently robust view of external factors to justify the conclusions. 
Given this, I contend that since the selected research methods combined in the study 
complement each other to a sufficient degree to render the findings reasonably reliable.
The case studies in this investigation have been drawn from very different sectors - private 
sector manufacturing (McVities’) and the financial services sector (Northern Rock Building 
Society). The two studies also involve very different examples of merger activity. In the 
first case, the merger examined is between the AEEU and the EEPTU, two unions operating 
in similar sectors and covering similar occupations. The membership of both unions was 
adversely affected by the decline in UK manufacturing in the early eighties and the merger 
could be classed as "consolidatory” under Undy's (1981) classifications. The merger was 
designed to preserved the strength and influence of the parties in a hostile environment and 
to retain a degree of occupational separatism from more general trade unionism. In contrast, 
the Northern Rock Staff Association was courted to engage in a merger with BIFU partly 
because of its sound financial and membership base and the opportunity for growth within 
the organisation and the sector. BIFU faced competition from many other TUC unions in 
seeking to merge with NORSA and had to stmcture the merger process with a series of 
guarantees and incentives for the incoming union. Far from falling into the category of 
merger identified by Undy (1981) as "aggressive or defensive," this merger resulted from 
specific objectives from both sides. For BIFU, the smaller union provided opportunities for 
growth and the chance to get a foothold in the emerging building society sector and for the 
Staff Association merger with a larger union offered the opportunity to up-grade services
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and membership administration in order to address the growth in membership and the size 
of the organisation.
McvmES* gjio
McVities’ UK is the largest manufacturer of sweet and savoury biscuits in Europe. The firm 
employs over 6,000 employees at five sites throughout the country. The Company 
recognises trade union for the vast majority of its employees based in the manufacturing 
sites. The operative grades are represented by USDAW and the GMB, the staff and 
supervisory grades are represented by the MSF and craft employees are represented by the 
AEEU. It is this latter group on which we shall focus.
Prior to the merger
Before the AEEU was formed in 1992, McVities’ negotiated with both the AEU and the 
EEPTU as separately entities. Both unions had their own organisation, stmcture and 
representatives at the main sites but invariably the two worked closely together. The two 
unions met jointly to draw up a pay claim and the company met both unions at the same 
time. One representative from each trade group adopted a senior steward but the preparatory 
meetings on pay and the pay talks themselves were attended by representatives fi-om both 
organisations. Interestingly the results of any ballot on acceptance of the pay deal were 
amalgamated.
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The Company reported that for the vast majority of the time the two craft unions operated in 
line with each other. The closeness of the relationship was illustrated by the fact that the HR 
Director of the Company could only recall one incident when the two organisations had 
followed different paths. This concerned some unofficial industrial action over bonus and 
call-out payments in the early 1980s at the Tollcross site in Glasgow.
The dispute involved both groups of workers but the EEPTU members moved more quickly 
to take (unofficial) industrial action whilst the AEU group chose to continue negotiations. 
When questioned, Phil Asquitii, die HR Director, suggested that the different approach 
adopted by the unions in this case was related directly to individual representatives at site 
level. He claimed that a militant cell within the EEPTU group at the site was responsible for 
pressing the electricians into industrial action.
Whilst the two groups worked closely on collective issues and in the negotiating forum they 
maintained separate structures, finances and representation of members. On individual cases 
the members were represented by a steward fi'om their own organisation and, where the 
grievance or issue was particularly serious, a full-time officer fix)m the unions would 
represent the individual. This representation was relatively infi-equent and for the most part 
the craft unions concentrated on the collective role to protect and extend the terms for the 
craft group at the site as far as possible.
Not surprisingly given the close relationship that had developed between the two 
organisations there was little overt hostility to the merger firom members when a proposal
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for a merger was floated. According to the union's Senior Steward, Robert Clarke, the 
membership generally accepted that there was a logic to the proposal and that it would 
formalise many of the co-operative arrangements that were already in place. The members 
also anticipated the savings which the union could make as a result of the merger 
particularly in relation to capital and communication. Clarke stated that the general feeling 
that a merger was to be applauded, resulted primarily from the fact that the membership 
knew (and had worked with their merger partner). He commented that if a merger had been 
proposed outside the craft group this would have been met with a fierce opposition. Craft 
employees saw themselves as a distinct group with separate interests from other groups of 
employees and any attempt to lump them together with other employees, particularly low- 
skilled groups would have been opposed. The fact that the engineers and electricians had 
worked together successfully in the past and had identified common interests led to a 
general support for the merger.
The actions of the Company also facilitated a shared outlook from this group of employees. 
The Company negotiated collectively for craft employees and recognised that it would be 
more efficient to have craftsmen that could fulfil electrical and mechanical engineering 
tasks. By 1992 mainstream manufacturing in the UK had awoken to the notion that it was 
more efficient to develop skills and invest in post apprenticeship training within the craft 
group. As firms developed programmes to up-skill craft employees to perform elements of 
each other's specialist skills, the two disciplines were pushed more closely together than 
before. This only served to reinforce the perception of common interests and problems in 
McVities’ where the initial attempts to secure cross-skilling had been viewed with
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suspicion.
As one might expect from a Company that had facilitated a common outlook by pursuing 
common policies and initiatives with the craft group, McVities’ was in favour of the merger 
between the two unions. It was felt that the merger would formalise many of the single table 
arrangements with the craft group and also facilitate some progress on the up-skilling 
initiative.
The arrangement was also welcomed because the company anticipated that it would 
improve communication and adniinistration. It was also thought that the merger would save 
the Company money by, in effect, slimming down the Joint Negotiating Committee and 
simplifying communications by providing a single point of contact with the union 
nationally and at each site.
The Company did not anticipate any disadvantages arising from the union merger. Phil 
Asquith, HR Director, stated that, whilst there may be some concern about a more powerful 
or militant vehicle for employee representation arising from some mergers, this simply did 
not apply in this case. The unions' close working relationship prior to the merger meant that 
they could operate, in effect, as a single union for the purposes of placing pressure on the 
employer. As Phil Asquith summarised the Company's position "Prior to the merger we 
had all the potential costs o f the merger (because the unions were operating as a single 
union in negotiations) without any o f the benefits in terms o f formal acceptance o f a single 
bargaining forum.. " He outlined the anticipated benefits as being a more simple bargaining
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structure, better communication and single contact points and the opportunity to purse 
cross-skilling through developing a single generic model with the AEEU.
Following the merger
The degree to which McVitie's realised the potential anticipated benefits of merger is central 
to the question of whether (and to what degree) power relations between the Company and 
the union changed following the 1992 merger. The evidence examined collected fix>m 
across the full range of terms and conditions, union facilities and skills issues suggests that 
employee relations in the Company changed very little as a direct result to the merger 
although the creation of a unified and fully integrated craft group might be said to have 
exerted greater influence on the Company in relation to cross-skilling (see below).
Fay settlements: There is no evidence that the merger exerted any iihpact on the levels of 
pay increase negotiated by the craft group post merger. The evidence revealed that, both 
prior to and post-merger, the primary determinant of the negotiated settlement was the level 
of headline inflation in the economy. The figures reveal that since 1990 the pay settlement 
for the craft group has been shghtly above the average rate of inflation for the year so that 
year on year the group managed to protect and extend their incomes to a limited degree. 
There is no evidence that the pattern on pay bargaining was any different following the 
merger in 1992.
240
McVities* Pay Increases and Inflation
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Craft pay increase 9.75 5.9 3.7 3.0 2.0 3.1 3.0
Rate of inflation 9.45 10.0 5.0 1.55 1.8 2.7 2.4
The Company argued that it had consistently rewarded employees at levels in excess of the 
annual RPI (a two-year deal in 1993/4 specifically refers to RPI-plus increases in the second 
year), so the maintenance of living standards in the annual pay round cannot be seen, 
according to the company, as any indication that the union merger extended union 
bargaining power. Moreover, the settlements for the craft group mirror those of the much 
larger USDAW/GMB group which has a settlement date in January compared with the craft 
group which settles in April. The company stressed, therefore, that the craft group tended to 
follow the settlement of their fellow workers and that this supported the contention that 
merger had only a marginal effect on pay settlements. Whilst this may be the case the 
figures relating to pay settlements do not necessarily suggest a lack of influence on pay rates 
arising from the union merger. The company and the union both reported a very static 
workforce amongst craft employees in McVities’. Turnover was low and the Company had 
no trouble recruiting sufficiently skilled employees. Turnover of craft employees in the 
Company had remained very stable since a major severance exercise in 1986 when the 
Company launched its first cross-skilling initiative (discussed in detail below). This was 
relatively unsuccessful and craft employees were still engaged largely employed on electro-
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mechanical tasks in 1995.In the light of a lack of progress on cross-skilling and combined 
with a stable workforce, the Company might reasonably been expected to either pursue the 
initiative more vigorously or else, cut numbers and control costs. The fact that an above 
inflation pay policy has been maintained in this environment might suggest that, far from 
having no impact on pay within the company, the merger at least maintained union strength 
in relation to the pay round. It may have been instrumental in protecting the income and 
expectations of the group in a hostile bargaining environment.
Up-skilling: In 1986 the Company launched the Blue Pages initiative to limit the costs of 
engineering in the Company (for additional information see Donald Ting: Breaking the 
Craft Mould, 1987). The plan included several different elements each aimed at reducing 
the costs of the craft group. Shifts were re-organised to include weekend working and mid­
week overtime pay was eradicated. Craftsmen received a hefty 12.7% increase on basic 
rates but still suffered a loss of income from the changes. The average working week was 
reduced from 48-56 hours to 42 hours. An up-skilling programme under which craftsmen 
would undertake the basic tasks of the other craft discipline was outlined. This was to be 
accompanied by a major decrease in engineering employees from 503 to 385. The 
dismissals were mainly "mates" or elder craftsmen tempted by generous severance pay.
The Blue Pages agreement also encompassed the organisation of craft employees into 
designated teams aimed at improving communication between shop-floor employees and 
craftsmen. There was to be an increase in the use of contracted labour to work on project 
tasks whilst the "core" craft workforce were to concentrate on basic plant maintenance.
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Concentrating on efficient production and preventive maintenance the craftsman was 
expected to generate a sense of ownership in the plant. This initiative was, in turn, expected 
to reduce downtime (the period for which machines are not operating due to breakdown) on 
the plant and contribute to a more economically efficient craft function. The cross 
functional flexibility amongst craftsmen was the pre-requisite of effective team working and 
reduced downtime.
The Blue Pages agreement was the most ambitious set of policies and priorities that the 
Company had ever tried to pursue with its craft employees, but it is clear that the initiative 
failed. In outlining the difficulties of the 1996 pay round it became clear that the Company 
was still working to secure the majority of components of the Blue Pages agreement. 
Horizontally flexible craft employees working in teams to maintain efficient production was 
still the area in which the company was seeking to make real progress during these 
negotiations. No up-skilling programme had been completed as a result of the 1986 
agreement and, whilst there had been lower craft costs due to job losses and less downtime, 
the craft group were overwhelmingly single skilled and still regularly working a large 
amount of overtime. It was on the question of cross-skilling in particular that the 1996 pay 
talks floundered with management pushing for a full cross skilling programme and the 
union pressing for additional payment (in the realm of 5%) to participate in the training.
In the end the talks reached a stalemate and the Company effectively ripped up the national 
agreement and moved to local bargaining for craft employees to see whether progress on the 
issue could not be made in local negotiations.
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The fact that the craft group was free to bargain and negotiate on the cross-skilling issue for 
several years, trading its co-operation on several occasions, illustrates not only a problem 
with managerial objectives and priorities in the company but also a level of bargaining 
power within the craft group. Whilst the plethora of negotiations, agreements and offers that 
have covered up-skilling in the Company since 1986 make it difficult to assess the direct 
impact of the union merger on union power in this area, it is clear that major advances were 
not made by managers in the wake of the merger. Even in 1997 the issues surrounding up- 
skilling are not fully resolved (although some progress is now under way) and this suggests 
that following the union merger in 1992 the power of the union to evade a commitment to 
up-skilling (or re-negotiate on it) was maintained or even extended.
Craft Numbers: The Blue Pages agreement reduced the number of craft employees from 
503 to 385 primarily by releasing craft "mates" and some older workers. The reduction of 
craft employees was in anticipation of the fewer craft that wovüd be needed if the craftsmen 
were equipped with a wider range of skills. By 1996 the craft numbers across all the 
McVities’ sites had fallen to 333. Given that the Company's aim was to reduce craft costs 
the resilience of the number of craft employees is significant. It becomes even more so in 
the light of the Company's stated aim (in Blue Pages) to develop a core workforce employed 
on maintenance tasks supported by contract employees on project work. Given that the 
project work has gone outside the craft group the numbers of craft employees have held up 
surprisingly well. Again quite what role the union merger played in the preservation of craft 
post is difficult to assess, nevertheless, what is clear is that job security amongst craft 
employees was not weakened following the merger of craft unions.
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McVities* Craft Numbers per Site
Site Ashby Carlisle Harlesden Manchester Tollcross Total
1986 66 71 65 115 68 385
1996 57 62 53 102 59 333
Membership Density - Whether the union merger had any impact on the levels of union 
density in the workforce may provide some indication of whether or not the merger had any 
indirect influence on union power in the workplace. If membership density is falling in a 
workplace, where there are a series of initiatives under way to reorganise the craft function, 
it might reasonably be assumed that the union will demonstrate less influence over these 
issues. In this instance, neither the Company nor the union reported an any change in the 
level of union density within the craft group after the merger in 1992.
The Company reported that the craft employees had always demonstrated a strong 
propensity towards unionisation and a density level in the 90 per cents was not uncommon 
in either the Company or the industry. Robert Clarke, for the union, stated that if density 
was less than 100% this could only be explained by transfers within units since he was 
unaware of any non-membership in the craft group either before or after the merger. Whilst 
the evidence on union density provides little scope for extending union power (albeit 
indirectly in this area), the figures may demonstrate some extension of power if the merger 
could be shown to contribute to maintaining density levels whilst union density in otlier
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parts of the Company was falling. Conversely, however, the merger cannot be held to be the 
most important factor in determining the maintenance of density levels and issues specific 
to other unions may influence their density rates above other factors. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that the density rate for operative grades fell from 82% to 76% (primarily 
the Company believe due to check off difficulties) whilst the density in the supervisory and 
white collar grades fell from 56% to 33%. Density amongst the craft group following the 
merger did not decline significantly and certainly not to the degree experienced by other 
groups. The effect of the merger on this is difficult to ascertain though it is possible to 
conclude that there was no negative correlation between the merger and union density.
Industrial Action: In recent years the craft group at McVitie's has moved to a ballot on 
industrial action on two occasions, in both cases after the merger had been completed. Aside 
from instances of sporadic unofficial industrial action, typified by the sort of action at 
Tollcross (in which only RFPTTI members were involved) there was no official industrial 
action in the five years preceding the union merger. Three years after the merger in 1995, 
the union balloted the membership to take part in strike action following a dispute at three 
factories on the "holiday divider" or how holiday entitlement was accrued under the new 
shift patterns. Although the union indicated some willingness to take action the dispute was 
settled through last minute negotiation and pushed out to local factory management to 
resolve. In 1996, the union also indicated a move towards industrial action when their 
national bargaining forum was effectively sidelined by the company's move to local 
bargaining designed to generate sonie progress on the up-skilling initiative. Given the 
unwillingness of the membership to respond positively to calls for industrial action
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combined with the support for the Company's move at some sites, a ballot for action was 
threatened but not undertaken.
The degree to which the merger had a role in the union's renewed interest in the threat of 
industrial action was alluded to by both the company and the union. For the company, the 
merger was seen as a facihtator for industrial action. It improved communication between 
the national committee and it simplified the organisation and co-ordination of balloting on 
action. The central factor underpinning both cases of threatened action however, was the 
issues and the support that could be generated for action at die shop floor level. Although 
the Company recognised that the merger facilitated greater confidence in the craft group to 
move towards, and to organise action, the marked difference between the ballot for action 
on the hoHday divider issue and the threats short of a ballot over the move to local 
bargaining, was the depth of feeling that the actual issue generated on the shop floor. Whilst 
the workforce perceived a genuine injustice over the way holiday was accrued on shift, the 
move away from national bargaining was seen as distanced from the shop floor issues. The 
union generally supported this analysis. The merger had played some part in generating a 
greater confidence in the union and did make joint action between the engineers and 
electricians easier to co-ordinate, but these factors' were, according to Robert Clarke, 
relatively unimportant in the decisions relating to industrial action.
The strength of feeling on the issue was the overriding determinant of industrial action. 
Clarke stressed that had either the holiday pay divider issue or the devolution of bargaining 
emerged prior to the merger they would have met with exactly the same response (albeit co-
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ordinated less effectively between separate unions). That said, Clarke was confident that the 
way in which the unions worked together pre-merger would have enabled a joint response.
Representation: Union representation being structured, funded and facilitated as it was, 
was largely unaffected by the merger. At the sites the facilities afforded the union in relation 
to time-off, access to rooms, office equipment and postage all remained the same following 
the merger. The stewards remained the same in most cases although after the merger one 
became the senior craft steward and one became the deputy. The transition seemed to occur 
naturally and no-one can remember an election being necessary to elect a shop steward.
The site steward and deputy attended national meetings maintaining the practice of two 
stewards attending from each site.. There was some change in relation to representing staff 
in disciplinaries, personal cases and grievances which were all handled by the site steward 
following the merger (regardless of whether the individual had previously been the 
representative of the former EEPTU or AEU members). The union reported that the old 
union loyalties had now disappeared and that two of the sites had stewards and deputies 
from within the same craft discipline.
Relationships with the union centrally were revised following the merger. Members in 
McVities were aware of steps to extend co-operation even prior to the merger. Joint courses 
on multi-skilling or the NVQ were organised and the two unions were encouraged to meet 
together and pursue similar objectives. Steps were taken to capitalise on this closer working 
arrangement through the publication of joint material and publicity. Following the merger
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the degree of integration was more noticeable. The union locally was aware of an efficiency 
review operating within the union to orchestrate the integration of branches. Joint research, 
legal, education and media facilities were established and membership services were 
pooled. The union released some staff from support frmctions. The integration process was 
overseen by the jointly established NEC and undertaken by frmctional managers (primarily 
of the AEU) headed by the two joint Deputy General Secretaries in relation to organisation.
The McVities' craft group was not integrated into a geographical network of joint branches 
it was organised along Company lines, i bis resulted in a speedy integration of the former 
AEU and EEPTU branches. A single branch financed by a single payment from the union 
centrally was being paid within about six months of the merger. Robert Clarke reported that 
branch funds post merger decreased slightly following the merger (but it is unclear the 
degree to which this reflected the slight decline in membership). A full-time official from 
the union was allocated to the McVities’ branch of the union after the merger. Prior to the 
merger both unions had been able to call upon the support of a national officer at the 
respective union's head offices, but negotiations had been overseen by a regional official. 
After the merger a Peter Storey, a national officerl based in Cudham, Kent, was appointed 
as the McVities’ contact in 1996 and Byron Jones, the previos contact, took early 
retirement. The allocation of full-time official to oversee bargaining was initially unpopular 
and the members of the craft group expressed some dissatisfaction to the national union.
The Bargaining Agenda: Neither the Company nor the union detected any change in the 
way in which the bargaining agenda was determined or the range of the issues covered.
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According to the Company, prior to the merger the union had concentrated overwhelmingly 
on lifting either basic pay or shift premia. There had been no additional claims associated 
with fringe benefits or training by the late 1980s and, not surprisingly, no claims based on 
extending equal opportunities. The union had adopted a very traditional stance. Where the 
union had been willing to negotiate on issues outside remuneration, the discussion had 
arisen largely as at the behest of management. The negotiations on the Blue Pages 
proposals, for example, which covered shift premia, overtime pay, team working, working 
patterns and up-skilling, were all discussed in response to management proposals. Phil 
Asquith claimed that the Company’s desire to reduce costs in die craft group generated a 
narrow bargaining agenda on which the union had no choice but to concentrate. He claimed 
that craft employees were largely on the defensive during the period 1986-96 and this led to 
a concentration on basic pay at the expense of other employee benefits. He stated that only 
when the Company started to make real in-roads into the up-skilling initiative were the 
union ahle to began to extend their claims to include some form of job security agreement 
and claims relating to the quality of training on offer. This was indicative, Asquith claimed, 
of the union’s defensive position that the agenda was only broadened Wien the union had 
no option but to accept the cross-skilling initiative.
This view was not accepted by the union. The view of union members was that the most 
important function of the union was to extend and protect living standards. As a result, the 
union concentrated on remuneration since this was the primary concern of their members. If 
an additional payment for participating in the up-skilling programme could not be attained, 
the union stressed, then there was no point in discussing other initiatives. A standard "going
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rate " had heen established across manufacturing for participation in cross skilling initiatives 
and the attainment of this was the union’s primary concern in the negotiations. Peter Storey 
argued that to see the union's concentration on basic pay as narrow was to misconceive the 
situation. As a result of the merger, he claimed, the union was better equipped to discuss 
skilling. There was a thorough understanding of the full range of craft skills in the union and 
the union has a great deal of pooled knowledge in relation to up-skilling initiatives. The 
merger had facilitated a greater understanding of up-skilling in general and he cited the 
attendance of all stewards on a week long union course on the issue in 1994 as evidence. 
Far from the narrowness of the bargaining agenda reflecting a defensive approach by the 
union, he argued that the union had managed to prevent discussion on the area in the 
absence of the company’s commitment to pay for participation in a scheme. The focus of 
the bargaining agenda demonstrated a degree of control by the union in response to a range 
of managerial proposals which failed to reward the employees.
Clearly it is difficult to assess which of these interpretations represents the actual position. 
Whether the bargaining agenda was narrowed as a result of management pressure to discuss 
skilling or a union response to the absence of a gateway payment to discuss skilling is 
unclear. What is clear, however, is that when, for whatever reason the agenda was widened, 
the union was prepared for negotiations on secondary issues and , by all accounts, present 
the material with vigour. Storey claims that the union's changed tack to open negotiations 
on job security, the quality of training and the degree to which qualifications were 
recognised and to demonstrate a degree of maturity amongst the union team. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that the merger, with its opportunity to exchange information and
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learn from  past experience, som ehow contributed to this.
Summary and Conclusions
The union merger does not seem to have had any overwhelming influence on power 
relations at McVities’. Where it has had an impact the focus has been formahsing the single 
tahle bargaining arrangement within the company and facilitating a closer working 
relationship between craft employees of different disciplines at the sites through better 
communication and administrative arrangements.
Since the merger it was claimed that the craft has developed a unitary approach to employee 
relations issues in Wiich the union came to share many of the company’s goals. This joint 
outlook has contributed to a growing appreciation of the range of craft skills and the pooling 
of a range of information on terms and skills development. The union also claimed tiiat in 
formalising the close working relationship which existed between the engineers and the 
electricians before the merger, the craft group were able to expand on structure that had 
already been developed and this led to a strong sense of integration and a renewed sense of 
confidence within the craft group.
Structurally the formation of the new union helped the union to communicate with members 
and to respond quickly to fresh developments. The union found it easier to co-ordinate 
action between different disciplines from within the same organisational framework. The 
union also found it difficult to obtain a mandate from the membership. The allocation of a
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full time official to union members in McVities’ was not popular amongst the members 
who saw it as an attempt to erode their autonomy. Nevertheless access to a full time official 
did improve the access to professional advice and access to bargaining information freom 
what had been available previously.
As far as the Company was concerned the main impact of the merger was to formalise some 
of the features of the joint working arrangements between the electricians and the engineers. 
In so doing the merger facilitated the bargaining arrangements with the union and the speed 
with which a joint union position could be developed. In addition the Company was able to 
secure a single representative for the craft group at each site.
The degree to which the merger consolidated or extended union power in bargaining by 
extending the availabihty of comparative information on claims from a range of other 
companies and contributing to a vibrant and confident craft outlook is difficult to gauge. 
However it is clear in maintaining the established position against the more hostile sections 
of the Blue Pages agreement the merger did not weaken the union's position. In defending 
members from job losses, maintaining and extending levels of pay and preserving union 
facilities the merged union managed to protect its membership and representation rights. 
Where the union merger can be clearly seen to have extended union power is in relation to 
developing an integrated craft position when management pursued a fi^sh up-skilling 
initiative in the 1990s. The way in which the union identified the dangers associated with 
the policy and the information that was presented in pursuit of a "going rate" for compliance 
with the initiative, indicated that the union had secured access to improved information
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from across industry. In facilitating a fully integrated union response on skilling including 
joint training, publicity and access to expert advice, overseen by a dedicated full time officer 
in particular, the merger can be held to have contributed to a growth in union bargaining 
power within McVitie's.
Northern Rock Building Society
The Northern Rock Building Society was a medium sized regionally focused building 
society until its merger wiüi die Nordi of England society took it into the Building Society 
Association's top ten societies. The Society has expanded from a strong identity amongst 
customers in the North East to take advantage of the opportunities available from financial 
deregulation. The Northern Rock product range has heen expanded to include loans, 
insurance, assurance and financial planning. Despite the extension of the product range, the 
Society remains focused primarily on the mortgage market and it has been outspoken in its 
defence of mutuahty.
Trade unionism has not heen particularly prevalent in the building society sector in contrast 
to other areas of the finance sector. Interest by bank employees in the National Union of 
Bank Employees led to the establishment of the in-house staff associations at the major high 
street banks. The pattern of in-house staff representation, a pragmatic response of employers 
to keep independent unionism at bay, quickly established itself as the norm in the sector. 
Most building societies set up their own in-house staff body run by employees and often 
funded by the employer.
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The Northern Rock Building Society Staff Association was formed in 1968 to represent the 
views of the employees to the Society's management. All staff below the grade of branch 
management were eUgible to join the Association and density was high. Initially the 
Association was sponsored hy the Society who contributed financial support, provided 
rooms and facilities and permitted a staff member to be seconded to Association duties on a 
part-time basis. In 1974 the Association, known as NORSA, was granted a certificate of 
independence by the Certification office.
The Association and the Society met regularly to discuss the full range of terms and 
conditions within the Society. Pay negotiations were conducted annually and the Society 
was happy to respond to the Association claim. The Association maintained a high level of 
density, (68% on average), amongst the employees and this figure remained fairly constant 
as the Society sought to expand both its product base, the number of markets in which it 
operated and its branch network to become a full national society in the 1980s. During this 
period the number of people employed by the society expanded rapidly fi-om just over 
1,200 in 1979 to over 3,000by the late eighties.
The increase in employment at the Society and the maintenance of a high density level 
meant that NORSA increased rapidly without the requirement to finance recruitment drives 
and campaigns. Brian Richards, Chairman of the Association 1990-92, stated that 
employment in the organisation expanded so quickly that the Association "^'didn't really 
have to recruit new members at all - they just kept walking through the door”. By 1989, the
255
Association had over 2,400 members and a healthy financial surplus generated fi-om 
subscription income. Although the growth in the organisation was welcome, Richards 
concluded, it also placed additional pressures on the Association. Up until then the 
Association had provided a very focused range of services to the membership including 
representation, a quarterly newsletter and some financial discounts. The growth in 
membership meant that the Association, which was still administered by part-time 
secondees, found it increasingly difficult to meet the growing aspirations of the membership 
or even to keep an accurate record of members details.
These problems were exacerbated further buy the economic development and increased 
competition in the finance sector which resulted in job losses and branch closures within 
building society. Given the economic environment, concluded Richards, it became clear 
that a greater level of expertise and professionalism was necessary in order to protect the 
members interests. Members were requiring more detailed information on their rights and 
protection, particularly in relation to health and safety. It was no longer enough for the 
Association to focus on the annual pay increase to address the concerns of the membership.
The merger process - Whilst the rapid growth of the Society followed by the contraction of 
employment within the sector created pressures on the Association to look to the support of 
a larger organisation, the Banking union BIFU identified a merger with independent unions 
in the sector as a way of staving off the pressure resulting from job losses in the High Street 
banks. The Strategy for Growth was developed by Bernadette Fisher, herself a fonner 
employee of the Halifax BS Staff Association, who was employed specifically to raise the
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union's profile with smaller unions and push for mergers with BIFU. The strategy appears 
very aggressive, smaller unions were cold called and members of the Executive invited to a 
presentation and video at BIFU offices,. The momentum for the campaign stemmed firom 
the expectation that the wave of anticipated joh losses in banking meant that the union has 
to diversify its coverage to the insurance and building society sectors.
Contact between NORSA and BIFU began in April 1988 when the Executive Committee of 
the union attended a presentation firom the BIFU. One month later NORSA representatives 
attended die union's annual delegate conference. Brian Richards recalls that members of the 
Executive were encouraged to meet with BIFU members from the Birmingham Midshires 
BS Staff Association which had transferred its engagements to BIFU in the previous year. 
Richards recalled BIFU basing their appeal on the range of benefits available to the 
membership from being a part of a larger organisation in which the budding society staff 
had protected representation by guaranteed membership of the BIFU NEC. Fears that the 
union was too big were countered by explanations that the budding societies had their own 
section, with autonomy for pohcy decisions and a designated fud-fime official. NORSA 
were impressed by the range of safeguards that the larger union were prepared to offer. The 
smader union was offered a subscription rate that was frozen at current level and increased 
gradually so that it did not meet standard subscription rates for almost five years. The 
Association was given the option of hailing out of any transfer agreement up to two years 
after the transfer detads had been agreed.
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Fisher for BIFU put the approach and the way in which it was targeted into some kind of 
context. She stated that the recruitment of the Northern Rock Staff Association was seen as 
important politically for the consolidation of the union's presence in the building society 
sector. In 1988, although the union had recognition rights in seven building societies, these 
were all small societies with the exception of the medium-sized Midshires. BIFU identified 
the Northern Rock as being a useful way of raising the profile of the union in the sector and 
recruiting staff associations fi-om some other smaller societies or even one of the major 
societies such as the Halifax.
Throughout 1988 there were a series of negotiations between the Association and the union 
and by the middle of 1989 both bodies were ready to proceed with a transfer of 
engagements. At this stage the management of the society were informed of the 
Association's intentions. The Society was initially suspicious. Michael Jackson, the former 
Chief Executive of the Society, reported that the society feared the influence of an external 
body on their staff and employment policy.
They also feared that operating in a "proper" trade union environment there would be a 
greater tendency to resist management proposals and to embark on campaigns of disruption. 
Finally the society feared that the union would have more impact on the Society’s ability to 
make decisions quickly and to respond to market pressure and developments. In the end , 
however, the Society was won round to the idea of dealing with a fully professional system 
of employee representation and industrial relations. This was at least in part due to the 
commitment that BIFU would honour the existing (and legally binding) recognition
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agreement and disputes resolution procedure.
BIFU was prepared to concentrate considerable resources on securing employer support for 
the merger, according to Fisher, on the grounds that whenever unions transferred into the 
union there was the risk of derecognition by the employer. (This did indeed happen three 
years later when the managers of the North of England society derecognised BIFU when the 
former staff association agreed to transfer its engagements). Fisher indicated that the union 
would often stress the benefits of dealing with a professional body with expert legal advice 
and good communication systems and the availability of cross-sector data from negotiations 
with other employers.
By the end of 1989 the transfer of engagements with BIFU was complete and NORSA 
moved into the Building Society Section of the larger union. The Association maintained its 
existing council and decision making machinery but maintained links access to the wider 
union through a full-time official and representation on the Institutional Committee of the 
Building Society Section. The mechanics of the merger hroadly followed the transfer 
arrangement applied to all other incoming staff associations and it is reasonable to assume 
that structurally NORSA had little impact on the union. Where the influence of the partner 
was much more acute, was in relation to the negotiations over union funds and membership 
subscriptions. NORSA, negotiated amongst other things, a two year subscription freeze and 
the option of becoming independent again (with their funds in tact) if the relationship with 
BIFU did not work out at any point during the first five years of joining BIFU.
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We have already noted the difficulties associated with any assessment of the extent to which 
the merger or transfer has an impact on bargaining power. In this case, this is likely to be 
even more difficult given the rapid rate of change during the period across the finance 
sector. The extension of new products and technology, job losses and deregulation may all 
have a significant impact on trade union power and all of these may mask the effects of the 
merger. Although the Northern Rock BS performed well during the eighties and managed to 
consolidate its market position and product range in the industry, it was not able to escape 
the huge competitive pressures on societies or the crippling level of bad dept across the 
sector. Towards the end of the eighties employment in the Society peaked at over 3,000 and 
the Society began to cut back on its level of staff in the early nineties. Initially voluntary 
severance and early retirement were apphed but some instances of compulsory redundancy 
were also recorded.
The degree to which the merger and the involvement of a larger union body had an impact 
on the outcome of negotiations is documented below. Although a straight comparison of the 
position prior to the merger with the situation post merger may not properly account for the 
full range of external indicators it provides a useful starting place for the study particularly 
when the results are examined in the context of the economic environment and market 
conditions as well as any internal review procedures that were underway.
Pay settlements - As the chart below indicates the trends in pay for the staff at the Northern 
Rock mirrored, but consistently exceeded, the level of inflation. In real terms staff pay prior
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to the merger in 1989 consistently leapt ahead of the level of price increases to deliver a real 
increase in the standard of Uving for members.
In each year, the settlement agreed with NORSA dehvered higher awards than inflation and 
was, in general, comparable with other settlements across the finance sector. It is probably 
worth stressing that in the period of the mid to late eighties the financial services sector 
expanded rapidly. Inflation was riding quite high so the level of increases awarded may will 
reflect anticipated changes in the cost of hving as well as any changes in union bargaining 
power. Competition for skilled staff intensified in the sector and the desire to retain skills 
may also affect the level of settlement. Interestingly, although the negotiations with 
NORSA always resulted in an inflation-plus deal the negotiations process was usually 
concluded quite quickly. The longest period for which pay negotiations were conducted 
seems to have been in 1987 when there were four meetings, mainly because a new 
performance related pay system was under discussion. There are no records of the union 
threatening any campaigns or action of even wishing to resolve the pay claim to 
independent arbitration in line with the procedural agreement that they had with the Society. 
The Association also failed to prevent (or arguably even resist) the introduction of 
performance related pay although one could arguë with some legitimacy that the employees 
were still receiving an inflation plus increase.
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NORSA Pay Increases and Inflation
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994
RPI 4.3 5.7 7.2 8.4 9.45 5.9 3.7 1.55 1.8
NORSA 5.0 6.2 8.4 9.2 10.4 11.0 3.75 2.2 2.1
After the merger in 1989 the level of increase grows to reflect the prevalence of higher 
levels of inflation. Initially the transfer may have enhanced, or at least facilitated, effective 
pay bargaining for the differential between the level of inflation and the settlement is large. 
There are undoubtedly market based reasons for these gaps but it certainly appears that the 
merger with BIFU has not harmed the Association’s abihty to protect and extend its 
members' income. What is more interesting, however, is how the merger may have affected 
the process of pay bargaining, Immediately after tiie merger tiie process is constrained and 
agreement secured relatively quickly, however, the in the 1990s perhaps as a result of 
economic factors and/or perhaps due to the impact of the merger-the bargaining process is 
drawn out and a noticeable change in the culture of bargaining in the society occurs. In both 
1992 and'l 995* thelmionTontinûëd tff barpiiTuhtirthe process was exHausted and iiTboth 
years the level of increase was ultimately determined by compulsory arbitration, the last 
stage of the procedure.
The Society are not keen to recognised any difference in pay negotiations pre and post 
merger and they argue that they were negotiations took place in the^same culture, were 
regulated in the same way and were often conducted with the same individuals. Where there
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is a difference in the bargaining process, it is argued that the underlying reasons were 
economic and not a sign of BIFlTs influence. The Society, was forced into a difficult 
position on pay by recession and had already identified the requirement for job losses. For 
BIFU, the negotiating officer David Evans stated that the pay round was extremely tough on 
these occasions and that the union pushed the settlement to arbitration. However he claims 
that there was a significant cultural dimension attributable to BIFU that enabled the 
Association to push the negotiations to arbitration and break with their past practice. He 
claimed that staff could put the responsibility for protracted negotiations on their 
professional negotiator from BIFU and escape any responsibility for delaying a settlement 
themselves. In other words the professional status and independence of BIFU was used as a 
cover by staff who, until they transferred to BIFU, would have been too closely identified 
with the bargaining strategy to push the negotiations to independent arbitration despite the 
facihty in their agreement to do so.
Skilling - The impact of the union merger on the development of skills in the Society was 
marginal according to both the union and the Company. Unlike engineering, initiatives on 
training and re-skilling were not pursued through the negotiating structure. The
development of-skiUsandthe paceof re-skiUing wëre'dfivên tiÿêithërnëwtëchnology and 
computerisation, requiring all staff to develop keyboard skills, for example, or marketing 
initiatives such as the development of a range of telephone services or the integration of the 
sale of mortgages and insurance pohcies.
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Equal Oppor^ities - In contrast the decision of the Association to merge with BIFU may 
have had a significant impact on the development of equal opportunities within the Society. 
Although the Society had negotiated an equal opportunities policy with the Association 
prior to the merger of BIFU, this was based primarily on the Society's legal obligations. The 
Society had a formal equal opportunities statement, maternity policy, fair recruitment and 
promotion procedures and some flexible working arrangements.
Following the merger there was a major campaign in the union on equal opportunities. 
"Equality in Action" ran between 1990-92, it was a nationally driven initiative in which the 
union tried to co-ordinate bargaining on several equality issues. Companies were 
encouraged to undertake an equality audit with the union, to extend flexible work patterns 
and opportunities, to provide suitable childcare and to bring the terms and conditions of 
part-time employees into Une with their fidl time coUeagues.
At the Northern Rock the union claims in 1990, 1991 and 1992 aU included some reference 
to improving terms in relation to equal opportunities. Some of the claims were agreed 
during the negotiations. The equal opportunities statement was reviewed and the Society 
discussed flexible working with the union. The terms and conditions of part-time employees 
were brought into line with ftdl-time employees in 1992 (not including access of part-time 
staff to the pension scheme) and in 1993 the Society introduced a formal harassment policy. 
Claims for the extension of maternity leave and for some childcare provision were not 
successful. Nevertheless, the union and society made significant inroads on equaUty at work 
and these initiatives have hy and large increased. The achievements can be linked to the
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influence of the central union’s campaign. According to Ed Blisset, the equality researcher, 
the banks and major employers in the sector, in anticipation of labour and skill shortages 
had shown some renewed interest in equahty initiatives in order to recruit and retain skilled 
female staff. Midland Bank, for example, launched a network of workplace nurseries in 
1992 and Barclays Bank agreed pro-rata pay for part timers and allowed access to the 
pension scheme that same year. Blisset claims that the union was able to disseminate 
information on these initiatives and on why the larger employers were pushing for an 
extension of equal opportunities. The union placed pressure on the small and medium-sized 
employers to develop their own policies and to respond to labourmarket pressures.
It is arguable that the extent to which the unions secondary role in generating some 
movement on equality can be said to demonstrate an increase in union bargaining power. As 
opposed to placing pressure on the employer to fall behind union demands, the approach 
that the union took to their campaign was that the extension of equal opportunities made 
good business sense and offered employers a way of cutting employee turnover and 
retaining skills. As Blisset stated "The arguments for extending these policies were 
presented very much as a win-win". Of course, it can be argued that negotiations on equal 
opportunities were evidence of an extension of union power through BIFU being able to 
harness a national campaigning machine and combine this with high quality information on 
competitors in the sector. The union was able to put pressure on the employer in several 
ways (not least that it was a reasonable and sensible thing to do) in a way that a small 
independent Association was not able to do.
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Job Security - Again the impact of a national union campaign combined with the labour 
market factors to generate a common interest between employers and employees to 
introduce a pohcy on job security. In the early 1990s, despite the long-term predictions of 
skill and labour shortages in the sector, the intensity of competition in the sector combined 
with deregulation of markets was leading to a wave of job losses and predicted future job 
losses. The Association had never negotiated on collective job losses and there was no joh 
security arrangement in place when the union merger took place in 1989. BIFU launched a 
major campaign on job losses in the sector on job security. Fart of the "Job Sate" campaign 
was to co-ordinate a push for joh security agreements in all the employers with whom the 
union negotiated. In 1991, the agreement of a job security agreement was the number one 
priority for the union negotiator and all agreements had to go back to the NEC for approval. 
The intention was for the union to prevent any compulsory redundancy in the sector by 
creating a web of no compulsory redundancy clauses in joh security agreements. In practice, 
it quickly became clear that most employers would not commit themselves to avoiding 
compulsory redundancies. Most, like the Northern Rock, stated that redundancy would only 
be considered when other options like alternative work or redeployment had heen fully 
considered. BIFU signed the agreement with the Northern Rock late in 1991.
There is a problem in trying to assess the impact of the union and its campaign on the 
introduction of a job security agreement. Again it may be argued that the Society were 
looking to pursue an initiative in this area (after all, the agreement did ultimately legitimise 
any redundancies that were made under it and the Society claims to have identified the need
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for job losses very early during the downturn). The fact that an agreement alone was signed 
is hardly an illustration of any increase in union power. However the agreement introduced 
at the Northern Rock was based very closely on the union's model agreement without the 
crucial clause on compulsory redundancy. Moreover, the agreement did seem to serve its 
members well. In contrast to some other Building Societies in the sector including 
Nationwide, Halifax and Birmingham Midshires all of vbom announced the start of their 
job loss programme in 1991, the Northern Rock did not start to make redundancies until 
1993/4.
Membership - Union membership is always dependent on the number of employees who 
work for an organisation. The merger with NORSA, combined with a period in which there 
was a major contraction of employment opportunities in the sector. NORSA always had a 
high density rate amongst the Society's employees in the grades for which they were 
recognised and this was maintained following the merger with BIFU. According to BIFU, 
membership in the Society was fairly steady and generally reflected working patterns in the 
Society. In 1989 there were about 3,000 employees of whom about 1,700 were members. 
Density amongst the group eligible to be members was about 60% and this figure appears to 
have remained stable even though some jobs have gone.
Although this suggests that the union has protected the membership density in the Society 
this does not tell the full story. The geographical base of the organisation through the branch 
network extended considerably, particularly in the South East and London, in the 1980s and 
density amongst employee working in these areas is traditionally lower than in the Society’s
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North East heartland. In practice there may have been considerably effort made (or power 
exercised) by BIFU to maintain density with the spread of geographical coverage.
Industrial Action - Industrial action (whether employees have become more wiling to 
embark on collective action to secure their aims) is not a suitable measurement of union 
power following the merger in this case study. BIFU agreed to take on representation of 
employees under the Society's existing procedural agreement with the Association. The 
agreement includes a clause which refers the parties to final (and binding) arbitration in the 
event of a dispute. There are no records of the procedure being breached although the union 
has shown a greater propensity to push issues through to final arbitration in order to obtain a 
satisfactory remedy to problems.
Culture - BIFU were keen to stress the cultural changes that they attributed to the merger 
and which they claimed had led to a significant change in the conduct of negotaitions ’with 
the Society. David Evans, the negotiator responsible for bargaining with the Society up until 
1995, claimed that following the merger the employees saw themselves as less reliant on the 
Society and fi-eer to pursue an independent line. The negotiations became more formal and 
agreements were drafted more carefully and made more widely available.
The Society do not entirely concur with this view, arguing that the impact of the union was 
to make bargaining more formal without having a noticable impact on the way in which 
bargaining was conducted or the issues discussed. Certainly the general fi-amework to 
bargaining remained unchanged post-merger, but meetings were planned much further in
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advance and with a pre-determined agenda. Minutes of meetings were published quickly 
and widely circulated. Information was requested from the Society prior to negotiating 
meetings. The Society agreed that the union had added some professionalism to the 
bargaining process and that the influence of the union's external contacts was visible in the 
negotiations post-merger. The union referred to national union campaigns and the pohcies 
and practices in a range of other companies. Management encouraged this approach since 
they valued information about what was happening elsewhere. The Society considered this 
a major benefit of negotiating with a trade union.
Bargaining Agenda - The bargaining agenda has heen extended since the merger to 
include campaigns on equality of opportunity and job security. The degree to which this 
generally indicates any concerted effort by the Bunion to place issues on the agenda is open 
to some debate. In the case of job security and equal opportunities, for example, the union 
made the claims based on specific campaigns co-ordinated at a national level. This indicates 
either that the union has succeeded in securing the issues on the agenda or, at least, an 
anticipation of the issues that the Society would wish to discuss during the negotiations. In 
either case it suggests some influence on the bargaining agenda that was not demonstarted 
by the Association. On some issues, like RSI or the introduction of COSHH there is no 
doubt that the Society would not have discussed these issues with the Association. However 
the union, with its specialised support services and access to practice across the sector was 
well-placed to lead the negotiations on these issues. In some instances like the union 
campaign to record bank and building society raids (raidwatch) or to ensure that post 
traumatic stress counselling was available to all employees, the union was instrumental in
269
placing the issue on the bargaining table and pushing the employers to introduce effective 
policies for staff.
Representation - Internally the way the union was organised, the range of services it 
offered and the facilities available to members all changed considerably following the 
merger. The union was still provided with an office and equipment, phones and time off. 
The number of employees seconded to union duties remained the same following the 
merger - one post dedicated entirely to union administration. Although for the main part 
there was no change in facilities there was a significant increase in time off for employees to 
attend national union committees. The Northern Rock section contributed delegates to the 
Building Society section of BIFU as well as to issue based committees such as the security 
committee (dealing with bank and building , society raids), the equal rights committee and 
the Pensions committee. On a rota basis, the Chair of the Northern Rock section was also 
appointed to the National Executive Committee. Clearly the NR employees were keen to 
get involved in the union nationally and the effect of mixing with other employees from 
different parts of the sector had a noticeable impact on the bargaining culture.
The professional support available to the union was increased dramatically post-merger. 
Prior to the merger the Association had no access to professional support and was reliant on 
journals and external training for specialist information. Following the merger the 
Association was offered the services of a professional negotiator and a series of professional 
support services including education, pensions and legal advice, research, an equality officer 
and campaigning and media services. The range of personal services available to members
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also increased. Members received a range of services and special offers including 
discounted holidays, insurance, discounts and road recovery. Members also received the 
union newspaper and regular communication mailings.
The level of subscriptions and the financial arrangements for the administration of the union 
were unchanged for three years after the merger and then they were gradually brought into 
line with other areas of the organisation. BIFU had argued that the union was fi-ee to leave 
the merger with no loss within two years (and on a sliding scale up to five years) of the 
arrangement. Union subscriptions were raised to Blf U's standard level in two stages and the 
money allocated to the NR committee, was brought into line with other areas of the union. 
The latter was achieved by fi-eezing current funding arrangements for the section and not by 
cutting back grants to the branches.
Union organisation - The process hy which the Northern Rock BS Staff Association was 
courted to transfer its engagement to BIFU, meant that one of the major reassurances which 
had to be offered the smaller union was the protection of their autonomy and the 
preservation of their independent decision-making machinery. The smaller union obtained 
several guarantees relating tfr union stmclure and finances prior to the merger. In agreeing 
to protect the Association's structure and guarantee their fiinances for two years BIFU 
viewed the relationship as an important development in opening the Building Society sector 
up to union membership rather than for the members and finances that NORSA would 
deliver in the short-term.
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The merger process to accommodate the Association within BIFU was arranged in much 
the same way as the transfer of the Birmingham Midshires had been arranged some months 
earher. The existing structure of the Association transferred in its present form into the 
Building Society Section of BIFU . It finances and level of expenditure on administration, 
campaigns etc was protected for a two year period during which time the Association would 
have access to BIFUs support services for free.
Following the union, the Northern Rock Section Committee had the freedom to make their 
own decisions and draw up their own bargaining priorities provided that these did not 
conflict with either NEC or conference resolutions (no sections of the union, for example, 
were allowed to lodge a claim for private health care). All sections of the union were 
encouraged (but not obhged) to participate in union campaigns and co-ordinated bargaining.
BIFU did not make any attempt to mould or amend the structure of the smaller partner and 
the transfer had no impact whatsoever outside the Building Society section other than to 
increase the workload of the support section. For the first two years BIFU was content to 
demonstrate the advantages of a professional union organisation by allowing the 
Association to have discounted access to its professional and personal services. When the 
two year moratorium on subscription levels and finances came to an end at the heginning of 
1992, BIFU initiated the first of the two stage increase in subscriptions and renegotiated the 
funding of the branch network.. The money allocated to the Association as branch funds 
was substantially less than the Association had enjoyed before the merger but the 
Association enjoyed access to agreater range of union support services.
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That BIFU should not undertake a formal efficiency review of its smaller partner may be an 
indication of the relationship between the two and what the parties hoped to secure from the 
merger. The fact that BIFU was keen to secure the merger in order to gain credibility for its 
emerging building society section meant that it was prepared to offer guarantees on 
independence and autonomy to the incoming body. The Association in return prided its self- 
on its relative independence within BIFU and the access it has secured to a range of 
professional services.
Summary and Conclusions
The degree to which the decision by the NORSA to transfer their engagements into BIFU 
affected bargaining power and influence is difficult to assess in isolation given the hundreds 
of other factors which, potentially, have an impact on bargaining. Nevertheless some clear, 
broad conclusions can be drawn. The merger had very little impact on the structural or 
internal dynamics of the smaller union. The bargaining framework, level of membership, 
and union facilities all remained more or less the same post-merger and the larger union did 
not intrude in the internal operation of the former Association until it sought to renegotiate 
branch funds some two years after the merger.
The merger had, by all accounts, more of an impact on the culture in which bargaining was 
conducted and the issues which were placed on the bargaining agenda. There also appears to 
have been some move to formalise the bargaining process so that the union were obhged to 
present a formal claim to which managers were invited to respond. Meetings between the
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Society and the union were scheduled a long time in advance and were always properly 
minuted. In addition where technical issues were under deliberation the union side might 
opt to bring a specialist from head office. In addition, the range of issues pursued by the 
union increased considerably post merger as the members had access to information on the 
practices in other companies and the union ran a series of national campaigns across the 
sector. Several initiatives on equal opportunities were taken up by the Society and for the 
first time is formal job security agreement for staff was agreed.
The impact of the merger on the provision of secondary support services to assist 
negotiators should not be underestimated. Both the Company and the union reported that 
the negotiations following the merger were a lot more informed. Negotiators were able to 
draw on substantial benchmark evidence and the impact of recent legislation or case law. 
The Society expressed their support for the more professional way in which negotiations 
with staff were now conducted.. In particular, the range of comparative data from other 
employers in the sector and the manner in which was deployed during the negotiations was 
the factor that impressed management most and that resulted from the merger!
Finally, the merger seems to have had some impact on the culture of industrial relations and 
collective bargaining in the Society. Although such developments are extremely difficult to 
measure the union indicated that members felt that they enjoyed a greater level of protection 
and were less open to the Society’s influence after the merger There was more scope fotr 
the union to formulate claims and to exhaust bargaining procedures during the negotiations. 
Collectively, as a group the employees are reluctant to settle during the earlier stages of the
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procedure and more willing to press the Society for an arbitrated settlement.
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9. STRENGTH IN NUMBERS? - DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS
The research on mergers has traditionally been rooted in a study of the causes and pre­
merger perceptions underpinning union merger activity. Whilst, this study does give some 
(brief) considerations to the pre-merger aspirations of the partners, it is far more concerned 
with the mechanism by which a merger is executed and the consequences of the merger 
when it has been completed on trade union power.
Summary of Main Findings
Having considered the findings from the questionnaire survey and the case studies, both 
generally and in relation to developments in the sector and industry, it is now time to turn 
attention to drawing out some of the general themes. There are some common themes 
arising from merger activity during this period, notably that the effect of union mergers in 
general seems to be to anq)lify and draw into focus the existing nature of industrial 
relations between a trade union and employer. In so doing the effect of a trade union 
merger can be held to be dependent both on the sector and industry in which it occurs and 
general developments in industrial relations.
The study shows that the rapid increase in trade union merger activity in the period 1988-97 
was primarily a response to environmental factors (declining employment in key sectors, 
falling union membership, managerial hostility) placing financial pressures on the 
organisation. There is no evidence from the unions that merger activity was a strategic
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response to secure and extend trade union influence and collective bargaining. Mergers 
were an attempt to stave off financial pressures resulting from a falling membership by 
securing access to more resources, more members in existing and new areas of employment 
and economies of scale. Where there was any intention to develop mergers into a 
springboard for approaching flesh areas of potential membership this was very much a 
secondary objective in the majority of mergers. Although some mergers can demonstrate a 
key strategic importance (for example the foray of the EEPTU into representation of white 
collar staff and managerial employees or BIFLTs attempt to extend representation from 
banking into building societies) the membership involved was small in comparison witii 
mergers for other reasons over the period.
The majority of mergers, identified by the large incentives and underlying motives to 
merge, were in Undy’s (1981) classification “consolidatorÿ\ That is to say mergers 
between two or more unions rooted in common or compatible sectors or occupations, 
designed to preserve the status and position of the partners in a difficult political and 
economic environment which threatened the decline of the unions involved. The second 
type of merger prevalent throughout the period, and indeed the most common in terms of 
the number of actual mergers completed (as opposed to members covered), was the 
predatory or ‘‘aggressive ” merger in which a smaller union or staff association opted to 
transfer its engagements to a larger partner. There is a degree of confusion about the extent 
to which these mergers, fall into the ‘'‘aggressive/defensive ” category (as defined by Undy 
(1981)) which stems from the way in which the motives underpinning a merger can be 
interpreted in several ways and from a variety of viewpoints. Many of the mergers during
277
the period of the study, for example, may initially appear aggressive or defensive but the 
survey respondents suggest a desire to consolidate the union’s existing position in the 
motives. Smaller unions, it appears, were attracted to larger ones for a degree of security 
and financial backing which would effectively preserve their organisation when faced with 
a loss of influence or power. In cases where small partners amalgamate with a large partner 
this was seen as a way of preserving (consoUdating) a level of service provision for 
members in an increasingly complex labour market. Conversely, some larger unions 
embarked on mergers with smaller unions in order to consolidate their status and influence 
by securing a presence and potential for growth in a new sector.
The trend in larger and smaller unions merging in order to protect themselves from a degree 
of decline and loss of influence also proved to be the catalyst for the emergence of the 
federated union organisatiop. For the purposes of this study, a structure in which 
participants ostensibly retained their independent structures but which allowed them to 
secure economic and pohtical influence through pooling their external services and 
expertise has been classed as a merger. It was the primary attraction of the federated 
structure that the unions involved could consohdate their existing position through securing 
economies of scale and shared services (hence the inclusion of the structure in this study) 
without being forced to compromise their independence.
Power
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The investigation into how the merger process affected Bargaining power confirmed that 
any study o f the power concept is fraught with difficulty given the variety o f ways in which 
power can be defined and the range o f political and economic influences on power and the 
difficulty in isolating inter-related factors to assess their impact. My research did attempt to 
define bargaining power in a meaningful way for the study. Firstly, bargaining power was 
analysed in relation to a range of factors including the outcome of decisions on issues 
discussed over the bargaining table. The nature of collective negotiation means that much of 
the focus of bargaining power may be away fi"om the area in which negotiations take place 
and is concentrated instead for example on creating a favourable backdrop against which 
collective negotiations can take place. Unions and employers allocate considerable 
resources to influencing the political or economic environment in which negotiations are 
conducted and in persuading the media and the pubhc to back their respective cases. 
Employees and union members are targeted by bargainers hoping to utilise their views and 
support to secure some advantage in the primary dimension of power relations. For this 
reason, in both the survey questionnaire and the subsequent case studies and interviews, an 
attempt was made to look beyond bargaining outcomes and encompass the views and 
aspirations of the practitioners. Collective negotiations were placed within the sectoral and 
economic fi-amework in which they were conducted. In addition, the study sought to look 
beyond the primary dimension of power and control for external determinants of union 
power in both the primary and secondary dimensions. Several sectoral specific 
developments and issues were highlighted as well as factors relating to the economic and 
political environment, trends in wages and pay levels, union membership, legislative 
developments and labour market pohcies - although in practice it is extremely difficult to
279
control for a full range of potential determinants of union power. As Martin's study (1986) 
indicates even the author of the most comprehensive matrix of power indicators was forced 
to resort to a case study approach to assess power changes when faced with the application 
of a model of such complexity. During the study the bargaining performance of unions, post 
merger, was compared with general trends in pay bargaining and employment patterns over 
the period. In addition, specific sectoral factors which may be held to have an impact on 
bargaining in the industry (such as rapid growth, sectoral decline, deregulation initiatives, 
privatisation or re-organisation) have also been considered. Trends emerging from the 
WIRS study (Millward et al, 1992) conducted in 1992 are also identified and apphed. 
Moreover, this study also had to take account of several conflicting responses to questions 
in the questionnaire which made definitive conclusions more difficult to readily identify.
For all these reasons I felt it was necessary to enhance the general overview of the 
consequences of recent mergers with two more detailed studies relating to the Northern 
Rock Building Society and McVitie’s (UK), a part of the United Biscuits Group, in which a 
wider range of indicators can be analysed over time and in a controlled fi-amework. The 
case study approach also allows for an independent assessment of power relations away 
from the subjectivity of survey respondents That said, even a very thorough investigation of 
factors pre and post merger, and the potential impact of a range of external factors, will still 
leave the study open to criticism that a range of factors which may have a direct or indirect 
impact on power have been neglected (or improperly controlled for). This is because the. 
complexity of bargaining interdependencies and power relations and the intricate 
relationship between factors that determine power mean that any study and any control
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system is likely to be unable to account for the full range of potential determinants. That 
said, on the balance of the evidence presented, and recognising the constraints under vshich 
any investigation will be conducted, the following conclusions are apparent.
My research showed no conclusive evidence that union mergers had any impact on 
bargaining power or achievements overall There is no evidence that merged unions were 
more successful in securing pay and benefit increases for their members or in resisting job 
losses than other unions. The success of unions in this area is, of course, difficult to measure 
and it is made additionally complex as year on year comparisons will invariably include the 
negotiated outcomes of unions which merged in the preceding years.
There is no evidence that the major anticipated drawback associated with union mergers 
by employers (that the new organisation would in some way become more disruptive 
following tbe merger) was realised. This was, in the main, the result of confusion 
amongst employers in all industries about from where this disruption was likely to 
emanate. Smaller employers anticipated that merger with a large, professional (and 
affiliated) body would lead to an influx of professional negotiators with a different 
agenda to the employees who had previously negotiated with the firm. In contrast, larger 
employers feared that union mergers would result in over stretched professional 
negotiators leaving more scope for shop floor activists, seen as unrepresentative of the 
general workforce, to become involved in collective bargaining. The perceptions are 
interesting in that they summarised the very different views of trade unions and collective 
bargaining between large and medium sized firms and smaller employers. In this
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instance, however, none of the employers reported that the anticipated fears had been 
realised.
The suggestion that a larger organisation with more members operating in more industries 
and with more resources to draw upon, is therefore more powerful, remains an 
unconvincing proposition. Industrial action in the Post Office and on the railways, for 
example, may be held to demonstrate an increase in power if only through the availability 
of greater resources to sustain the action. However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the newly merged print industries were better placed to resist an orchestrated programme 
of derecognition, for example, than they would have been separately.
There are some differences in the change in power relations depending upon whether the 
merger brings together unions which negotiated separately with the same employer prior to 
the merger and those who have historically negotiated with different employers. In the 
former it seems a natural consequence of post merger organisational change for the 
employer to facilitate single union bargaining arrangements. In particular, the move 
towards single table bargaining and single status employment has been supported by a 
move within unions to break down the organisational boundaries between them. Mergers 
have clearly assisted the move by employers to reform bargaining structures. However, - 
whether or not this is an indication of a reduction in trade union power is less clear since, 
again generally, the move towards integrated bargaining has also been in the interests of 
the union in bedding down the newly integrated structure. For the most part one of the 
aims of the merger for the trade union has been to pool their collective strength in a single
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forum for bargaining. Indeed, in mergers such as those between NUPE and COHSE in the 
NHS, and between the AEU and EEPTU in manufacturing, an anticipated benefit of the 
merger for the parties was the formalisation of the informal joint working relationships 
between members across occupations and grades. Where it was in the union’s interests to 
preserve an element of separate representation in the same union (such as for former 
NALGO members in UNISON in the NHS and local government) however, unions were 
able to facilitate this (on an ongoing basis in the former).
The argument that the reform of bargaining structures and general support for the merger 
by employers cannot necessarily be attributed to a reduction in union power is further 
supported by the fact that, in some instances the employers anticipated major drawbacks 
arising fi-om the merger but that joint representation under the merger went ahead. 
Hammersmith Council anticipated that the formation of UNISON would promote a new 
round of factionalism in hade union inter-relations, whilst ICI reported that a constructive 
relationship with the electricians was likely to be disrupted by the merger with the 
engineers. In both cases single table bargaining was introduced despite the concerns. In 
the case of the North of England Building Society, who derecognised their staff 
association on its merger with BIFU, the fact that they were ultimately obliged to restore 
bargaining arrangements with the union indicates that the merger had a positive impact on 
union power.
On balance, it is fair to say that, despite the fact that reformed bargaining was welcomed 
by the newly merged union in some instances (and despite the maintenance of union
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facilities post merger) generally, the move to new bargaining structures should be seen as 
evidence of a reduction in union power within the period. In general, unions opposed the 
moves towards single table bargaining for different occupational groups but employers in 
manufacturing, local government and health service and others were able to facilitate 
joint representation and a single agreed outcome of negotiations on the back of union 
mergers. The traditional negotiating ploy of securing improvements on the back of 
leapfrogging was no longer an option following the mergers in local government, the 
NHS, manufacturing and to a large extent the civil service.
Therefore the development of single table bargaining arrangements following a merger may 
signal a transfer of power to the employer, given that structural frameworks in bargaining 
that are identified in WIRS. Unions traditionally aim to preserve existing multi-dimensional 
bargaining structures against employer pressure to simplify bargaining arrangements. The 
move to single table bargaining may indicate a shift in post merger power relations 
particularly given that the implementation of revised bargaining structures is not a natural 
consequence of a consohdatory merger. Both UNISON and the PTC, for example, have 
sought to preserve different bargaining structures for different categories of member despite 
now being the common union for a wide range of employees in that sector. Employers 
reported that a re-organisation in union structures resulting fix)m a merger had a direct 
impact on simplifying bargaining structures and reducing costs. The merger was reported to 
complement the development of new initiatives in collective bargaining (such as the move 
to single table negotiation, flexibility agreements, or single status employment.
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Any change in bargaining power amongst unions that are involved in a merger but which 
continue to bargain separately with different employers is very difficult to assess. In many 
cases the merged union continues to negotiate in the same way, with the same employers 
representing the same members. In the survey, employers generally indicated that a merger 
in which the union joined with another but which left the bargaining structures in the 
company unchanged had no impact on collective bargaining structures or negotiated 
outcomes. The employer did not register any changes in bargaining or in the ft-amework of 
negotiations and in most cases the merger did not have a direct structural impact. Although 
it is difficult to draw any conclusion from this evidence, because we cannot determine the 
degree of structural c l^ g e  in bargaining if the union had not been involved in merger , it 
may be that preserving the status quo in bargaining (structure and outcomes) represents a 
significant increase in union power. (WIRS suggests a general employer led initiative to 
revise bargaining structures during this period.) If economic, sectoral and political 
influences result in a general decline in union power (and structural change in bargaining) in 
other companies the ability to preserve the current position (and counteract these pressures) 
suggests a robustness in bargaining power. A conclusive statement is not possible given the 
difficulty of assessing the degree of structural change in companies negotiating with unions 
that have not been' involved in merger.^ The WIRS survey, however, records structural 
changes in bargaining arrangements in 57% of respondents, and we can speculate that, in 
the light of our own evidence, the majority of these would be either involving non-merger 
unions or unions where the merger had a direct impact on simplifying the bargaining 
structures,
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The degree to which union mergers were successful in preserving a union's bargaining 
strength (as opposed to the structural framework) was not a conclusive funding o f the 
survey. Union membership, with few exceptions, continued to decline and not a single 
employer recorded a increase in union density following a merger. There are, of course, 
many inter-related influences on the degree of unionisation and density (not least the 
economic and political environment) and it may be that membership fell more slowly tiian it 
would have done in the absence of the merger. Nevertheless, the merger did not stem 
membership decline absolutely. If maintaining the status quo, or slowing the pace of union 
decline and membership loss, was the object of the consolidatory merger, then unions may 
have achieved their objective. Membership levels in traditional employer strongholds 
remained broadly static, according to the survey responses.
Given the number of influences on bargaining power, and the degree to which they are 
inter-related, it is clear that any investigation of the extent to which unions have preserved 
power in what Lukes (1977) would define as the primary dimension, is likely to be difficult. 
Examples of where the. employer chose to derecognise unions in response to their 
involvement in merger (where there was a clear change in power towards the employer) 
were confined to relatively small employers (like the North of England Building Society) or 
to groups of managerial employees (like those at Unilever). The degree to which a culture 
of collective representation was prevalent in areas which were derecognised during or after 
the merger seems to be the key determinant in these cases. Moreover, there is some 
evidence that following a merger trade unions did become more resilient to attack firom 
employers. The survey recorded only two instances of derecognition by employers and, in
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one case, the union affected was able to secure recognition rights after a vibrant campaign 
for recognition. The survey did not record any instances where derecognition had been 
attempted by employers and successfully resisted by the merged union but the indication is 
that mergers did not generally signal to employers that they could take steps to remove 
bargaining rights. This might be seen in the context of a marked increase in derecognition in 
the late 1980s and 1990s and may be indicative of the merger deterring derecognition by 
employers.
Research conducted by McKay (1996) of the Labour Research Department (LRD) indicated 
that there was a significant increase in the incidences of union derecognition, particularly 
affecting manual workers and people working in the manufacturing and public sectors. The 
LRD survey indicated that union derecognition cases may have almost doubled between 
1992 and 1995 and that full, as opposed to partial, dercognition was on the rise. Whilst LRD 
concluded that low or falling levels of union membership remained the primary cause of 
derecognition, it is interesting to consider the link between the withdrawal of bargaining 
rights and the involvernent of the union in merger activity. LRD indicate that since the mid- 
1980s only four unions have had to deal with 50 or more cases of derecognition. Two of 
these unions, TGWU and the NUJ, have not been involved in major consolidatory merger 
activity but the other unions, GMPU and UNISON, have both utilised merger to shore up a 
declining membership. Whilst there will undoubtedly be sectoral determinants of the 
growth in derecognition cases involving particular unions (the significant spread of personal 
contracts in the print industry, for example) it may also be the case that unions have 
responded to falling membership with mergers and employers with derecognition, leading
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to a higher incidence of derecognition where unions have embarked on a merger. In the 
LRD survey 32% of respondents cited low union membership as the primary cause of union 
derecognition. In 1992, membership was cited by 29% of respondents. The survey found 
that the introduction of performance pay or personal contracts was given as the primary 
reason for derecognition in 29% of cases (compared with just 7% of cases in 1992). None of 
the respondents indicated that union involvement in merger activity had had any impact on 
the decisions by employers to withdraw bargaining rights.
Research on union derecognition between 1988 and 1994 conducted by Gall and McKay 
(1994), suggests a strong sectoral dimension to decisions to derecognise. Provincial and 
national newspapers, magazines and books, ports and shipping, public sector, electricity and 
water supply and the on-shore oil industry are identified as the main areas of derecognition 
and falling levels of union membership was again cited as the primary determinant. A move 
to performance based pay and derecognition, linked to a wider dispute over terms and 
conditions, were the other main reasons given by employers for union derecognition. 
However, the research also found that a significant numbers of employers moved towards 
bargaining with a single union. (Unfortunately the material does not distinguish between 
moves to negotiate with a smgle body tbllowing a merger and those which followed an 
employer instigated simplification of bargaining arrangements.)
It can be argued that in relation to the other two dimensions of power identified by Lukes 
(1977) the unions may have extended their influence tinough mergers. Lukes defined his 
second dimension of power in relation to the seminal work by Dahl "Who Governs?"
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(1961). Dahl (op. cit.) argued that the ability to get things on the agenda for a discussion 
was a clear demonstration of power in itself because it controlled whether or not the issue 
became the object of power relations in the primary dimension. In this respect, the provision 
o f personal, non-work related benefits by the merged union is a key indication that unions 
increased their power post merger. Whilst the effect of mergers on member benefits in the 
primary sphere of power is difficult to measure, unions were able to improve employee 
welfare outside that forum through the provision of a comprehensive range of services for 
members ranging from legal to financial, educational and promotional The research 
showed that in every single case a merger between unions had led to a levelling up or 
improvement in the range o f personal services on offer to members. In cases where a 
smaller union amalgamated with a larger body the result was a huge increase in the range of
I
membership benefits provided and in many cases the formation of a new, consolidatory 
organisation was accompanied with an extension of personal services for individual 
members. This can be explained in part by the fact that as membership levels increase 
through mergers there is scope for the unions to negotiate with service providers in order to 
extend the range of services on offer to members even more.
Finally,-the increase in mergers has beehThâtcHêd' by ah”increase in the political activity o f 
unions. In general unions have sough to exploit the strong commitment to social 
partnership, collective consultation and negotiation that is prevalent in the EU and which 
underpins most European employment law. Given the greater access to financial and 
organisational resources and wider membership, within a merged union friere is more 
opportunity to fund initiatives aimed at influencing the political environment in which they
289
operate. Increased involvement with the European Parliament was a common outcome of 
the large consolidatory merger and merged unions tended to sponsor more MPs and allocate 
a greater level of resources to campaigning and lobbying activities than other unions. The 
success of the unions’ campaign against post office privatisation is one indicator that unions 
are becoming more effective in this area. Lukes (1977) defines the third dimension of power 
as that focused upon the pohtical and economic environment in which decisions are taken. 
In concentrating resources on lobbying Westminster and Brussels the unions are clearly 
engaged in trying to create a more amenable or less hostile environment in which they 
might operate. In extending this activity either directly through the sponsorship of MPs and 
MEPs, or indirectly, through lobbying and campaigning, mergers can be held to have a 
positive impact on influencing the pohtical and economic environment in which bargaining 
takes place (the third dimension). .
The trend in union mergers reveals that unions have largely responded to a hostile 
environment by seeking to preserve their current influence and position rather than embark 
on a strategy o f growth and expansion through merger. Nevertheless, mergers may have 
been instrumental in, if not extending union power, at least preserving the status quo in 
power relations in a difficult bargaining environment. In addition,lnergers may be seen as 
having a much clearer impact on increasing power in the second and third dimension. The 
provision of a wider range or quahty membership services and more activity (and success) 
in seeking to influence the economic and pohtical environment through campaigning and 
lobbying activity, particularly in Europe can both be seen as ways in which unions have 
increase their power post merger.
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Whilst the increase in union mergers did not result in an engine for union growth to extend 
their influence into new industrial and commercial sectors, it seems it was a mechanism for 
preserving status and influence over the bargaining agenda In part this strategy depended 
upon the new organisation being more efficient than its component parts. It may be 
anticipated that some degree of efficiency would result from the savings arising from the 
provision of services to a larger number of union members and the removal of duplicated 
functions and services from the new organisation. The desire to capitahse upon economies 
of scale was a key driver for a union’s involvement in merger activity. The efficiencies 
resulting from economies of scale were also the driving force behind the concept of a 
federated union structure, in which unions maintained independence whilst they shared 
union services like education and research. However, it is the question of whether or not the 
merger can deliver efficiency gains over and above those resulting directly from the merger 
which may be more interesting.
Efficiency Reviews
The survey investigated the degree to which unions had used the merger process to 
introduce ongoing organisational development into the structure of the new organisation. 
Whether unions had been able to build upon the process of change and development which 
inevitably resulted from a merger to extend economies beyond the areas directly affected by 
a merger was of particular interest during this research. Similarly the extent to which this
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process could described as ongoing was also of interest. If a union could harness the engine 
of change sparked during the merger to develop more efficiently in future then one might 
argue, this process of continual improvement (resulting from a merger) could be more 
important than the merger itself.
From the outset this study suggested that involvement in a merger may present trade union 
with the opportunity to review organisational efficiency by unfreezing resistance to change 
within partner unions. It was suggested that merger partners might take the opportunity to 
conduct a review of organisational efficiency during the merger process, and in some 
circumstances, this may stretch beyond the confines of the areas of the organisation affected 
by the merger. Four distinct categories of union organisational reviews were identified -  
minimal, focused, broad and ongoing. In the first two types the efficiency review was 
imposed by one of the parties upon the other. In “minimal” reviews, rationahsation would 
be imposed on one party with the aim of eradicating any duplication of functions and 
services in the new organisation. The partner would be required to review organisational 
efficiency but this would not be against specific targets or budgets set by their merger 
partner. Reviews which were accompanied by such targets and were similarly imposed by 
one party on the other were described as ^focused”. Again these reviews were limited to the 
area or section of the union where the merger had a direct impact. A “broad” efficiency 
review, the third category, would be a general review of organisational efficiency that 
covered the entire organisation following a merger conducted jointly by the parties to the 
merger and including areas not affected directly by the merger. However the review would 
be directly connected to the merger and there would be no arrangements for it to be
292
ongoing.. The fourth category of review were those where the merger was the catalyst for 
ongoing organisational development following a merger, In the creation of the PTC from 
the ERSF and NUCPS amalgamation, for example, the facility for an annual review of 
organisational efficiency was written into the constitution of the new organisation. This 
ensured that the organisational benefits of the merger extended beyond the immediate 
period of the merger. The facility for reviewing organisational structure afforded by the 
merger was harnessed in such a way as to create the opportunity for an ongoing efficiency 
review in the union.
The study revealed that 47% of the unions surveyed had identified the opportunities for 
efficiencies and change afforded by the merger process and introduced one of the four types 
of efficiency review (minimal, focused, broad or ongoing) to accompany the merger 
process. This is not to suggest that the other unions chose to ignore the possibilities to 
promote greater efficiency, radier that in many circumstances die size of the merger partners 
meant that it was not practicable to formally review efficiency with designated processes 
and structure. Nevertheless, there may have been some cases for conducting an efficiency 
review of the organisational structure that were neglected. Those union mergers forming 
(and those subsequentiy involving) the MSF were unlikely to involve an efficiency review 
and the GMPU suggested that the questions relating to efficiency reviews suggested a 
general misunderstanding of the merger concept and, in contrast to the majority of unions, 
reported that reviews had not been a feature of their merger. In these circumstances the 
merger process seemed to concentrate purely on integrating separate organisations. The 
benefits of the merger were expected to stem solely from future savings in relation to
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economies of scale / shared servicescombined with the opportunities to organise 
membership in new and expanding companies that were often hostile to bargaining with a
umon.
In contrast there were unions which did conduct an efficiency review to accompany the 
merger and maintain the review so it became an ongoing component of the new 
organisational structure. In around 20% of mergers where a review was hosted, it was 
suggested that it was a one-off exercise confined to the area of the union directly affected by 
the merger and imposed by one party on another. Ihe development of the white collar 
section of the EEPTU, where incoming staff associations were subject to stringent 
efficiency tests, can be seen as an example of this. The incoming SA or union underwent a 
review at the behest of the larger union to ensure that it was an efficient organisation prior 
to the merger being concluded. Thereafter, the management of future reviews transferred to 
the members of the new section itself Several sections maintained the review process, 
others dropped it altogether.
The second type of efficiency review (focused) was also imposed by one party on the other 
and was conducted as a one-off exercise rather than an ongoing  ^process. During the merger 
talks between the NUR and the NUS, the TGWU and UCATT, and to a lesser extent 
between the IRSF and the NUCPS one partner was obliged under the terms of the 
agreement to undertake an efficiency review in order to meet stringent financial targets. In 
these cases, die junior partner were also required to reduce overheads and staffing levels and 
to record a financial surplus prior to the merger being conducted. This strategy stemmed
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from concern in the membership of one union that merger with an partner with unsound 
finances would be impractical for the new organisation. The imposition of financial and 
organisational targets in these reviews differentiated them from the general (minimal) 
reviews also imposed by one party on another.
Broad reviews, covering an entire organisation and conducted jointly by partners, but where 
the facihty for reviews was not ongoing covered several of the consohdatory mergers that 
were investigated. The merger between the AEU and the EEPTU, for example, 
encompassed a jointly conducted efficiency review but there were no arrangements for the 
review to extend beyond the period in which the merger was conducted. Similarly, the 
structure of UNISON organisation was partly the result of a comprehensive review. This 
was conducted with the involvement of all the partners to the creation of the organisation 
but it was not to be an ongoing feature of the new union.
Ostensibly the most popular kind of efficiency reviews identified by respondents in the 
survey were those which covered the entire organisation and were conducted on an ongoing 
basis. These survey responses, indicating that the review process would be ongoing, were 
initially be treated with some suspicion. Some of the respondents suggested that the reviews 
were conducted on an ad hoc basis outside a formal structure. This gave rise to questions 
about the degree to which these reviews were linked to the merger process at all and indeed, 
whether the reviews actually took place or were sustainable. (It is unlikely after all that a 
union is going to admit to inefficient practice in such a survey.) In a minority of cases, 
however, an ongoing efficiency review process was huilt into the emerging organisation so
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that the organisational structure is reviewed regularly to ensure that it was still an 
appropriate model for the environment in which the union operates. The mergers which 
established the NCU in the Communications sector and the PTC in the Civil Service both 
embraced the opportunity to conduct regular and ongoing efficiency reviews.
There are several factors that seem to impact upon whether or not a union integrates an 
efficiency review process with the merger and, if it does, the type of review chosen. The 
culture of the organisations involved in the merger and the type of merger activity are two 
important factors that may influence the nature of reviews. The study showed that in 
consolidatory mergers (between unions operating in blue collar manufacturing industries) 
the merger was least likely to be accompanied by a review. In mergers involving the MSF 
and GPMU , for example, it was considered that the merger itself would generate sufficient 
savings and efficiency to justify the policy without further initiatives. In these instances a 
review was not conducted. A single, general efficiency re\new covering the areas of the 
union directly affected by the merger is usually prevalent where one of the parties is more 
powerful than the other and where this advantage is applied to impose efficiency targets on 
the partner. In doing so, the larger partner aims to protect itself from inefficiencies within
the^rnâllër organisation pârtaérTÀ' focused review in which one union seeks to impose a 
review against specific targets on its partner, is usually reserved for consolidatory mergers 
where the decline of one party is significantly in advance of the other. In these 
circumstances the union is generally seeking to protect itself from inheriting the problems 
of its merger partner and risking instability. A broad, jointly conducted review of the entire 
organisation will usually accompany a consolidatory merger where the partners are of
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generally equal standing. The review is conducted to establish a reasonably efficient new 
organisation which will protect the opportunities for stability or development. Finally, the 
ongoing efficiency review covering the entire organisation seems to be confined to white 
collar organisations (predominantly in the public or newly privatised industries) entering 
consolidatory mergers with a partner in a related industry but, crucially, where an 
opportunity for future union growth is anticipated in the sector. In the PTC the commitment 
to a regular organisational review forms a part of the union's constitution and in the NCU, 
the focus of reviews over the next three years was formulated at a special training course 
organised by Templeton college prior to the merger.
The support for the merger and the degree of opposition to it also has an impact on whether 
the merger is to be accompanied by an efficiency review. In mergers where there is 
opposition to the merger from either union activists seeking to preserve the union's 
independence or the regional officials of the union threatened by job losses or 
reorganisation, it is less likely that the unions involved will risk antagonising the situation 
by seeking to link a regular and ongoing efficiency review to the merger. Securing 
acceptance of the merger is in itself a significant achievement and'one that will consolidate 
the union’s immediate position. Similarly, where a union has courted and promoted a 
merger with a smaller but financially secure party it is unlikely to risk jeopardising the 
arrangement by insisting on the implementation of a focused efficiency review.
Finally, the terms of the merger agreement may also have some impact in determining the 
type and scope of any review. Given the level of uncertainty and insecurity which surrounds
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a merger it is not unsurprising that the merger process attracts a degree of sensitivity 
amongst the parties. Merger agreements can seek to address the concerns of union staff by 
safeguarding jobs, stipulate arrangements in relation to union assets and specify levels of 
membership subscriptions in the short term.
Whilst all these arrangements can facilitate the merger process by allaying the fears and 
concerns of those involved they can also limit the scope for efficiency reviews by protecting 
inefficiencies in the areas on which any review might focus.
The survey shows that a range of factors associated with the merger will determine the 
degree and scope of organisational development that is integrated into the merger process. It 
ranges from a complete absence of reviews to a comprehensive frumework for an ongoing 
reviews. Efficiency reviews have not delivered the full range of benefits available to unions 
embarking on a m^ger, partly because they have been rejected as a legitimate tool by some 
unions seeking to protect inefficiencies in powerful areas but also because of the scope and 
degree of regulation controlling the merger process. The initiation of an ongoing vehicle for 
organisational development, such as that adopted by the PTC, is very much the exception 
blit it surely offers ah example of how pragmatic policy formulation can offer long-term 
benefits in addition to those arising directly from the merger.
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Strength in Numbers - Closing Remarks and Directions for Future Research
One of the objectives of this study was to start to redress the balance of research into union 
mergers away from the causes and towards the process and consequences o f merger^ 
activity. I have attempted to examine the outcomes of union mergers in relation to union 
power in collective bargaining. The study has been difficult, not least because it is partially 
dependent on arriving at a workable definition of union power in which the components 
influenced by merger activity can be isolated and then measured. To construct a meaningfid 
model for union power in which all the components and interrelationships can be included 
has proven difficult. This difficulty is something I share with a number of academics who 
have attempted to define and measure power and whose work I reviewed earher. It is 
symptomatic of the difficulties inherent in the task that by far the most complex model 
constructed to measure union power could not be apphed in practice. The proponent, Martin 
(1986) was forced to rely on a series of case studies to arrive at his conclusions. Given the 
complexity of some of the models involved in the study and the difficulty in identifying and 
measuring the range of component factors (which may only have an indirect effect on 
power relations or impact only at the periphery) the study has stopped short of a fully 
integrated analysis of the relationship between union power per se and union mergers. The 
material on the merger process has not been integrated with the evidence relating to 
bargaining power and power relations. Moreover, there has been no formal attempt to link 
efficiency reviews, which as we have seen can be a determinant o f union power, to union 
mergers.
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The way in which the union involvement in mergers facilitated organisational reviews and 
legitimised rationalisation within the trade union was one of the more interesting aspects of 
this study. The existence of efficiency reviews conducted in conjunction with a union 
merger but often extending far outside the areas of the organisation directly affected by 
merger , was an unintended consequence of this study and one that would reward further 
research and investigation. The possibihty that one of the determinants of union power 
arising from involvement in a merger might be unrelated to the economies of scale 
delivered to a larger organisation is one of the key findings of this study. The fact that the 
relative power of newly merged organisation might relate less to its strength in numbers and 
more to a organisational consequence of the merger process is an exciting concept that 
warrants further discussion and research. The notion that it may be possible to realise some 
of the benefits of a merger without engaging in one may prove decisive if unions decide to 
move away from mergers as a means of shoring up their existing levels of membership and 
securing access to expanding areas of employment in the future.
One could speculate that there is a direct relationship between the process by which two 
organisations are integrated and the consequences of the merger in relation to trade union 
power. It seems teasôftâble to suggest that there is a direct relationship between the 
organisational process by which unions merge and the impact on power relations upon 
completion. One might even speculate that the more fully integrated the partner unions to a 
merger become (and the extent to which they form a new organisation and defiuie joint 
objectives and goals) the more powerful that organisation will be. However the complexity 
involved in investigating the dual effects of post merger activity have effectively prevented
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any objective analysis of the relationship between the processes and the consequences of a 
merger. This remains a neglected area by those who have conducted research in this area 
but it is undoubtedly of key importance in extending our understanding of the process and 
dynamics of union mergers. The relationship between process and power is, in effect, the 
key to understanding why mergers have had very different outcomes even where unions 
have embarked on a merger with similar motives and in similar economic sectors. It is, 
therefore, the key to understanding the factors which can determine a successful merger in 
which the parties, regardless of initial motivation, can use the process to extend and advance 
union power.
301
8. APPENDICES
APPENDIX ONE - UNION MERGERS 1988 TO 1997
Amalgamating Trade Unions Forming Registered
1988
Utd.Friendly Asst. Mgrs Assocn 
and Utd Friendly Divn and District 
Mgrs Assoc.
Utd. Friendly Divn and 
District Mgrs Assocn.
4.1.88
AUEW -  TASS and ASTMS and 
ASTMS
MSF 18.1.88
Assocn. of Lecturers in Colleges of 
Education in Scotland and 
Educational Institute of Scotland
Educational Institute of 
Scotland
23.3.88
Alliance BS SA and Leicester BS 
SA
Alliance and Leicester BS SA 9.6.88
Utd, Friendly Field Mgrs. And 
MSF
MSF 9.6.88
Imperial Supervisors Assocn. and 
MSF
MSF 9.6.88
Gter London SA and the GMB GMB 14.9.88
Preston and District Powerloom 
Overlookers and Blackburn and 
District Powerloom Overlookers 
Assocn
Blackburn and District 
Powerloom Overlookers 
Assocn.
17.10.88
C of E Children's Soc SA and MSF MSF 29.11.88
Assocn of HM Inspectors of Taxes 
and FDA
FDA 21.12.88
Gateway Building Society SA and 
Woolwich Ind. SA
Woolwich Ind SA 29.12.88
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1989
GMB and Apex GMB 1.3.89
Imperial Gp SA and MSF
Assoc of Scottish Local Govt 
Directors of Personnel and Fed 
Union of Management and 
Professional Officers
MSF 31.3.89
Fed Union of Managers and 
Professional Officers
20.4.89
NORSA (Northern Rock SA) and 
BIFU
BIFU 31.5.89
Assocn of British Professional 
Drivers and EEPTU
EEPTU
/
31.5.89
MODSAandEEPTU EEPTU 2^7.89
Springfields Foreman's Assocn and 
EEPTU
EEPTU 30.8.89
Nelson and District Power Loom 
Overlookers Soc and EEPTU
EEPTU 1.12.89
Gter London Senior Staff Guild 
and Fed Union of Management and 
Professional Officers
Fed Union of Management 
and Professional Officers
21.12.89
Nat Assocn of Senior Probation 
Officers and EEPTU
EEPTU 2942.89
f
1990
Nationwide Building Soc. SA and 
Anglia Building Society SA
Nationwide Anglia Building 
Soc SÀ
1.2.90
Nationally Intergrated Caring . 
Employees and EEPTU
EEPTU 1.5.90
National Union Of Labour 
Organisers and GMB
GMB 22.5.90 -
Law Society's Legal Aid SA and 
GMB .
GMB 12.6.90
North of England Building Society BIFU 27.7.90
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SA and BIFU
Health Visitor's Association and . 
MSF
MSF 22.8.90
Nat. Assocn of Fire Officers and 
EEPTU
EEPTU 31.8.90
Prison Service Union and EEPTU EEPTU 31.8.90
Assocn. of Agricultural Education 
Staffs and NATFHE
NATFE 4.9.90
National Unilever Managers 
Assocn and IPMS
IPMS 5.9.90
National Union of Railwaymen 
and National Union of Seamen
National Union of Rail, 
Maritime and Transport 
Workors
10.9.90
Institute of Journalists and EEPTU EEPTU 1.10.90
Television and Film Production 
Employees Assocn and EEPTU
EEPTU 1.11.90
National Union of Hoisery and 
Knitwear Workers and National 
Union of the Footwear and Allied 
Trades
National Union of Knitwear, 
Footwear and Apparel Trades
19.12.90
Haslingden and District Power- 
Loom Overlookers Soc & 
EEPTU
EEPTU 27.12.90
National Assocn of PowerrLoom _ 
Overlookers and EEPTU
FFPTT T -------- 27 rl“2:90--------
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1991
Assocn of Cinematograph, 
Television and Allied Technicians 
and Broadcasting and 
Entertainment Trades Alliance
BECTU 2.1.91
National Assocn. of Colliery 
Overmen Deputies and Shotfirers 
(Staffs) and National Association 
of Colliery Overment Deputies and 
Shotfirers (Midlands)
National Assocn of Colliery 
Overment and Shotfirers 
(Midlands)
2.1.91
National Union of Tailors and 
Garment Workers and GMB
GMB 31.1.91
PMB SA and IPMS IPMS 22.2.91
Wire Workers Union and Iron and 
Steel Trades Confederation
Iron and Steel Trades 
Federation
9.4.91
Society of Graphical and Allied 
Trades 1982 and National 
Graphical Assocn.
Graphical, Paper and Media 
Union
30.9.91
Australian and Mutual Provident 
Society SA and MSF
MSF 3.12.91
Colne and District Power-Loom 
Overlookers Assocn and EEPTU
EEPTU 24.12.91
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1992
British Cement Staffs Assocn and 
EEPTU
EEPTU 30.3.92
Assocn of Health Service Officers 
andNALGO
NALGO 7.4.92
AEU and EEPTU AEEU 1.5.92
Town and Country Building 
Society SA and Woolwich 
Independent SA
Woolwich Independent SA 4.12.92
1993
Yorkshire Association of Power- 
Loom Overlookers and TGWU
TGWU 22.1.93
Assocn of Staff of Probation and 
Bail Hostels and AEEU
AEEU 3.2.93
Association of Preparatory 
Workers and AEEU
AEEU 23.4.93
NALGO, NUPE and COHSE UNISON 6.5.93
A. Monk and Company and AEEU AEEU 13.5.93
National Association oTColliery 
Overman Deputies and Shotfirers 
(N-West)and National Assocn of 
Colliery Deputies and Shotfirers 
(Yorks)
National Assocn of Colliery 
Deputies and Shotfirers 
(Yorks)
3.8.93
Hospital Physicists Assocn and 
M S F ' -  "
MSF
.  _______________
Lancashire Box Packing Case and 
General Woodworkers Friendly 
Relief and Sick Superannuation 
and Burial Society and TGWU
TGWU 16.9.93
Furniture, Timber and Allied 
Trades Union and GMB
GMB 16.11.93
National Union of Scalemakers 
and MSF
MSF 8.12.93
306
1994
Cream Research Staff Assocn and 
MSF
MSF 23.6.94
NUM (Yorks Area) and NUM NUM 17.8.94
1995
National Communications Union 
and Union of Communication 
Workers (Engineering and 
Clerical)
Communication Workers 
Union
25.1.95
Electrical and Plumbing Industries 
Union and TGWU
TGWU 9.6.95
Film Artistes Assocn and BECTU BECTU 7.7.95
NUM (Lancs Area) and NUK NUM 10.8.95
Professional Association of 
Nursury Nurses and Professional 
Association of Teachers
Professional Association of 
Teachers
4.9.95
1996
NUCPSandlRSF Public Services, Tax and 
Commerce Union
01.01.96
Scottish Health Visitors Assoc UNISON • 01.05.96
Procurators Fiscal Society FDA 19.06.96
NUM (COSA) Region 5 NUM (COSA) Région 4 ' 06.08:96
Rossendale Union of Boot and 
Slipper Operatives
National Union of Knitwear 
Footwear and Apparel Trades
27.09.96
North of Ireland Bakers 
Confectioners and Allied Workers 
Union
Bakers Food and Allied 
Workers Union
31.12.96
Leeds Permanent Building Society 
SA
Independent Union of Halifax 
Staff
31.12.96
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APPENDIX TWO - RESEARCH METHODS
The research conducted for this study comprised a questionnaire survey supplemented by 
both interviews and cases studies. The way in which the research was conducted is outlined 
below.
The first stage of the research was to identify the ^propriate group of respondents in order 
to obtain relevant and accurate information. Given the degree of change in both the labour 
market and trade union organisation, it was felt that the research should be closely focused 
on mergers that took place recently. It was also felt that the inclusion of mergers that 
happened some time ago in the sample, would make it difficult to obtain accurate 
information. This was partly because the individuals directly involved in the merger 
process, (and targeted in the research), would have moved on to new posts and partly 
because, given the frailty of human memory, the time since the merger would not be 
conducive to receiving accurate information about the merger. The passage of time and 
ongoing developments in bargaining focus and structure would make it extremely difficult 
to disassociate the ongoing effects of the merger firom the range of other influences and 
factors affecting union power.' Therefore, it was decided that the study would focus on 
mergers that had been completed since 1988, starting with the influential TASS/ASTMS 
merger of August that year. It is an indication of the sheer scale of merger activity during 
the late Eighties that over sixty mergers occurred in the period 1988 to the end of 1996. 
Large scale mergers, covering thousands of members, such as the merger between the AEU 
and the EEPTU or between the COHSE, NALGO and NUPE, were obviously included. The
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mergers and transfers of engagements involving both trade unions and staff associations 
were also considered. Focusing on the responses from those trade unions that had recently 
been involved in a merger provided a useful and self contained group for the survey 
exercise given the nature of the research. However, it would not be acceptable to 
concentrate solely on the union for an assessment of the effect that the merger had on union 
power. Respondents who were by the nature of their position supportive of the merger may 
be prone to exaggerate its effects. Moreover, since the studies of power that we have 
reviewed indicate that the outcome of contested decisions is a standard barometer of power, 
it may be placing an unreahstic expectation of objectivity from both unions and employers 
to admit that they failed to secure their objectives in bargaining. Since the concept under 
investigation was essentially the change in union power resulting from a merger, it was 
decided that the employer or company should also be included in the exercise. This would 
act as a control for union responses by confirming outcomes and also acting as a indicator 
of the need, where there was inconsistency in responses, to examine the responses in the 
light of other sources. In theory, at least, as a result of the collective bargaining process, the 
employer will be ideally placed to assess the degree to which unions have grown more 
powerful in the bargaining arena as à result of their involvement in mergers.
To a large degree then, the pool of trade union respondents for this research defined itself. 
Restricting the mergers to be investigated to those that occurred since 1988 restricted the 
number of unions to be surveyed to fifty-five. Some unions were involved in several 
mergers and some mergers that were underway, but not yet completed at the time of the 
survey, were also included.
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Where a merger involved the transfer of less than 50 members to a new organisation, or a 
merger of two independent sectors of the same union, (i.e. geographical regions of the 
NUM), these were not usually included in the survey. The selection of trade unions also 
determined the selection of employer respondents. Where the unions involved in mergers 
negotiated with a single employer, the respondent was easily identifiable. Otherwise two 
employers who had members in the unions engaged in a merger were selected. The 
selection criteria were generally applied those companies with a large number of members 
(100 plus) in a particular union pre-merger. In many cases, the union was approached 
independently and questioned about the companies in which membership of the merger 
partners had been concentrated. Finally, some employer respondents were selected 
randomly. In the public sector, which has been subjected to numerous re-organisations and 
restructures since 1988, the respondents were selected entirely at random. Potential 
respondents in the NHS, Local Government and some parts of the Civil Service were 
contacted by telephone with details of the project. When two contacts for each merger 
agreed to participate in the survey they became the potential respondents. An outline of 
employer respondents is printed in Appendix 4 and it illustrates the wide range of sectoral 
and organisational views that were canvassed in the research.
A better response rate was expected fi*om the trade unions directly involved in a merger than 
firom employers who were not directly involved. In order to address this, only in 
circumstances where the union merger mirrored a merger between the employers was a 
single employer accepted as a the employer respondent for that merger. Where an employer 
selected on the basis of pre-merger membership or randomly failed to respond to the survey,
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another respondent was selected. This ensured that in relation to the majority of mergers the 
study, the views of at least two employers were collated to obtain a balanced employer 
view. Where the relevant staff associations merged to reflect a merger between employers, 
for example, the merger between the Nationwide and Anglia Building Societies or the 
AUiance and Leicester Building Societies, a single employer response was held to be 
adequate.
Pilot Exercise
Once the pool of respondents had been identified the draft questionnaire was compiled and 
piloted amongst a sub-group of both unions and employers. The selection of the pilot group 
was based on an established network of personally known contacts within particular unions 
and employers. Ten unions including BIFU, IPMS, CWU, NUCPS and the TGWU were 
included in a pilot group with around 10 major employers including British Telecom, 
Rover, ICI and Nissan. In addition, the views of the organisations representing unions or 
employers collectively, who wOuld not be respondents in the survey, were also sought. The 
TUC, CBI, Institute of Personnel and Development and the Engineering Employers' 
Federation were all included in the pilot exercise. The response rate for the pilot exercise 
was very high. Comments from all but three non respondents were incorporated into a 
revised questionnaire.
The survey was conducted in June and July 1995. A named respondent from each of the 
organisations identified as the sample was sent a questionnaire and a stamped, addressed 
envelope.
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This was followed by a reminder letter which was sent out to those who had not responded 
some six weeks later. Organisations who had not responded after a further two weeks were 
contacted by phone. The exercise was completed by mid-September. The only exceptions to 
this pattern were employers in the printing industry (whose views on the SOGAT/NGA 
merger were sought). Initially, the response of the Print and Paper Manufacture Industry 
Federations was sought but this body advised that, given the trend in local bargaining in the 
sector, a more robust response might be achieved by surveying the employers directly. 
Employers in the printing sector were surveyed in September 1995.
The Questionnaire Survey
In total of 156 questionnaires were sent out to representatives of employers and trade 
unions. Every effort was made to keep the questionnaire easy to complete in order to 
achieve a respectable response rate. However, the range of issues to be covered, 
(background information, indicators of union power etc.), necessitated a fairly lengthy 
questionnaire. Although there were some areas of commonality between the questions 
posed of unions and employers, it was decided that a different questionnaire was necessary 
for employers and for the unions. Tfte unions were expected to respond on the merger 
process and the internal effect of the merger on organisational structure (and its effects on 
collective bargaining and individual services). Both unions and employers were surveyed 
on the external effects of the merger on collective bargaining and the bargaining structure 
and outcomes, both pre and post merger.
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The Employer Questionnaire - The employer respondent was asked to complete details 
on all aspects of collective bargaining prior to the merger including details on levels of 
membership, facilities provided to the union (time off for members and officials, office 
facilities etc.), the structure of bargaining (national, local etc.) and the degree to which 
full-time officials were involved in the process. The attitudes of ençloyers to the union 
merger were then investigated in the context of their response to the union decision to 
embark on merger. Employers were required to rate a series of potential benefits, such as 
more stable industrial relations or more moderate pay claims arising from the merger 
alongside the potential disadvantages arising from the merger (such as, an increase in 
union influence or the prospect of more industrial action). Employers were also required 
to rate their general hostihty to, or support for, the merger. The focus of the first section 
of the questionnaire was to obtain information on the climate of bargaining immediately 
prior to the merger. The employers’ perception of union power in the first dimension, that 
of collective bargaining, was investigated.
The way in which employers anticipated changes post-merger was instrumental in 
investigating power relations in collective bargaining and industrial relations after the 
merger. The survey focuses on the structure and scope of bargaining machinery, (and not 
just outcomes), in this section. It investigates and attempts to measure the shift in power 
relations to the second dimension of power - control of the bargaining structure and agenda.
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The shift in the focus of power relations may be instrumental in indicating the employers 
perspective on the merger.
An employer may attempt to respond to an increase in union power in the first dimension, 
(bargaining outcomes), by seeking to constrain union power by curtailing the bargaining 
agenda and controlling the environment in which the union can exercise any new bargaining 
power. The most extreme form of this response to an increase in union power would be 
union derecognition. An employer who viewed the merger with some trepidation fearing 
more successful union outcomes in the primary dimension of power through more success 
iu industrial action, wage claims etc. could reflect this awareness of increased union power 
through concentrating on a second dimension of power relations. Alternatively, where an 
employer indicates support for the merger on the grounds of stability and a more 
professional, well organised union this might be reflected in the employer seeking to 
concentrate power relations in the collective bargaining arena (first dimension) and not 
manipulate bargaining through the control of the agenda. Depending upon the employers’ 
perception of union power after the merger, the focus of the study may be on the primary 
bargaining agenda or the secondary dimension of power, bargaining structures and agenda.
Employers were asked to assess how power relations had developed post merger and to 
assess this in relation to changes in the scope of bargaining and the scope of successful 
outcomes by the union. The level of union activity and membership, the depth and scope of 
the bargaining agenda and the level of facilities were all investigated and contrasted with the 
information supplied on bargaining before the merger. Employers were then asked to
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evaluate changes in bargaining and power relations between the employer and unions after 
the merger.
Finally, the third dimension of power relations was investigated. The degree to which power 
was exercised over the socio-pohtical environment in which bargaining occurs and in which 
agendas are formulated was investigated. The effect of the merger on political institutions 
and on areas such as company aims, organisation, performance, were all assessed in the 
closing questions of the survey. Whist it would be difficult to explore fully areas of this 
complexity within the context of a questionnaire a response indicating some impact on these 
areas could be picked up and reviewed in the follow-up interviews. The questionnaire ended 
with the opportunity for the employer to include any other information that might prove 
useful to the study.
The Union Questionnaire - The opening questions in the questionnaire directed at the 
trade unions relate to the status of the union contact and the position of the union prior to 
the merger. The questionnaire then concentrated on identifying the background of the 
decisionYo embark on a merger and the internal hrq)etus for the policy. The degree of 
unity in relation to the merger policy, both within and between, the merger partners was 
explored. The focus of any opposition to the merger was investigated. Respondents were 
required to rate the primary motives underpinning the decision to enter a merger. In 
identifying the motives underpinning the merger, the survey aimed to examine the
315
priorities and objectives of the new organisation. It also provided some indication of the 
pre-merger status in relation to union power in collective bargaining.
Where a union entered a merger defensively to shore up a declining membership base then, 
clearly, its aims and objectives differed from where the merger is the product of two bodies 
coming together from a position of security to consohdate their position before a decline in 
membership occurs (Undy's (1981) "consohdatory" merger).
The questionnaire then assessed the way in which the merger has been organised. The 
timetable for the integration of the partner organisations and the realisation of potential 
savings from union assets was investigated. These factors should provide some indication of 
union power in the bargaining arena, the primary dimension of union power. Whether a 
union embarked on merger to take on a larger membership and more employees and 
resources may have indicated a potentially more powerful result in terms of successful 
outcomes in bargaining. Where a union halted an internal organisational decline through 
merger, this may also have demonstrated an increase in bargaining power (even if the 
organisation simply preserved the status quo post merger). Where a union embarked on an 
aggressive merger policy and taken on additional costs and responsibility, this may have 
been indicative of a less powerful performance in the bargaining arena, at least in the short 
term.
An entire section of the union questionnaire was dedicated to an examination of trade union 
reviews. The timetable, scale and terms of reference for the review were investigated
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together with some indication of where the impetus for the review came from and the 
degree of unity within the merged organisation on the question of the review process. Any 
efficiency gains arising from the reviews together with some indication of whether the 
reviews are to be ongoing, were to be examined. This section of the questionnaire was 
designed to shed some light on the degree to which efficiency reviews dehvered the 
efficiency gains in a merged organisation. It was also designed to investigate whether the 
perceived organisational benefits often attributable to mergers, in fact arose from a series of 
ongoing reviews. In other words, whether the benefits of a union merger arose from the 
merger itseü or from the efficiency reviews that are legitimised by the merger process was 
investigated.
Finally, the questionnaire focused on the post-merger power relations that affected the 
organisation. The levels of union membership and number of branches and full-time 
employees were considered and unions were asked to provide an illustration of the increase 
or decrease in membership services following the merger. These factors were all seen as 
having a significant effect on power relations in the primary dimension of power, the 
bargaining arena. More union members, better organised and informed, with greater 
resources and expertise to call upon could have a positive impact on outcomes. The range of 
issues covered in collective bargaining, whether the union has secured any advantages in 
relation to the agenda and the structure of bargaining, may all be indicative of changes in 
power relations in the second dimension. The union's number of sponsored MPs and the 
level of involvement with the European Parhament were considered at the close of the 
questionnaire in order to examine the impact of the merged organisation on the third
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dimension of power, concentrating on the socio-political environmental determinants of 
power.
The first section of the questionnaire was designed to investigate the degree to which the 
union had capitalised on the organisational benefits of a merger. The second section was 
designed to illustrate the degree to which the merger has affected individual membership 
services, numbers and resources and the impact of this on the first dimension of power. 
Studies of the collective bargaining agenda and structure, and the degree of political 
influence both in the EL) and Britain were a measure of change in power relations in the 
second and third dimensions. All of these factors might be reasonably expected to provide 
some insight into the question of how the merger has affected union power. As with the 
employer questionnaire, unions were afforded the opportunity to list any additional 
information at the close of the questionnaire.
Copies of questionnaires are contained in Appendix 2.
Level of Responses
The careful selection of the pool of respondents, combined with the structure of the 
questionnaire and a rigorous follow-up procedure, provided a very satisfactory response rate 
in the survey. A total of 156 questionnaires were sent out to both unions and employers, and 
of these, 89 or 57% were returned. Moreover, 57 or 37% were returned fully completed
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with a response to each question detailed on the form. Thirty two questionnaires (21%) 
were returned partially completed.
Surprisingly, given that the survey dealt with union mergers, the response rate from the 
unions was sUghtly lower than that amongst the employers, although the quality of the 
responses (in terms of the number of fully completed questionnaires) was significantly 
better. Fifty five questionnaires, covering all the important mergers since 1988, were sent to 
out to trade unions, of these 27 organisations or 50% responded. Fully completed 
questionnaires were returned in 23 or 41% of cases. Just 4 or 7% of the questionnaires were 
returned partially completed. This resulted in 27 or 85% of returns being completed to some 
degree.
Amongst employers the response rate was lower but still satisfactory. Of the 101 
questionnaires submitted to employers, 62 were returned and of these, 34 were fully 
completed. Twenty eight or 45% of the questionnaires which were returned were only 
partially completed.
The response rate in this study was significantly better than many of the other studies 
conducted in the industrial relations field Wiere responses of 25-30% are not uncommon. 
On the basis of a reasonably good response rate, the information obtained through this 
survey can be held to be a reasonable indicator of emerging trends from which some fairly 
robust indicators of power relations and union mergers can be drawn, Jhe survey responses 
also indicated those areas which needed to be clarified or followed up in interviews which
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were conducted subsequently and the degree to which responses m ight need to  be controlled
to take accounts o f  external determinants.
Follow-up Interviews
Given the range of issues and the complexity of the subjects under investigation in the 
study, the questionnaire was primarily designed to provide reliable core information on the 
motives and consequences of the merger process. Nevertheless, in the interests of clarity, it 
was useful to supplement the questionnaire responses with some interviews of key 
personnel involved directly in union mergers or exposed directly to the consequences in 
collective bargaining. Most of the interviewees were selected on the basis of their responses 
to the questionnaire and the questionnaire also formed the basis for many of the questions 
posed. A number of interviewees were selected to ensure that the study reflected a general 
overview of mergers since 1988, by taking accounts of development in mergers particularly 
in the Civil Service and Communications, which occurred after 1988. It was considered 
important to include information relating to important mergers that were underway when 
the survey was conducted but which were not completed until some time afterwards.
For the follow-up interviews with union representatives it was important to speak with 
individuals actually involved in a particular merger. Given the high degree of interchange 
and mobility amongst full-time union negotiators, the Head of Research in a trade union 
was a useful point of first contact. Generally speaking even if the personnel had changed 
since the merger, the Research Department had access to the original documentation dealing
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the merger process. Every effort was made to include interviews with the negotiators who 
has been directly involved in the merger process where this was possible. The questions 
posed during the interviews arose in part from the responses given in the questionnaire. 
Areas such as whether thé union had a policy on increasing or maintaining levels of 
membership through seeking involvement in merger were explored, together with the 
internal and external pressures for and against the merger, the structure of the merger 
process and at what levels and the degree of support and opposition to the merger. The 
reasons for entering mergers and the attitude of employers to mergers were also explored. 
The process by which a merger was conducted and the arrangements for a transitional 
period were covered as were the arrangements for any efficiency reviews conducted as a 
result of the merger. The organisation of the union following a merger, the affect of the 
merger on the range of individual membership services and the scope and goals of 
collective bargaining were considered in some detail.
For the employers survey the focus of the follow-up interviews was the Employee Relations 
Manager and the HR or Personnel Department. The focus of the interviews was on the 
outcomes of collective bargaining, changes and developments in bargaining structure pre 
and post merger and the impact of socio-pohtical factors on bargaining pohcy. Perceptions 
of union power were also a feature of the interviews. A summary of interviewees from both 
the trade unions and employers is included in Appendix Three.
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Analysis of the data - Controlling for External Determinants
The central difficulty of an investigation of the effects of union mergers on union power and 
collective bargaining is that there is an indeterminate number of potential influences on 
trade union power and collective bargaining outcomes. As we have seen in our review of 
the literature on power theories, the most comprehensive theory of power in the bargaining 
context, that developed by Martin (1986) allowed for so many potential determinants that it 
was never applied in a full study of union power. Similarly, the range of potential influences 
that may have an impact on bargaining outcomes makes any fully comprehensive study 
impossible. Pohtical, economic and industrial factors combined with developments in 
sector, occupational structure and even, the personahty of negotiators can all have a decisive 
impact on bargaining outcomes and the perception of relative power relations.
Ideally the solution to the degree of potential influences on bargaining would be to identify 
a single and comprehensive mechanism of control for the range of factors, other than 
mergers, which may affect union power. However, this is not possible given the range and 
variety of the factors involved, the relationships (and inter-relationships) between them and 
the fact tiiat many of the factors may be directly related to the union’s decision to merge. 
For example, the numbers of union members and officials, the structure of bargaining 
arrangements and the degree of political activity in which a union is involved may be 
determinants of union power, but they may also be indirectly affected by a merger.
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Therefore it has been decided to measure union power by analysing the consequences or 
outcomes of union power and controlling for the influences on power (other than mergers). 
In controlling for influences on bargaining outcomes, an estimation of impact of mergers on 
power can be estimated. However, this is fi^ught with difficulty. Factors impacting upon, 
for example, the increase in wages of a given group of employees will be numerous and 
inter-related. It is difficult to identify and then separate these factors from the effects of a 
merger. Moreover, a further complication arises because the ongoing effects of union 
mergers on outcomes are not separated from the general trend but contribute to the standard 
level of outcomes by which subsequent mergers are measured. For example, even if all the 
factors which affect an outcome could be isolated and the effects of the merger measured 
against a pre-merger baseline, then that baseline itself would have been affected by any 
mergers that had occurred prior to setting the baseline. If all the employees in the economy 
received a £5 per week increase on average and employees represented by a union involved 
in a merger received a £10 per week increase, a comparison would not be legitimate since 
the £5 increase itself would have been affected by previous involvement of other unions, (or 
indeed the same union) in merger.
Any system of control for a study of the impact of a single factor on union mergers will 
therefore prove imperfect. Nevertheless, an analyst can make a reasonable assessment of the 
impact of secondary factors on bargaining outcomes by controlling for the outcomes in 
three separate and distinct ways. Firstly by focusing on movements in general economic 
determinants, secondly on focusing upon factors which specifically affect the collective 
bargaining environment and thirdly, by focusing on specific sectoral developments.
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The impact of general economic factors on bargaining outcomes can be assessed in relation 
to the levels of unemployment and inflation, as indicative of changes in the economic cycle 
and the level of pay settlements. These factors can act as a baseline indictor for bargaining 
outcomes against which specific outcomes may be measured. The levels of employment 
and self employment 1984-94 suggests a general baseline against which union power can be 
assessed. It is reasonable to assume that against a backdrop of falling employment (1991- 
93) union power will be weaker and outcomes more unfavourable than in a period where 
employment is growing (1993 onwards). This is given additional weight by the fact that 
during the period under study the level of long-term unemployment (52 weeks or more) 
remained fairly stable at half a million. The long term unemployed are not assumed to place 
any pressure on union bargaining power given their relative ability to compete for work 
with unionised labour. An employer cannot therefore argue that union labour will be 
replaced unless restraint in union power is exercised. In contrast, a high level of short term 
unemployment which can compete for work does have an adverse impact on a union's 
ability to bargaining for improvements.
The picture is complicated by the changing patterns of employment over the period 1984- 
94. Full-time employment fell from 1989 onwards whilst over the entire period part-time 
employment levels increased. This may have had an indirect impact on trade union power 
because unionisation amongst those employed full-time in traditional areas of manual 
employment was strong, whilst among the emerging service sectors of the economy it was 
weaker. This was partly due to the flexible working patterns applied in these sectors, the
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temporary and transient nature of employment which made the workers difficult to 
organise, and partly because the majority of employees in the emerging sectors for 
employment were women with little history of trade union membership.
The average level of pay settlements, compared with the headline rate of inflation, over the 
period is a useful indicator of an average level of pay bargaining outcomes given that over 
50% of employees still have their pay determined by collective bargaining. If a union is able 
to achieve a healthy, above average increase post merger this may be indicative of a merger- 
related increase in bargaining power, (however, even here there will be other determinants 
and the average pay increase level will have been influenced by previous mergers). 
Nevertheless, the average levels of pay increase provide a single (although not exclusive) 
indicator against which the performance of unions involved in a merger may be assessed. 
The average level of increases used in this study are based on the median and inter-quartile 
increases of private sector employees so that the figures are not unduly distorted by any 
policy of public sector pay restraint.
The information contained in the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (Millward et al, 
1992) can provide a-usefid barometer of general changes in industrial relations structures 
and organisation against which the effect of those unions engaged in mergers can be 
measured. The survey data can be said to reflect the bargaining structures at the time of the 
study, falling as it does midway into the period of the study.
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Given the range of information presented in the survey, it has been necessary to select 
general indicators of union bargaining power from emerging trends in bargaining outcomes. 
For the purposes of this study it has been decided to focus on the following areas: 
bargaining machinery, the changes in bargaining structure, the scope and coverage of 
collective bargaining and the changes in union contact with outside officials. The survey 
records a general simplification of bargaining structure and a move towards single table 
bargaining arrangements which were supported by managers and generally opposed by 
trade unions. The maintenance of separate bargaining structure may therefore be held to be 
a reasonable indication of union power being exercised in the secondary dimension. The 
WIRS survey reveals a move by managers in the manufacturing sector to lessen the 
influence of union full-timers and replace this by arrangements focused on lay members of 
the union. In the service sector the opposite was reported, a move to integrate union 
professionals into the bargaining structure. Finally, the WIRS survey illustrates a general 
cross sector move to curtail the coverage of collective bargaining amongst professional 
occupations, (particularly for managerial groups and in newly privatised industry), and to 
narrow the scope of union bargaining to focus on pay and benefits, or in some cases only, 
on employee representation in relation to individual disciplinaries and grievances.
The data contained in WIRS has been criticised because, as a survey of employers and 
unions it exposed a degree of inconsistency between the responses of employers and unions 
(Wood, 1995). Conscious that this same criticism might also be applied to this study a 
decision has been made to assess the survey responses against the specific trends chosen as 
general indicators from WIRS, rather than to focus on the detailed responses from
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employers and unions. Finally as the WIRS survey suggests, at least in some areas of the 
study, the issues under investigation will vary according to the sector in Wiich the 
bargaining occurs. This is largely because sectors are subject to different economic 
pressures. A rise in interest rates disproportionately affects manufacturing for example, 
whilst the Government may use the pubhc sector as a lever in the control of inflation. 
Sectors are also subject to different levels of growth and expansion and responsible to 
different forms of regulation and legislative control. Put simply one sector may be growing 
whilst another (or even the whole economy) declines and so a study of bargaining outcomes 
must take some account of sectoral variation. I he deregulation of the finance sector in the 
mid-1980s resulted in an unprecedented expansion in the sector against the overriding 
economic trends affecting other employers.
For this reason, the information collected from the survey, already examined in relation to 
general economic influences (the general level of unemployment and the average increases 
in income against inflation), general trends identified in the WIRS study will also be 
examined in relation to a range of sectorally specific factors will be applied to the data in 
the investigation including income levels, legislative fi'amework and employment 
populations. The latter will facilitate an investigation of the more sector specific 
developments which may have an impact on union power but which may also be disguised 
in a general overview such as WIRS.
Whilst this complex frumework of control represents a reasonable attempt to provide a 
means of isolating the effect of union mergers, the variety of factors which may have an
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impact on bargaining outcomes, and the fact that these are themselves difficult to measure 
and interrelated, make any fully comprehensive and robust model extraordinarily difficult to 
construct and apply.
Case Studies
Given the complexities of constructing a workable model for assessing changes in union 
power, it was decided that the quantitative data from the questionnaire survey should be 
supplemented by with data from case studies which might provide more qualitative data and 
act as a further control for the conclusions of the survey. The case study mechanism offered 
the opportunity to challenge some of the information arising from survey respondents in 
relation to their subjectivity and, intentional or unintentional bias. The mechanism also 
offered a way of considering complex concepts of power and power relations on bargaining 
independently thereby avoiding the potential subjectivity of survey respondents.Conversely, 
conducting case studies in conjunction with a questionnaire survey offered the opportunity 
to escape the primary limitation of cases studies, namely that it is not always possible to 
generalise from the specific study to the general position (Daft 1982). The difficulties 
associated with generalising conclusions from a study were also addressed by conducting a 
dual study in unrelated economic sector. An approach supported by both Blau (1963) and 
later Powell (1990) amongst others. The adoption of the dual approach offers the 
opportunity for the researcher to compare and contrast the findings of the two studies. The 
obvious advantage of combining a questionnaire survey method with a series of case studies
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in tandem is that it allows the validity of findings to be checked against two very different 
forms of data collection.
In this investigation, the case studies were conducted by a close and ongoing examination of 
industrial relations within McVitie’s (UK) and Northern Rock Building Society operating 
in two different economic sectors. The studies involved close observation of bargaining 
processes, dynamics and outcomes over time supplemented by ongoing interviews with 
representatives jfrom management and employees, and with officials of the relevant unions. 
The results of the study were fed back to key personnel in both organisations to act as a 
check on the conclusions presented in each study.
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APPENDIX THREE : SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS 
Pilot Exercise
4 X Head of Research, Trade Unions (2 private sector, 2 public sector)
Ix Senior Research Officer, Trade Union 
Respondents from TUC, CBI, EEF and IPD 
Questionnaire Survey
9 X General Secretaries / Assistant General Secretaries, Trade Unions 
18 X National Officers, Trade Unions 
11 X Head of Research, Trade Unions
9 X Chairmen, Trade Unions
1 X Equality Officer, Trade Union
10 X Directors of Personnel / HR / Group HR Manager (Private sector)
11 X Head of Employee Relations / Employee Relations Managers (Private sector) 
9 X Personnel / HR Managers / HR Controllers (Private sector)
3 X Production Directors (Private sector)
9 X Head of Personnel / HR (Public Sector)
8 X Personnel / HR Manager
4 X Employee Relations Manager (Public Sector)
7 X General Manager (Public Sector)
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Follow-up Interviews
1
4 X Convenors/ Lay Officers,Trade Union
7 X Head of Research / Research Officers, Trade Union
2 X Equality Officer, Trade Union
3 X National Officer, Trade Union
2 X Head of HR/ HR Director (Private sector)
1 X Head of Employee Relations (Private Sector)
1 X HR Manager (Private Sector)
5 X HR/ Personnel Manager (Public sector)
2 X General Manager (Public Sector)
3 X Head of Research / Research Officer (Employer orgnisqdon)
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APPENDIX FOUR - EMPLOYER'S SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
The questions below refer to the merger or transfer of engagements
between_____________________(A) and_____________________ (B)
* Throughout the questionnaire 'Company' refers to a company or public sector 
organisation. Due to the range o f merger, transfer and co-operative arrangements 
employed by unions it has not been possible to design a questionnaire to cover each 
development. Please complete the questionnaire as fully as possible adding any explanation 
where necessary. Any information, no matter how limited, is better than none at all
Background Information
I. Name of Company  ....................................................... ..................
n. Type of business...,............................................................................
in. Name of recognised union (prior to merger).....................................................
IV. Name of recognised union (following merger)....................................................
V. Manager primarily responsible for collective
negotiations............... ...........................
VI. Name and position of person completing questionnaire.............................. ..............
VII. Telephone number...............................................................................
PART ONE - Collective Bargaining Pre-merger _ . . .
The questions in this section refer to a period prior to the trade union merger. (Where the 
company recognised two unions which subsequently merged to form a single body please 
give the details for both o f the unions.) Please estimate where accurate figures are not 
available.
Vin. What was the proportion of union members within the workforce (relating to the 
merger)? %
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EX. What occupations and grades did the union represent in the company?
X. What facilities did the company provide to the union? (Please tick) 
Time off for lay officers* Office facilities
Time off for members Check off facilities
* Please specify how much time-off was available and how many officers were 
eligible?
XI. At what level(s) was the majority of collective bargaining conducted within the 
company? (Please tick)
Multi-employer National/Whitley
Divisional/Agency Company/Trust
Plant Individual Contracts
XU. Were full-time officials present during negotiations? Yes/No/Sometimes*
* Please indicate which negotiations would involve full-time officials and which 
would be left to local stewards:
333
PART TWO - During the merger negotiations
Xin. Did the company see any of the following as advantages arising from the merger? 
(Please rank five in order o f importance - where 1 indicates the most important)
More stable industrial relations
Less complex/ more appropriate bargaining structure
More professional union services
More moderate pay claims
Union representation o fsta ff and supervisors (conflict o f interest)
Narrower bargaining agenda 
Union more representative o f employees 
Less industrial action
Less needfor company facilities (eg time-off)
More access to industry-wide comparative data 
Other (Please Specify)  .............
XTV. Did the company anticipate any disadvantages arising from the merger? (Please 
rank the top 5 in order o f importance - where 1 is the most serious disadyantage)
More powerful union
More industrial action
Greater access to comparative' information eg pay and conditions across the 
industry
More diverse bargaining agenda
More professional representation/More effective union presence
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Union less representative o f employees views
Less specific company knowledge amongst participants in negotiations 
Less shop-floor involvement in negotiations
More /Less influence o f professional, full-time officers (Please specify)
More /Less power in the hands o f local stewards (Please specify)
Union has more political influence (eg. support o f local MP)
More tribunal/legal activity
Other (Please Specify).............................................................
XV. Please indicate the company's support for, or hostility to, the merger process: (On 
the scale 1-5, outright opposition is indicated by 1 and full support for the merger 
process by 5).
1 2 3 4 5
XVI. Was your workforce, in your opinion, in favour of the merger? Yes / No
PART THREE - Collective Bargainipg Post-Merger
XVn. Did the number of union members or proportion of union members in the workforce 
change following the merger: (P/ease tick)
—  Increase “  décrété remain constant
XVCQ. What occupations and grades did the union represent after the merger:
XIX. Did the union merger have any impact on the collective bargaining agenda in the 
company? Yes/No
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Did the range of issues determined at plant level: Increase / Decrease
Did the range of issues determined at divisional level: Increase / Decrease
Did the range of issues determined at company/agency level: Increase/Decrease 
Did the range of issues determined at national/whitley level: Increase / Decrease
Which of the following facilities did the company continue to provide to the union 
following the merger? (Please tick)
Time off for lay officers* Office facilities
Time off for members Check off facilities
*Please specify how much time-off was available and how many officers were 
eligible:
IXX Please indicate the changes to the union's bargaining agenda in relation to the 
following areas after the merger (on a scale o f 1-5 where 1 indicates far more 
moderate claims following the merger and 5 indicates far more ambitious claims).
Pay claims 1 2 3 4 5
Hours o f work 1 2 3 4 5
Holidays 1 2 3 4 5
Pay o f managers 1 2 3 4 5
Equal Opportunities 1 2 3 4 5
Training Issues 1 2 3 4 5
Stress Management 1 2 3 4 5
Violence at work 1 2 3 4 5
Pensions 1 2 3 4 5
JQC, Has the union merger had any impact on the following areas? 
a,The aims of the company/organisation: Yes/No
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b.The structure of the company/organisation: Yes/No
c.The climate of collective bargaining: Yes/No
d.The performance of the company/organisation: Yes/No
d. The political environment in which you operate: Yes/No
Other information
XXI. Please include any other details that you think may be useful:
XXII. Are you prepared to be approached to be interviewed on the issues raised in this 
questionnaire? Yes/No.
Thank you for your time and co-operation.
Please return the completed questionnaire to:
Richrad Gartside 
Industrial Relations Department 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
Telephone: 0171 405 7686
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APPENDIX FIVE: TRADE UNION QUESTIONNAIRE
Please Complete the form in relation to the merger / transfer involving: 
______________________________ (A) a n d _________ ,____________________ (B)
(Since it is extremely difficult to design a questionnaire that is applicable to the fu ll range o f 
merger, transfer o f engagements and co-operative arrangements please complete the form  
as fully as possible and add explanations o f your answers where appropriate. Any 
information is far more useful than none at all. Thank you.)
Background Information
XXrQ. Name of organisation post-merger / transfer  ...........
XXTV. Name of Officers primarily involved in negotiations a).
b).
XXV. Name and position of person completing questionnaire...
XXVI. Telephone number......................... ................................
PART ONE - Pre-merger Information
XXVn. What occupations did the union(s) represent:
Union (A).......................................
Union (B).......................................
What proportion of members were working in the public and private sectors:
Union (A): Public % Private % Union (B): Public % Private %
XXVin. Date when merger talks first began  ........................................
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XXEX. Date merger completed..............................
XXX. Which organisation(s) initiated the merger.
XX?Q. What is your perception of the general attitude of the following groups in the
merger process. (Please indicate on a scale o f 1-5 where 1 indicates strongly in 
favour o f the merger and 5 indicates outright and public opposition)
First trade union
Union Officers (Regions): 
Union Activists: 
Membership:
Partner(s) in merger
General Secretary:
Union Activists: 
Union Membership:
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Pro Anti
1 2 3 4 5General Secretary:
National Executive Committee: 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Head Office): 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 .5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
National Executive Committee: 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Head Office): 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Regions): 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
XXXn. To what degree were the following groups united in their support of or 
opposition to the merger in your opinion. (Please indicate on a scale o f 1-5 
where 1 indicates complete unity and 5 indicates deep division.)
In the first trade union:
Unity Division
National Executive Committee (or equivalent): 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Head Office): 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Regions): 1 2 3 4 5
Union Activists: 1 2 3 4 5
Union Membership 1 2 3 4 5
In the merger partner(s):
National Executive Committee (or equivalent):
Unity
1 2
Division
3 4 5
Union Officers (Head Office): 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Regions): 1 2 3 4 5
Union Activists: 1 2 3 4 5
Union Membership: 1 2 3 4 5
XXXm. In your opinion how important were the following in initiating the merger 
process. (Please indicate on a scale 1-5 where 1 indicates very important 
and 5 indicates no importance whatsoever in the process.)
In the first trade union:
General Secretary
V. impt Not impt
1 2 3 4 5
National Executive Committee 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Head Office) 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Regions) 1 2 3 4 5
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Union Activists 1 2 3 4 5
Union Membership 
In the merger partner(s): 
General Secretary 
National Executive Committee 
Union Officers (Head Office) 
Union Activists (Regions) 
Membership
1 2 3 4 5
V.impt Not impt
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
XXXIV. From the point of view of the main instigators of the merger process
what were the three most important reasons underpinning the decision to 
merger. (Please place a number 1, 2 or 3 against the three major reasons 
where 1 indicates the most important reason, 2 the second and 3 the third 
most important.)
a.Fall in membership subs.
b Shrinking assets base .
c.Rising expenditure............
d.Improve bargaining structure...
e.Employer Pressure.............
f.New areas of membership.
g.Consolidation in industry.
h.Devolved bargaining........
i.Seek increased expertise....
j.Other reason 
(Please specify).
XXXV. Were the membership of both organisations involved in the merger or 
transfer balloted? Yes/No
XXXVI. Please indicate the balloting arrangements and the result:
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PART TWO - Organising The Merger
Please indicate the sequence in which the following developments following the approval of 
the merger in a ballot of union members. (Place a number 1-5 opposite the development 
where 1 indicates a development closest to the ballot and 5, one furthest from it Then 
estimate the time periodfrom the date o f the ballot at which the development occurred)
Sequence order 1-5 Estimated time since ballot
Joint NEC established:    ...:.
New rulebook / constitution drafted: ......... ..........................
Branch structure integrated: ......... ..........................
Merge union services: ......... ..........................
Set up joint head office:.................................. ......... ....................... .
XXXVII. Please indicate what happened to the majority of union buildings Wiich 
were not required by the union post-merger: (Please tick)
Leased Sold Put on Market (Not sold)
Other............
PART 3 - Organisational/Efficiency Reviews
Mergers are sometimes accompanied by an efficiency review separate from simply 
harmonising arrangements between the merger partners. For the purposes o f this 
questionnaire an efficiency review occurs when each o f the three elements listed below are 
present during a merger or transfer:
* a working party or consultant is charged with reporting on the aims, organisation and 
functions of the entire union (including areas not affected directly by the merger or 
transfer),
* a report recommends changes to the aims, organisation or functions of the union 
(including those parts not directly involved in the merger or transfer) which is accepted by 
the NEC,
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* a major change or series of changes occur in the aims, organisations or functions of the 
union which are not related in any way to the merger or transfer.
* reviews of union efficiency continue to be conducted following the completion of the 
merger, the establishment of a joint structure and rule book etc.
XXXVIQ. Was the merger process accompanied by a series of efficiency reviews? 
Yes/No
XXXIX. At what stage(s) were the reviews carried out from the date on which a 
ballot of members approved the merger: (Please tick)
6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months Other.
XL. Did the review cover (Please tick) : -The entire organisation (newly constituted)
-The partner union
(Please specify)..................................
-A section of the new organisation
(Please specific)  .
XLI. Who conducted the reviews?......................................................................
XLn. Who did the review team report to?...............................................................
XLin. Who set the terms of reference for the review?...................................................
XLIV. What did you perceive to be the attitude of the following groups to the
review process. (Please indicate on a scale o f 1-5 where 1 indicates strongly 
in favour o f the review process and 5 indicates outright opposition.)
In favour Opposed 
General Secretary; 1 2 3 4 5
National Executive Committee: 1 2 3 4 5
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Union Officers (Head Office): 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Regions): 1 2 3 4 5
Union Activists: 1 2 3 4 5
Union Membership: 1 2 3 4 5
XLV. How united were the various groups in their attitude to organisational or efficiency 
reviews in your opinion. (Please indicate on a scale 1-5 where 1 indicates total 
unity and 5 indicates deep division).
Unity Division
National Executive Committee: 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Head Office): 1 2 3 4 5
Union Officers (Regions): 1 2 3 4 5
Union Activists: 1 2 3 4 5
Union Membership: ' 1 2 3 4 5
XLVI. Can you provide an example of efficiency gains resulting from a review
which did not result directly from the merger or the transfer:
XLVn. Is the review process to be ongoing? Yes / No
If so, when? (Please tick)
Every 6 months Every 12 months
Every 2 years Other.........
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PART FOUR - Post-Merger Information
XLVin. What occupations does the union currently represent?..................................
What proportion of members currently work in die private and public sectors; C
Pubhc..., % Private............%
XLEX. Since the merger what has happened to union membership? (Please tick)
Increased Decreased Stabilised
XLX Since the merger what has happened to the number of union branches? (Please tick) 
Increased Decreased Not changed
Please indicate whether the following union services were available before and/or after the 
merger: (Please tick)
Before After
Free legal advice 
Education courses 
Death benefits 
Benevolent Fund 
Convalescent Homes 
Car Insurance 
t ravel discounts 
Credit card 
Insurance services 
Mortgages
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Car Breakdown 
Investment Advice
L. Please indicate what has happened to the range of issues covered by collective 
bargaining since the merger. (Please tick)
Increased Decreased Not changed
LI. Please indicate what has happened to the number of members per full-time 
professional officers (paid by the union) since the merger: (Please tick)
Increased Decreased Not changed
LB. Please indicate the number of MPs sponsored by the constituent unions and the 
merged organisation:
Union one  Union Two.......... Merged organisation.
Lni. Does the union have more involvement with the European Parliament or sister 
organisations on the continent since the merger? (Please tick)
More involvement Less involvement Not changed
Other information
Please include any other details that you think may be useful.
LIV. Are you willing to be approached to be interviewed on the issues raised in this 
questionnaire? Yes/No.
Thank you for your time and co-operation.
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